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Abstract 
Existing research suggests that availability of cognitive resources has a potentially 
significant impact on information processing capabilities. Circadian variations constitute one 
of the factors that are likely to impact on an individual’s availability of cognitive resources. 
Accordingly, this thesis sought to investigate the impact of circadian variations on 
information processing from the perspective of belief perseverance and framing effects. It 
comprises of three experiments that were conducted using a sample of students from 
Kingston University as the participants. Experiment 1 examined the influence of circadian 
variations on belief perseverance and the moderating impact of socially distributed thinking. 
The results reveal that participants tested at their circadian congruent times had significantly 
less belief perseverance compared to counterparts tested at their circadian incongruent times. 
Socially distributed thinking was also found to contribute towards a reduction in belief 
perseverance. Experiment 2 examined the influence of circadian variations on belief 
perseverance and type of reason given (supporting or disconfirming the belief) in a legal 
context. From the results, participants tested at their circadian congruent times reported 
higher mental alertness and greater task involvement compared to participants tested at their 
circadian incongruent times, but at a non-significant level. In addition, there was no 
interaction effect between time of testing and the type reason given on belief perseverance 
and confidence scores. Experiment 3 tested the effects of circadian variations on framing 
effects in the context of the Classic Asian Disease Problem, Lung Cancer and HIV Virus. 
Significant framing effects were found for participants tested at their circadian incongruent 
times. No significant interaction was found between framing and order of the frame. The 
thesis discussed the implications of the findings and offered recommendations.  
Keywords: Circadian Variations; Belief Perseverance; Cognitive Resources; Socially 
Distributed Cognition; Framing Effects. 
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Chapter 1: Introduction 
1.1 Study Background  
 
People undergo daily variations in their arousal levels that can affect cognitive functioning 
(Schmidt, Collette, Cajochen, & Peigneux, 2007). Some may reach their functional peak 
during the morning (morning people) and some in the evening (evening people). Research on 
circadian variations has established that synchrony between circadian type and time of testing 
matters for cognitive tasks requiring executive control and deliberative processes, but not so 
much for tasks that required intuitive and automatic processes (Yoon, May, & Hasher, 1999). 
Meanwhile, dual-process approaches to the study of judgement and decision-making has 
shown that people may produce judgements and make decisions using either deliberative, 
effortful processes or intuitive and associative processes (Kahneman, 2012). The research 
reported here explored whether or not people tested at their optimal time of the day will be 
more likely to rely on deliberative processes in judgement and decision-making tasks, 
compared to people tested at their non-optimal time of the day. Specifically, the work 
reported here examined the extent to which people’s tendency to demonstrate belief 
perseverance, framing effects and cognitive reflection would be influenced by circadian 
preference and time of testing. The research had three objectives: 
(1) To determine how circadian synchrony impacts individuals’ judgements. 
(2) To determine how circadian synchrony impacts individuals’ risk-taking.  
(3) To determine how circadian synchrony impacts individuals’ ability to suppress 
intuitive but erroneous answers in favour of a more reflective answer. 
1.2 Circadian Variations  
 
Individuals tend to experience patterns of arousal and dormancy that vary during the day 
on a relatively regular cycle. Such patterns are commonly referred to as circadian variations 
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or rhythms (Hornik & Tal, 2010; Dickinson & McElroy, 2012). They have also been 
described as the cycles that regulate a range of physiological processes, such as when to sleep 
or eat. These rhythms also determine when one’s peak and off-peak hours of performance are 
experienced during the day (Bechtel & Abrahamsen, 2010; Kyriacou & Hastings, 2010). The 
variations have been demonstrated in cardiorespiratory responses (e.g. heart rate and blood 
pressure), hormonal secretion (e.g. catecholamines and cortisol), metabolic variables (e.g. 
oxygen consumption and carbon dioxide output) and thermoregulatory variables (e.g. body 
temperature and blood flow) (Giacomoni, Edwards, & Bambaeichi, 2005).  
The wake-sleep regulation model suggests that the human circadian system involves two 
basic endogenous mechanisms: a self-sustaining endogenous circadian pacemaker (ECP), and 
a sleep-wake cycle (SWC). Each mechanism regulates specific functions, for example, ECP 
regulates body temperature, and rapid eye movement (REM) regulates sleep while SWC 
regulates sleep timing and slow-wave sleep propensity (Natale & Cicogna, 1996; Saper, 
Cano, & Scammell, 2005). Similarly, Buhr, Yoo, and Takahashi (2010) examined that 
circadian is driven by variations in body temperature; in which case, temperatures reach their 
peak levels at a certain point during the time of an individual’s optimal performance.  
 In terms of impact, circadian variations have been suggested to be one of the underlying 
causes of differences in individual performance for tasks that require working memory 
capacity, subjective alertness, visual attention and reaction times (Wright, Hull, & Czeisler, 
2002). Arousal levels are therefore likely to fluctuate in a regular pattern (Valdez, Ramírez, 
& García, 2012). Besides tasks that require working memory, circadian variations also have 
an influence on performance in other contexts, such as motor skills. Athletic performance 
has, for example, been found to be highest in the afternoon/early evening when most people 
have their core body temperature and metabolism at near peak values. In this case, circadian 
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variations have a significant influence on muscle strength and efficiency in terms of maximal 
voluntary contraction (Callard, Davenne, Gauthier, Lagarde, & Van Hoecke, 2000). 
 Research in the field of circadian variations further indicates that individuals do not 
generally share the same circadian patterns. Some are likely to reach their peak arousal levels 
during the morning hours, while others are more likely to be more alert during the evening 
hours. Such differences have led to the categorisation of individuals as either “early birds” 
(morning types) or “night owls” (evening types) (Stevens et al., 2011). In general, morning 
type people tend to perform better when they are subjected to tests in the morning rather than 
evenings. The pattern is reversed for evening type people, where better performance results 
are recorded in the evening (Ezzatian, Pichora-Fuller, & Schneider, 2010). Hence, this 
suggests that individual differences in circadian variations could be a contributing factor 
towards an individuals’ ability to perform a specific task.  
Physiological data provides reliable support for the morning and evening type persons 
arising from circadian variations. Natale and Alzani (2001) found that evening type persons 
on average reach the acrophase/peak of body temperature during the second half of the day. 
By contrast, morning type persons reach their peak level one to three hours earlier than the 
evening types. Similarly, Bailey and Heitkemper (2001) examined 19 subjects while 
Kudielka, Federenko, Hellhammer, and Wust (2006) analysed 112 subjects and found that in 
morning type persons the acrophase of melatonin occurred earlier than in the evening type 
persons. Acrophase, in this context, means the estimated peak time when melatonin, a 
hormone that is produced by animals and human beings, is responsible for the regulation of 
sleep and wakefulness (Natale & Alzani, 2001).  
Availability of cognitive resources during various times of the day has further been 
associated with the presence of circadian variations among individuals. More specifically, an 
individual at his or her optimal time of the day is likely to have more cognitive resources 
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available to undertake certain tasks (Dickinson & McElroy, 2012). During their non-optimal 
time, the individual will experience a shortage of cognitive resources, which, in turn, results 
in inferior performance. This is especially the case for tasks that require higher levels of 
cognitive efficiency (Natale, Alzani, & Cicogna, 2003; Schmidt et al., 2007). As an example, 
Bodenhausen (1990) and Bodenhausen, Macrae, and Sherman (1999) found that individuals 
are likely to depict social stereotyping during their non-optimal times. This observation was 
attributed to the lack of adequate cognitive resources that are required to correct the 
judgemental heuristic.  
In relation to real-life contexts, research has also shown that sleep-related car accidents are 
usually at their highest between 2am and 4am, when the majority of individuals have 
depleted cognitive resources after spending the earlier part of the day working (Lucidi, 
Mallia, Violani, Giustiniani, & Persia, 2013; Crummy, Cameron, Swann, Kossmann, & 
Naughton, 2008). Such incidents are linked to the view that, at circadian incongruent times, 
an individual’s visual attention, reaction times and recall memory are negatively affected 
(Wright et al., 2002; Horowitz, Cade, Wolfe, & Czeisler, 2003). In some extreme cases, 
performance dips in shift workers have been blamed for some of the major disasters in recent 
history such as the Exxon Valdez oil spill and the Chernobyl nuclear explosion (Coren, 
1996).  
1.3 Influence of Circadian Variations on Cognitive Processes  
A substantial amount of research has been conducted in relation to the nature of the 
relationship between circadian variations and cognitive processes, which form the basis of the 
present experiment. The variations are considered to be responsible for differences in 
performance of tasks that require working memory capability and relatively high levels of 
alertness and attention (Wright et al., 2002). In addition, the circadian variations may play a 
crucial role in differences associated with cognitive processes such as memory, learning, 
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focused attention, reaction time, time estimations and arithmetic calculations (Tranah et al., 
2011; Valdez et al., 2012). In this context, individuals working at their circadian congruent 
times are characterised by relatively high availability of cognitive resources that are required 
in the performance of tasks. When required to work at their circadian incongruent times, the 
same individuals are likely to be characterised by inferior performance due to unavailability 
of adequate resources required to perform tasks that demand greater cognitive efficiency 
(Schmidt et al., 2007).   
The potential impact that circadian preferences have on cognition has also been 
demonstrated through research, theoretically linking working memory and decision-making. 
Sleep deprivation is, in this context, associated with fewer cognitive resources available for 
an individual to engage in information processing (Mullington et al., 2003). According to 
Kerkhof and Van Dongen (2010), decision-making constitutes as one of the domains of 
executive functions that require the use of a number of cognitive operations. Research on 
changes in brain neural activity after sleep deprivation has found the presence of a significant 
decrease in cortical activations, a critical component of decision-making. As a result of the 
decreased neural activity, individuals find it difficult to sustain their cognitive flexibility (Mu 
et al., 2005).  
However, a few studies have suggested that sleep deprivation may not always affect 
decision-making. In some cases, individuals can adapt to sleep deprivation through adaptive 
cerebral response (Drummond, Gillin, & Brown, 2001). Harrison and Horne (2000) also 
argue that the impact of sleep deprivation on cognitive capacities is not global in the sense 
that some cognitive functions are unaffected. The study suggests that numerous decision-
making domains, which do not require complex integrating of tasks such as flexibility and 
innovation, are unaffected by sleep deprivation. Linking to circadian preferences, such 
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findings suggest that the influence of circadian congruence or incongruence on the 
performance of tasks may be dependent on the nature of task at hand.  
In some cases, the results of the relationship between circadian variations and performance 
of tasks requiring cognitive performance may vary based on the method of measurement 
used. The three common measures include: time of the day protocol, constant routine 
protocol and forced desynchronisation protocol (Valdez et al., 2012). In brief, a time of the 
day protocol entails measuring the performance several times in the course of the day. 
Contradictory results have been found in time of the day protocol and attributed to the lack of 
control of factors such as physical activity, temperature and light, which are likely to modify 
the circadian variations (Scheer et al., 2010). A constant routine protocol involves 
minimisation of exogenous influences by keeping ambient light and temperature constant. It 
overcomes the problems associated with time of the day protocol by keeping constant all 
conditions that are likely to influence circadian rhythms (Valdez et al., 2012).  
Forced desynchronisation requires that participants adhere to their sleep-wake cycle (Dijk, 
Duffy, & Czeisler, 1992). The performance of the individual is then assessed during circadian 
congruent and incongruent times. Studies making use of forced desynchronisation have 
shown that performance tends to correlate with circadian rhythms, in which case, best 
performance occurs when participants are assessed at their circadian congruent times. Poor 
performance, on the other hand, occurs when participants are assessed during their circadian 
incongruent times (Buxton et al., 2012).  In the study 1 experiment, the forced 
desynchronisation method is preferred, since it is difficult to control factors such as 
temperature, food intake and physical activity in a normal setting. In this study, the impact of 
circadian variations is investigated in relation to belief perseverance and framing effects.  
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1.4 Belief Perseverance  
 
Belief perseverance describes the tendency among individuals to display biased responses 
to information as a way of maintaining an existing belief or conception (Jelalian & Miller, 
1984). Such belief persistence has been demonstrated in a number of real-life situations. For 
example, IBM employees who had ownership of the company’s stock during the early 1990s 
were characterised by support of information depicting rosy performance about the 
company’s performance. At the same time, they discounted evidence showing that IBM was 
facing increasing competition from Microsoft. A few years later, IBM stock fell significantly, 
leading to the loss of large sums of money. In such a case, perseverance of the belief that the 
company was performing well, despite evidence to the contrary, led to loss (Pompian, 2012). 
A rational investor would have been expected to change the investment position based on the 
new information released to the market (Ward, 2004).  Therefore, belief perseverance hinders 
the process of adjusting existing views.  
Ross, Lepper, and Hubbard (1975) conducted one of the most notable experiments on 
belief perseverance. In the experiment, the subjects were asked to make distinctions between 
genuine and inauthentic suicide notes. After completion of the tasks, the subjects were 
provided with feedback indicating their success levels. Some were told they had failed, others 
performed moderately well, and others were excellent. They were then thoroughly debriefed 
by being informed that the feedback was completely random and predetermined. In other 
words, the feedback was not based on the actual assessment of the authenticity of suicide 
notes. In a final questionnaire, the subjects were requested to estimate the actual number of 
correct responses they had made in the earlier questionnaire as well as indicate their probable 
success for similar tasks in the future (Ross et al., 1975).  
Interestingly, a significant majority of the subjects, despite being debriefed about the 
random nature of the initial feedback, displayed a marked influence of the prior information 
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in making the subsequent judgements. As an example, subjects who had been informed that 
they had mainly made incorrect judgements still held the belief that their future problem- 
solving capabilities were poor. Later studies by Ross and his colleagues also found the 
presence of belief perseverance even after the subjects were debriefed, and informed that the 
initial outcomes had been staged (Lepper, Ross, & Lau, 1986; Jennings, Lepper, & Ross, 
1981).  
The exact mechanisms that are responsible for belief perseverance are yet to be fully 
established. However, Nisbett and Ross (1980) offered several possibilities. First, it is likely 
that the unexpectedly good or poor performance prompts individuals to search for likely 
sources. This view was further supported by Pyszczynski and Greenberg (1981) who 
demonstrated that individuals are highly likely to engage in thorough attributional processing 
following unexpected events compared to expected events. Attributional processing, in this 
context, involves an individual assigning the cause of behaviour to an event that is outside 
one’s control, rather than an internal characteristic. Second, Nisbett and Ross (1980) 
suggested that it is likely that the initial impression of either a good or poor performance 
induces an individual to generate additional evidence that can lead to confirmation of the 
impression. This has been described in more recent studies as confirmation bias (Cipriano & 
Gruca, 2014). Collectively, the attribution and confirmation bias leads to individuals 
constructing frameworks of cognition prior to the debriefing process that perform a role in 
discrediting the evidential basis of the belief (Critcher & Dunning, 2011). In such a case, the 
impact of earlier information remains intact. In other words, the individual continues to 
maintain a set of cognitions that leads to the generation of erroneous inferences and 
predictions, even after debriefing. These views are parallel with the conclusion that the 
consideration of alternative hypotheses corrects numerous social judgement biases (Lord, 
Lepper, & Preston, 1984; McFarland, Cheam, & Buehler, 2007).  
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One of the ways to overcome belief perseverance is the use of counterarguments. The use 
of counterarguments is meant to reduce one’s confidence in an existing belief, hence 
increasing the chance that a compelling explanation will help in initiating the process of 
revising existing views (Burke, 2006). The efficacy of counterarguments in overcoming 
belief perseverance has, however, been a subject of debate. Koehler (1991) concluded that, 
although counterarguments can help reverse the effects of prior explanations, it is likely that 
some impressions from the original belief are still retained. In other words, counterarguments 
only assist in reducing the strength of existing beliefs, as opposed to completely overcoming 
them. While corroborating such views, Woll (2001) found that despite efforts to overcome 
belief perseverance, initial views continue to dominate later explanations. In the present 
experiment, the role that circadian variations perform in overcoming belief perseverance is 
critically investigated. 
1.5 Belief Perseverance and Circadian Variations  
 
Prior studies are yet to investigate the potential influence that circadian variations could 
have on an individual while revising the existing biased beliefs in light of discrediting 
evidence. However, Some studies have suggested that cognitive efforts play a role in belief 
perseverance. Gilbert (1991), for example, highlighted that believing occurs more 
automatically compared to revising. In other words, less cognitive efforts are required in the 
acquisition of a belief compared to revising the belief. This helps in explaining why many 
beliefs have been shown to outlive the data that is used to discredit them. Similarly, Guenther 
and Alicke (2008) argue that belief perseverance tends to occur because people 
spontaneously construct causal stories that help reinforce the belief while refraining from 
engaging in a more deliberate cognitive process to revise the invalidated information. 
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Cognitive bias could also influence the extent of belief perseverance. As Friedman (2004) 
explains, one of the areas where cognitive bias occurs pertains to situations affected by 
availability and primacy. Availability describes the tendency for people to judge the 
probability of a certain event based on the ease with which examples relevant to an event are 
remembered. Therefore, information that is provided first in a given sequence (primacy 
effect) is likely to have a high influence on decision-making (Burke, 2006; Friedman, 2004). 
Taken into the context of circadian variations, it could be argued that the subjects tested at 
their circadian congruent times have greater availability of cognitive resources that play an 
important role in helping overcome cognitive bias and primacy effect.  
From yet another perspective, the dual process view of cognition can be used to possibly 
explain the underlying reasons behind belief perseverance. This approach is yet to be 
incorporated in belief perseverance, but has wide application in other related fields that focus 
on examining memory, reasoning and judgement in decision making (Kahneman, 2003; 
Evans & Stanovich, 2013). The dual process of cognition makes a distinction between two 
kinds of thinking: intuitive/heuristic (System 1) and deliberate/analytical thinking (System 2). 
Intuitive thinking is fast, autonomous and makes little use of working memory. This kind of 
thinking has also been described as automatic, contextualised, associative, relies on 
experience-based decision-making, unconscious and is made independent of cognitive ability. 
By contrast, analytical thinking is conscious, controlled, rule-based, entails consequential 
decisions and is negatively correlated with cognitive ability (Evans & Stanovich, 2013; 
Kahneman & Frederick, 2002). Therefore, analytical thinking, unlike intuitive thinking, 
makes use of working memory, requires mental simulation and complex emotions.   
Within the above context, belief perseverance is associated with people failing to 
thoroughly consider alternative explanations/hypotheses. Therefore, it could be argued that 
belief perseverance is likely to be high among individuals characterised by System 1 type of 
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thinking that operates independent of working memory. In contrast, individuals characterised 
by lower levels of belief perseverance, after counterarguments or discrediting evidence, are 
likely to make use of System 2 type of thinking, that is more deliberate. Testing of 
participants at their circadian congruent time increases the chance that analytical thinking 
will be utilised. It is thus expected that individuals tested at their circadian congruent times 
are characterised by greater willingness to revise their beliefs compared to those tested at 
circadian incongruent times. It should, however, be noted that although the dual process view 
of cognition enjoys significant empirical support, it is not without criticism. It has, for 
instance, been argued that some tasks that require System 2 thinking could, over time, 
become habitual and automated, and hence makes use of System 1 processes (Evans, 2008). 
In addition, some decision-making contexts may necessitate a mixture of System 1 and 2 
thinking processes (Evans & Stanovich, 2013).  
From another perspective, Bodenhausen (1990) demonstrated the potential impact of 
circadian variations on judgements through research on stereotype making. The study 
hypothesised that, during circadian incongruent times, individuals experience a constraint on 
cognitive resources that, in turn, predisposes them to rely on judgemental heuristics during 
decision-making. The results of the study demonstrated that stereotype judgements depicted 
predictable diurnal patterns. Specifically, morning type individuals were found to rely more 
on heuristics for stereotype judgements when tested during evening hours. Similarly, evening 
type persons relied more on stereotype judgements when tested during the morning hours 
(Bodenhausen, 1990).  
1.6 Socially Distributed Thinking/Cognition  
 
Research on social psychology and situated cognition has, over the years, laid a 
foundation for broader investigations on socially situated cognition (SSC). SSC is based on 
the premise that, besides influencing the content of thought, social objects also shape the 
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processes that underlie thoughts and behaviour (Smith & Semin, 2004). Four themes are 
captured in the SSC approach and include cognition as action-oriented, cognition as an aspect 
that is embodied, cognition as situated, and cognition as socially distributed (Mitchell, 
Randolph-Seng, & Mitchell, 2011; Semin & Smith, 2013). The present experiment focuses 
on the dimension of cognition as a process that can be socially distributed. Within this 
perspective, Smith and Semin (2013) posit that cognition can be distributed across social 
agents such as groups and the environment. Similarly, Cornelissen and Clarke (2010) found 
that speaking and interactions that occur in a group context have an influence on how 
individuals construct meaning pertaining to an aspect of interest, such as the development of 
a new venture. The two scholars further found out that entrepreneurship ideas that arose from 
social context interactions were likely to be characterised by high levels of sense making that 
were instrumental to the venture success. Along similar lines, West (2007) found that 
collective cognition is distinct from individual cognition.  The study elaborated that, unlike 
individual cognition, collective cognition tends to have a more superior impact on decision-
making.  
The hypothesis of extended cognition (HEC) also provides useful insights pertaining to the 
mechanisms inherent in socially distributed cognition. HEC suggests that the human 
cognitive processes are not limited to an individual’s brain. Rather, they span across the body 
and the external world (Spaulding, 2011). In greater detail, the hypothesis indicates that 
cognitive processes and systems are spatiotemporally spread in such a way that extra 
neuronal elements from the external world closely work with the internal elements to give 
rise to the cognitive system (Clark, 2008; Sutton, 2010; Wilson, 2010). The extra neural 
resources may be in the form of other groups of individuals and learning aids, playing an 
important role in aiding, sculpting or augmenting cognition (Kirchhoff, 2014). Other objects 
that constitute part of the external environment include calendars, books and personal 
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computers. Based on HEC, these objects help provide intimate feedback to an individual’s 
thought processes and guide actions in direct, and in some cases, undeliberated ways 
(Sprevak, 2010). The implication is that when individuals are confronted with tasks that 
require cognitive effort, they are likely to take advantage of processes, structures and 
objectives that provide additional cognitive support. 
 Hutchins (1995) provided one of the most popular illustrative examples of how socially 
distributed cognition works. In the study Cognition in the Wild, the author described how the 
successful navigation of large ships emanates from a complex cognitive system. The 
navigation of the ship involves several persons and their artefacts as opposed to a single 
individual. In order to carry out the complex and delicate task, the marine staffs collaborates 
in taking the bearing of other ships, landmarks and buoys. The bearings are then 
communicated to staff in the pilothouse and subsequently marked on charts to provide 
accurate directions. An individual cannot do this cognitive task independently (Hutchins, 
1995).  
The need to investigate the influence of socially distributed thinking on belief 
perseverance in the present study is a result of several factors. First, feedback from other 
individuals has been shown to play an important role in influencing the decision-making 
processes (Blanchette & Richards, 2010; Xue, Lu, Levin, & Bechara, 2010). Second, 
judgements in most cases are not discrete events that have no history or future. People have a 
habit of frequently sharing their judgements with others. The feedback received may be used 
to make judgements as to whether one is on the right track (Glockner & Witteman, 2010). If 
the discussion reveals that a judgement is wrong, then there is a high chance that the person 
or group will change the existing view through consideration of additional information. 
Alternatively, the feedback can be used to change the process of reaching a certain 
conclusion. As such, it is expected that individuals in a group context are more likely to 
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attenuate previous biased beliefs in light of new discrediting information. This can be 
attributed to a greater amount of cognitive capacity that is available to critically consider the 
credence of counterarguments or evidence.  
While taking the above views into consideration, some research exists on the potential 
influence of group discussion on decision-making. Wright and Wells (1985) found that group 
discussion significantly attenuates attribution errors which entail the generation of distorted 
perceptions about other individuals or objects under consideration. In a latter study, Wright, 
Christie, Johnson, and Stoffer (1996) further found out that group discussions have a major 
influence on the elimination of consensus underutilisation effect, which is the tendency for 
group discussion moderators to underuse consensus information. In the consensus 
underutilisation effect, an individual is likely to give insufficient weight to information 
leading to inaccurate judgements. In experiments involving multiple cue judgements, 
whereby decision makers are confronted with multiple information cues that must be 
combined to make an overall judgement, groups demonstrated better performance in terms of 
accuracy when compared to individuals (Olsson, Enkvist, & Juslin, 2006).  
Through distributed information processing, it has also been shown that groups are better 
placed to approach problems in a highly structured manner that is aided by external cognitive 
artefacts (Wilcox, 2008). In a similar study to that conducted by Wilcox (2008), 
Chidambaram and Tung (2005) showed that the presence of inputs from different members of 
a team improved the chances that a complex problem would be well understood compared to 
an individual working alone. It should, however, be noted that not all cases of socially 
distributed thinking are likely to lead to better judgements compared to individual cognition.  
Research on social loafing, for example, indicates that some members of a group may 
exert less effort on the task at hand leading to the lacklustre performance of the overall group 
(Chidambaram & Tung, 2005; Blaskovich, 2008). An example of social loafing occurs when 
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some students working collectively on an assignment put less effort since they will receive 
one grade for the assignment. The same students, however, make more effort when an 
assignment requires one to work individually.  
While taking into consideration belief perseverance, an individual’s initial impression of a 
certain subject, or another person, may be biased and erroneous. Such bias may reflect a 
preference for specific dispositional inferences even in a context where strong discrediting 
information exists (Jelalian & Miller, 1984). It may have negative implications in certain 
contexts, such as legal judgements and politics. Accordingly, it is important to understand the 
conditions under which biased impressions are retained or abandoned in the presence of new 
information that offers contradictory evidence. Accordingly, the present study contributes in 
this field by investing circadian variations as one of the conditions that influence belief 
perseverance. Prior studies are yet to investigate the relationship between the two variables, 
and hence an opportunity to provide new insights from a social psychology perspective.  
1.7 Information Accessibility/Type of Reasons Given and Belief Perseverance  
Several studies have examined the impact that ease of retrieval affects attitude-based 
judgements. In a study on the availability of heuristics, Schwarz et al. (1991) asked the study 
participants to recall instances where they had behaved assertively. The participants were to 
recall either 6 or 12 instances. A pre-test of the study found that the majority of participants 
experienced greater ease in recalling 6 instances, as opposed to 12 instances. Following the 
completion of this task, the participants were further asked to rate their level of assertiveness. 
Ideally, if the participants’ judgements were determined by the content that, in this case, is 
the number of recalled instances, and then it would be likely that individuals who recalled 12 
instances would express higher levels of assertiveness. However, Schwarz et al. (1991) made 
the prediction that judgements made by the participants were determined by the subjective 
ease of conducting the retrieval task. Therefore, higher ratings of assertiveness were expected 
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among participants who were asked to recall 6 behaviours. The final results of the study were 
consistent with Schwarz et al.’s (1991) prediction leading to the conclusion that individuals 
can rely on the ease with which they generate information in their mind to form judgements.  
In support of the above findings, Wanke, Bless, and Biller (1996) found that participants 
had more favourable attitudes towards the use of public transport when they experienced the 
ease of generating supporting arguments or experienced difficulties in generating 
counterarguments. Another key finding of the study was that participants expressed greater 
confidence in their attitude when they had an easier time in generating supporting arguments 
(Wanke et al., 1996). Haddock, Rothman, and Schwarz (1996) also conducted a similar 
study, in which case, participants were required to generate either 3 or 7 arguments that either 
supported or opposed the issue of doctor-assisted suicide. From the study results, the majority 
of the participants had an easier time recalling three arguments, but found it difficult to recall 
seven. After completion of the task, the participants were further requested to rate the 
intensity, certainty and importance of their views towards the issue of doctor-assisted suicide 
(Haddock et al., 1996). The predictions were that, if the participants used the ease or 
difficulty with which they could bring material to mind as their source of information, they 
would report higher levels of certainty, intensity and importance following a recall of 3 rather 
than 7 supporting arguments, or recalling 7 rather than 3 opposing arguments. The results of 
this second part of the study were consistent with the predictions. In particular, the 
participants depicted stronger attitudes towards the issue when they had an easier time 
retrieving supportive arguments or difficulty in retrieving opposing arguments. Collectively, 
the studies by Schwarz et al. (1991), Wanke et al. (1996) and Haddock et al. (1996) 
demonstrate that attitude judgements can be influenced by the ease or difficulty with which 
attitude-relevant information comes to one’s mind.  
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More recently, Nestler (2010) investigated the role that accessible context and 
accessibility experiences performed, with respect to overcoming belief perseverance. The 
study was undertaken in the form of two experiments, in which case, participants were tested 
with regard to whether accessibility experiences had an influence on belief perseverance 
when participants generated few or many reasons with regard to how a reported/original 
outcome or its alternative would have turned out. Among participants in Experiment 1, who 
had listed many reasons for the reported outcome, the majority considered this outcome to be 
less likely after debriefing was performed. The conclusion, therefore, was that the 
participants did not exhibit belief perseverance, compared to those who had provided fewer 
reasons. By contrast, Experiment 2 found that participants who provided many reasons for 
the alternative outcome indicated that the reported outcome would be more likely. They 
therefore exhibited higher levels of belief perseverance compared to individuals who had 
listed a few reasons (Nestler, 2010).  
Traditionally, attitudes were conceptualised as being stable evaluative responses 
pertaining to an issue or attitude object (Eagly & Chaiken, 1993). The implication of this 
perspective is that attitude judgements should not be influenced by the context or 
environment in which they are completed. Currently, this view has been contested with 
theorists postulating that it is possible that attitudes are formed on the basis of information or 
data that is temporarily available and accessible during the time of judgement making (Cone 
& Ferguson, 2015). Therefore, attitude judgements, such as those that revolve around belief 
perseverance, can be affected by the context in which they are reported. Within this 
perspective, Wilson, Lindsey, and Schooler (2000) demonstrated that thinking about the 
reasons behind one’s attitude could produce attitude change (e.g. attenuation of belief 
perseverance). In the present study, change in attitude is investigated with respect to belief 
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perseverance with circadian variations being the context within which differences in belief 
perseverance attenuation are likely to occur. 
Based on Experiment 1, in the study by Nestler (2010), it is expected that participants 
tested at their circadian incongruent times would have less cognitive resources available. 
Generation of reasons should, therefore, be more difficult. When an individual experiences 
difficulties in generating the reasons in favour of a known outcome, he or she should rethink 
and initial judgement and change their mind. Therefore, it is expected that less perseverance 
should occur under incongruent thinking. By contrast, it could be assumed that, when 
participants are tested at their circadian congruent times, they would find it easier to generate 
reasons for the outcome due to the availability of a greater degree of cognitive resources. It is 
thus expected that belief perseverance should increase under congruent thinking when 
individuals are asked to generate reasons supporting the outcome. In Experiment 2, it is 
assumed that generating reasons against the alternative outcome would be hard when 
participants are tested at their circadian incongruent times due to unavailability of cognitive 
resources. In such a case, it is likely that participants should revert to their original belief and 
hence demonstrate increased belief perseverance. When tested at their circadian congruent 
times, the participants should find it easier to generate reasons against as they have more 
cognitive resources for doing so. Therefore, the current study expects that less belief 
perseverance is expected for congruent thinking when participants are asked to provide 
reasons against.  
1.8 Belief Perseverance in a Legal Context 
 
The legal environment such as courtrooms constitutes as one of the areas where the impact 
of belief perseverance could have important ramifications. According to Jelalian and Miller 
(1984), the sequential stream of information presented in the form of assertions and 
counterarguments makes the courtroom an obvious area where possibilities for belief 
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perseverance are elevated. For example, the court may use the testimony of an eyewitness 
who is later judged to be unreliable due to the discredited information provided. Loftus 
(1974) demonstrated an incident when the court verdict was influenced by the account of an 
eyewitness who was later found to have extremely poor vision. The poor vision rendered the 
testimony offered by the witness logically untenable. Although the aggrieved parties were 
briefed about the condition of the witness, they still held onto the earlier judgement about the 
guilt of the suspect. It is, on this basis, that Loftus and Monahan (1980) recommended the 
presence of psychologists with social perception and memory expertise to be used as expert 
witnesses to help identify unreliable eyewitnesses in courtrooms.  
Several lines of research have, however, shown that belief perseverance may not always 
hold in court settings. Hatvany and Strack (1980), and McCloskey and Egeth (1983), for 
example, failed to observe perseverance effects in jury simulation experiments. In these 
cases, the subjects were able to discount initial testimonies that were subsequently 
discredited. There have been attempts to explain the possible basis for the absence of 
perseverance effects. Haddock and Maio (2004) explain that, in courtrooms, the various 
parties usually have prior expectations in relation to the validity of information. Therefore, 
the different parties in the courtroom are likely to consider alternative outcomes and causal 
explanations before they can form stable beliefs. Another explanatory argument is that in 
most belief perseverance studies, the participants usually receive information that often 
entails an unfamiliar domain (such as detection of authentic suicide notes) from an individual 
considered to be a highly credible source. As a result, the study participants often have little 
reason to suspect the presence of inaccurate information. By contrast, court proceedings are 
such that the parties are aware that some witnesses may not be truthful in their testimonies 
(Schul & Manzury, 1990). Such awareness constitutes a warning that deception may arise, 
and hence the affected parties may require less effort in attenuating initial beliefs.  
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1.9 Framing Effects and the Classic Asian Disease Problem  
 
Most important decisions that individuals make involve some risk (Dovidio, Piliavin, 
Schroeder, & Penner, 2017). As a result of the implications of risks, a substantial body of 
research has sought to understand approaches used by decision-makers to incorporate risks 
into their choices. Research has, for example, shown that risk aversion behaviour among 
individuals contributes significantly to an understanding of diverse economic and legal 
problems in areas such as portfolio selection, insurance issues and contracting (Lim, Sherali, 
& Uryasev, 2010).  
Theoretically, existing models on risky choices indicate that individuals tend to value a 
risky prospect, such a lottery, by some type of weighted average scheme. In other words, 
individuals, when presented with risky choices, are likely to balance the chances of relatively 
good and poor outcomes (Bellemare & Shearer, 2010).  For example, an individual might be 
faced with two prospects in which one prospect involves two events (uncertain) and the other 
prospect involves a single event (risky) that has the same probability structure. In this case, 
the decision maker will require a higher return on the uncertain prospect since he subjectively 
views it as riskier. This might occur in a situation where an individual has the option of 
investing in one country with a weak institutional environment, and another with a stronger 
institutional environment. In this case, the investment in the institutionally weaker country is 
considered as riskier, and hence will require a higher return compared to the other country.  
Within the above context, there is a general consensus that individuals usually consider the 
implications of good or poor outcomes while making risky choices (Kühberger & Tanner, 
2010; Mahoney, Buboltz, Levin, Doverspike, & Svyantek, 2011). Prospect theory, however, 
suggests that presentation/framing of the outcomes as either a loss or gain may affect the 
amount of risk that an individual is willing to accept (Gneezy, List, & Wu, 2006). This effect 
has been attributed to differences in perceived subjective value, and is explained through the 
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S-shaped value function. The function is concave for gains, thus implying outcomes that are 
presented, as gains are likely to lead to risk-averse preferences. It is convex for losses, thus 
providing that outcomes framed in loss terms leads to preferences for risky alternatives (see 
Figure 1.11) (Levy & Levy, 2002). Simply put, decisions about gains lead to risk aversion, 
while decisions about losses lead to risk-seeking behaviour, even in instances where both 
outcomes are similar. It also implies that an individual’s preference towards risks will depend 
on whether a choice is made in the domain of gains or in the domain of losses. For example, 
presenting an individual with a gamble in which $110 can be gained or $100 lost with equal 
probabilities will most likely lead to rejection of the gamble.  
 
Figure 1.1: The S-value function for gain and losses in the Prospect Theory (Bloomfield, 
2006) 
Framing effects tend to violate the invariance axiom as explained in expected utility 
theories. The axiom indicates that choices are expected to be the same across situations where 
all outcomes are transformed in the same way. As such, framing effects depict irrational 
behaviour among the affected individuals (Tversky & Kahneman, 1986).  The basis of risky 
choice framing is, therefore, that “how” something is expressed has a more significant 
																																								 																				
1 Prospect theory’s value function for gains and loses was originally adopted from Kahneman and Tversky 
(1979).  
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influence on the evaluation of information than “what” is said (Levin, Schneider, & Gaeth, 
1998).  
The Classic Asian Disease problem constitutes as one of the most popular and widely used 
examples of framing effects. In this experiment, participants were informed that there would 
be an outbreak of an unusual Asian disease that would kill 600 people. The participants were 
required to choose from two alternatives to combat the disease from Positive and Negative 
frames.  In the Positive frame, adoption of Program A would lead to 200 people being saved; 
while in Program B, there was a 1/3 probability of 600 people being saved, and a 2/3 
probability that no people would be saved. In the Negative frame, adopting Program C would 
lead to 400 people dying, while in Program D there was a 1/3 probability nobody would die 
and a 2/3 probability that 600 people would die from the disease. Notably, Program A and C 
were equivalent in terms of possible outcomes, as are Program B and D. The study, however, 
found that 72 percent of individuals responding to the Positive frame chose the certain option 
of Program B. On the other hand 78 percent of individuals responding to the Negative frame 
chose the risky option of Program D (Tversky & Kahneman, 1981). The rationale behind the 
choice of program B and D is that rational individuals tend to engage in the risk-taking 
behaviour when they are presented with a Negative/risky frame.  Similarly, they are more 
likely to avoid risks and uncertainties when presented with a Positive frame. This framing 
effect has been tested in other studies and found to be enduring (Gonzalez, Dana, Koshino, & 
Just, 2005; Levin, Gaeth, Schreiber, & Lauriola, 2002; McElroy & Dickinson, 2010). Some 
studies (e.g. Peters & Levin, 2008) have, however, demonstrated the absence of significant 
framing effects when alternatives are framed in Positive versus Negative terms.  
Framing effects manifest themselves in a variety of ways in real-life contexts. In the field 
of politics, existing work indicates that framing of political issues significantly influences 
public opinions. Slothuus and De Vreese (2010), for example, found that supporters of a 
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certain party were likely to depict bias towards a certain political issue if it was sponsored 
and framed by their party. De Vreese, Boomgaarden, and Semetko (2010) also found 
significant framing effects in a study that sought public opinions on support for the admission 
of Turkey into the European Union. The results of the study showed that negative news 
frames about Turkey yielded stronger effects compared to Positive news frames. In other 
words, the level of public support for Turkey varied significantly, depending on whether the 
respondent was exposed to a positively or negatively valenced news frame. Similar effects 
have been reported in studies on climate change. Americans were, for example, shown to 
think differently about the benefits of deep sea oil drilling when the issue was expressed, in 
terms of the country’s continued dependence on foreign energy sources as opposed to the 
economic costs of failing to develop newer and greener sources of energy (Zaller & Feldman, 
1992).  Collectively, these studies suggest conceptual clarity of information influences its 
interpretation among the targeted audience. They also provide evidence on the capacity for 
Positive and Negative frames to shape public opinions on certain important matters.  
1.10 Circadian Preferences on Framing Effects 
 
The presence of circadian preferences provides possible explanations for the presence of 
framing effects among individuals.  However, previous attempts to investigate this area have 
only been indirect in nature. For example, some studies have suggested that the cognitive 
effort that an individual puts towards examining a question could have an influence on 
framing effects. Cacioppo and Petty (1982), for instance, studied need-for-cognition (NFC) 
and its influence on framing effects. The study found that individuals depicting high levels of 
NFC put more effort in processing tasks, while individuals with low NFC used less effort. 
Similar research has demonstrated that individuals who have a high NFC are characterised by 
lower framing effects (Smith & Levin, 1996; Chatterjee, Heath, Milberg, & France, 2000; 
Curseu, 2006).  
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In addition to NFC, high depth of cognitive processing and mathematical ability has been 
shown to reduce framing effects (Simon, Fagley, & Halleran, 2004). Through a Cognitive 
Reflective Test (CRT), Frederick (2005) further found that the effects of risky-choice framing 
were attenuated among individuals who relied on more conscious and deliberate processes. 
The effects were robust among individuals who relied on more automatic processing. 
Oechssler, Roider, and Schmitz (2009) also reported similar findings, and found that 
individuals with higher cognitive abilities were characterised by lower incidences of biases 
and conjunction fallacy. This occurs when an individual assumes that multiple specific 
conditions are more probable than a single general one.  
To conclude, the above studies suggest that the factors which affect the level of conscious 
and deliberate processing of information are likely to influence framing effects.  Within this 
context, research, as mentioned earlier, suggests that individuals tested at circadian congruent 
times are more likely to engage in more effortful thinking due to the optimal availability of 
cognitive resources (Böckenholt, 2012; Wieth & Zacks, 2011). It is therefore expected that 
individuals tested at their circadian congruent times are likely to depict lower levels of 
framing effects, compared to individuals tested at circadian incongruent times. This 
constitutes one of the aspects that the present study seeks to investigate in greater detail.  
Another stream of research investigates framing effects from the context of decisional 
situations. One study suggests that framing effects can be linked to mental models relied 
upon by the individual during decision-making. An individual is predisposed to make 
decisions through a comparison of the information used to describe a current situation and 
pre-existing cognitive representations of a similar situation that are activated from the long-
term-memory (Gigerenzer, Hoffrage, & Kleinbolting, 1991). In another study, Olekalns and 
Smith (2005) demonstrated that, framing effects, in part, arose from the presence of 
alternatives that were embedded in an individual’s cognitive causal schema. The way in 
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which the alternatives are presented to a person tends to activate congruent schema from the 
long-term memory that, in turn, influences the selective processing of information during 
decision-making. Olekalns and Smith (2005) further used the example of cooperative and 
uncooperative negotiators. In the case of cooperative negotiators with the same orientation 
dyad, they tend to place greater emphasis on cooperation, flexibility and trust. On the other 
hand, competitive negotiators focus mainly on competition. The outcome is that negotiators 
in the same orientation are likely to report a more positive experience compared to 
negotiators in mixed-orientation dyads. Taken in the context of circadian variations, this 
would mean that individuals tested at circadian incongruent times are more likely than their 
counterparts tested at circadian congruent times to depict framing effects. This can be 
attributed to selective processing of information that arises from fewer cognitive resources 
that are available during ones non-peak hours.  
From yet another perspective, framing effects are associated with higher sensitivity levels 
of human cognitive systems to information that is negatively presented. In particular, framing 
a situation in negative terms triggers a well-established negativity bias in human cognition to 
truth judgements (Acton, 2013).  During the impression formation process, the expectancy 
that confirms negative information tends to override the effect of news confirming positive 
information. For example, information that points towards the materialisation of a threat 
expected by an individual outweighs information that signals hope (Lupfer, Weeks, & 
Dupuis, 2000). While attempting to explain such behaviour, some authors have argued that 
people are willing to allocate more cognitive resources to process information that has 
elements of danger or threats. Interestingly, the same individuals depict reluctance in 
allocating resources to positively framed information (Miclea & Curseu, 2003).  Human 
cognition is, therefore, such that individuals are more likely to consider negatively framed 
statistical statements as true compared to equivalent statements that are positively framed. 
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The underlying processes that influence this effect are yet to be sufficiently understood. The 
present experiment seeks to improve the level of understanding in this area by investigating 
the role performed by circadian variations.   
Individual differences in framing effects have also been studied. One of such areas 
pertains to impact of age on framing effects. Several studies suggest that the ageing process 
after midlife appears to have a negative effect on a variety of intellectual abilities such as 
memory, reasoning and attention (Zacks, Hasher, & Li, 2000; McDowd & Shaw, 2000). 
However, Mayhorn, Fisk, and Whittle (2002), in a study that was based on the Asian Disease 
problem, found no age-related differences in choice of preferences. The study thus concluded 
that individuals of all ages are susceptible to framing effects.  
1.11 Present Experiment – Aim, Objectives and Hypotheses  
 
The dissertation is structured in terms of three experiments. In the first experiment, the 
primary aim pertained to (1) examining the cognitive processes that influence an individual’s 
belief perseverance, and (2) examining the moderating role that circadian variations and 
socially distributed thinking have on cognitive processes that impact on belief perseverance.  
In order to meet these aims, participants were required to take part in a forensic based 
experiment. The participants were provided with a description of stereotypical suspect 
assumed to be guilty of committing an offense. After making their initial judgements, the 
participants were debriefed by being provided with an atypical offender profile in the form of 
counterevidence from an expert profiler. The participants were then asked to revise their 
initial judgements in relation to the extent to which the suspect was guilty. The participants 
were separated into two groups. One group was tested based on their circadian congruent 
times, while the other half of the participants were tested based on their non-optimal 
circadian incongruent times.   
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From the review of prior studies on circadian variations, it was expected that individuals 
tested at their optimal circadian congruent times would experience less belief perseverance 
compared to individuals tested at their circadian incongruent times. This should be the case, 
since the higher cognitive resources availability during circadian congruent times allow for 
more deliberative thinking that helps in revising prior information that may be biased. 
Furthermore, due to the positive impact of socially distributed thinking on complementing 
individual cognitive resources, it was expected that groups would depict less belief 
perseverance compared to individuals when tested at their circadian congruent times. The 
following hypotheses are therefore tested: 
H1a: Belief perseverance is significantly less when participants are tested at their optimal 
time of circadian preferences compared to testing at circadian incongruent times. 
H1b: Participants in a group will depict significantly less belief perseverance than individuals 
when tested at their optimal time of circadian preferences.  
The second study complements the first study by incorporating the effect of type of reason 
given on the relationship between belief perseverance and circadian preferences in a legal 
context. The study thus focuses on the decision-making context under which belief 
perseverance occurs. It makes use of two experiments conducted by Nestler (2010) on the 
role of accessible content and accessibility experiences on belief perseverance.  While taking 
into consideration the testing of participants at circadian incongruent times, it is expected that 
difficulties would be experienced in the generation of reasons that support the original belief 
due to lower availability of cognitive resources. Therefore, the participants are motivated to 
rethink their initial judgement hence producing higher chances that belief perseverance will 
be attenuated compared to individuals tested at their circadian congruent times. For the 
alternative outcomes, it is expected that the generating of reasons against should be difficult 
when testing is performed at circadian incongruent times. The participants should, therefore, 
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revert to their original belief and hence depicting more belief perseverance. In contrast, 
generating reasons against should be easier when individuals are tested at their circadian 
congruent times, leading to the attenuation of belief perseverance. The corresponding 
hypotheses are as follows: 
H2a: Participants tested at their circadian incongruent times find it significantly difficult to 
generate reasons in favour of a known outcome, and hence less belief perseverance.  
H2b: Participants tested at their circadian congruent times find it easier to generate reasons in 
favour of a known outcome, and hence more belief perseverance. 
H2c: Participants tested at their circadian incongruent times find it more difficult to generate 
reasons against a known outcome and hence more belief perseverance 
H2d: Participants tested at their circadian congruent times find it significantly easier to 
generate reasons against a known outcome, and hence less belief perseverance. 
The third study further extends the research on circadian effects by examining the 
potential influence on framing effects in the context of the Classic Asian Disease Problem by 
Tversky and Kahneman (1987). Prior research, as evident from the literature review, has 
reported mixed findings on the factors influencing framing effects. In order to provide 
additional clarity in this area, the study investigates whether Morningness-Eveningness 
orientation, based on circadian preferences of the participants, influences decision-making 
and consequently framing effects. One of the related studies by Bodenhausen (1990) 
demonstrated that framing effects in the context of stereotyping are more evident when 
participants are tested at their circadian incongruent times, than when tested at their circadian 
congruent times. The moderating effects of circadian variations in risky choice framing are 
however yet to be conclusively investigated. Thus, the present study investigates whether 
framing effects in the context of the Classic Asian Disease Problem are moderated by 
circadian preferences. In relation to the literature the following hypotheses are tested: 
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H3a: Participants tested at their circadian congruent times are less susceptible to framing 
effects in the Asian Disease Problem.  
H3b: Participants tested at their circadian incongruent times are more susceptible to framing 
effects in the Asian Disease Problem.   
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Chapter 2: The Role of Circadian Variations and Socially Distributed Thinking in 
Belief Perseverance 
2.1 Chapter Introduction 
2.1.1 Study Background  
 
The past few decades have been marked by an increase in research regarding the tenacity 
with which individuals maintain their beliefs or attitudes in the face of discrediting evidence 
(Nestler, 2010; Beaulieu & Reinstein, 2010). It is common for people to believe that many 
things are likely to be untrue. However, they are not always able or willing to revise the 
previous beliefs about the false information (Savion, 2012). For example, an individual who 
believes that swimming right after a meal will lead to a bad stomach cramp is likely to hold 
on to this view even after evidence that refutes such a belief has been provided. This 
phenomenon is referred to as belief perseverance. It describes an individual’s biased response 
to information as a way of maintaining an existing conception (Green & Donahue, 2011).  
Two of the main lines of research on belief perseverance include: perseverance in the 
presence of discrediting evidence, and perseverance after assimilation of information that is 
closely related to an individual’s initial belief (Goodwin, 2009). This study focuses on 
perseverance in the presence of discrediting evidence.  
In an attempt to explain the belief perseverance phenomenon, some studies have suggested 
that individuals tend to engage in the search and recollection of information that is consistent 
or in support of an existing impression (Cook, Ecker, & Lewandowsky, 2015). This aspect 
has been referred to as behavioural confirmation, and is characterised by an individual 
depicting self-fulfilling processes. The implications of belief perseverance are evident in 
many real-life contexts. These include the undesirable effects of false accusations in the 
media, jurors being influenced in their decisions by discredited eyewitnesses and stability in 
the liking and dislike in the responses provided by others (Green & Donahue, 2011).  
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There have been several attempts to alleviate belief perseverance, albeit with limited 
success. One of such attempts involves generation of counter-explanations to the initial 
belief. Anderson (1982, 2007), within this context, argued that since generating an 
explanation can bolster a given belief, and a counter-argument could also help in reducing 
one’s confidence concerning the belief under consideration. However, the extent to which 
counterarguments are effective in helping to overcome the initial belief perseverance effect 
has been a subject of debate.  
Arguably, the limited success of counterarguments in alleviating belief perseverance can 
be accounted for with the help of the dual process view of cognition. Although this process is 
yet to be widely incorporated into studies on belief perseverance, it has been used in related 
fields that examine memory, reasoning and judgement.  The dual process view of cognition is 
based on evidence indicating that people tend to neglect base rates and engage in biased 
judgements in a wide range of tasks and situations (Gilovich et al., 2002). In a bid to explain 
such occurrences, the dual process view indicates that they are two types of thinking: System 
1 (intuitive/heuristic thinking), which is characterised by processing that is fast, autonomous 
and requires little working memory; and System 2, (deliberate/analytical thinking), in which 
processing puts a heavy load on memory, operates consciously, is largely controlled and slow 
(Stanovich & Toplak, 2012). 
From the dual process view of cognition, belief perseverance can be linked to System 1 
thinking that is intuitive or heuristic. By contrast, individuals engaging in System 2 thinking, 
which is analytical, are less likely to be affected by belief perseverance. This is expected 
since analytical thinking is done consciously and deliberately. As such, it can be further 
expected that belief perseverance is likely to decrease in situations that are characterised by 
higher demand for analytical thinking. The present study seeks to examine the possibility of 
such occurrence, by investigating the potential role that is performed by variations in 
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cognitive resources on belief perseverance. The examination is based on two aspects: 
circadian preferences and socially distributed thinking.   
While linking the dual cognitive process to circadian variations, it can thus be suggested 
that, during an individual’s optimal time, he or she is likely to engage in more deliberative 
thinking. In other words, circadian congruence/match will lead to the availability of high-
level cognitive resources, which in turn, allow for analytical type of thinking, as opposed to 
heuristic thinking. By contrast, circadian incongruence/mismatch predisposes one to engage 
in less conscious thinking. Such thinking requires less effort, and therefore an increase in the 
chances that it could be biased in nature. Accordingly, the present study hypothesises proves 
that belief perseverance alleviation is likely to be more successful when individuals are 
required to revise their prior beliefs, in light of the contradictory evidence, at a time 
congruent with their circadian preferences.  
At the non-optimal time, when an individual’s cognitive resources are depleted, belief 
perseverance may still be alleviated but only through augmenting of such resources 
(Dickinson & McElroy, 2012). The aim, in this context, is to counter the effects that circadian 
variations have on the cognitive efforts made in analysing a given situation. In the present 
study, this possibility of augmenting cognitive resources at a non-optimal time were tested 
through an examination of the influence of socially distributed cognition on belief 
perseverance. The concept of socially distributed cognition can be explained through the 
Hypothesis of Extended Cognition (HEC).  
In brief, HEC claims that important aspects of an individual’s mental life tend to spill 
outside one’s thoughts into objectives in the environment (Sutton, Harris, Keil, & Barnier, 
2010). This hypothesis further suggests that human cognition is supported by opportunistic, 
soft-assembled hybrid associations of neural, bodily and environmental elements (Sterelny, 
2010). Meaning an individual’s brain is likely to take advantage of processes and structures 
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that can help support its cognitive resources. Distributed cognitive, therefore, treats the 
activity system rather than the individual as the main unit of cognitive analysis (Michaelian 
& Sutton, 2013). The activity system takes into account the external environment under 
which an individual operates, as well as interactions with other individuals (Hazlehurst, 
Gorman, & McMullen, 2008). Hutchins (1995) provides one of the influential accounts of 
how socially distributed cognition works. Using the example of a ship’s navigation, Hutchins 
(1995) explained that the navigation process is, to a large extent, a cognitive process, in the 
sense that it leads to the representations of the ship’s positions in its environment. Among the 
members of the crew, no single individual can perform the complex navigational task alone. 
Instead, the task is undertaken by the interaction of many individuals with the help of 
technical instruments.  
In a group context, socially distributed cognition enhances information processing 
capabilities of the members, and therefore increased ease of making decisions in complex 
situations. Through socially distributed thinking, individuals can exploit the performance 
strengths of individual cognition in aspects such as hand-eye cognition, while at the same 
time avoiding its weaknesses such as emotional interference (Brown & Duguid, 1991). 
Boland and Tenkasi (1995) also found that the inputs from different members of a team 
significantly increase the chances of understanding a complex problem compared to an 
individual acting alone.  Such superior performance among individuals working in a group is 
further attributed to the possession of complementary knowledge (Yoo & Kanawattanachai, 
2001).  
Some studies have however underscored that socially distributed thinking may not always 
result in enhanced cognitive resources that yield superior performance. According to List 
(2008), socially distributed thinking provides better performance outcomes when two key 
conditions are met. First, the group should be such that it is a well-demarcated system. 
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Second, the group must count as a system that is capable of producing cognitive outputs. The 
first condition can be achieved only when the group’s collective behaviour is well integrated. 
For example, a well-organised group of scientific collaborators are likely to benefit from 
socially distributed thinking compared to a random group of people. For the second 
condition, the group should be such that it is capable of producing outputs that offer a 
representational content or collective judgement. This can be achieved by ensuring that the 
group has a formal structure that allows for joint declarations (List, 2008). Steiner (1972) also 
found that performance in a group is dependent on the presence on a fit between the cognitive 
resources at the disposal of the members, the cognitive demands imposed by the task, the 
distribution of resources, and process costs associated with interactions. Similarly, Hutchins 
(1991) suggests that superiority in deliberative thinking in a group context will depend on 
cognitive resources that are available to the members.  
Within the above perspectives, this study also examined the influence of the amount of 
cognitive capacity available to individuals in a group has in relation to alleviation of belief 
perseverance. Resource availability to the group members was manipulated through circadian 
variations. The study hypothesised that members constituting a group would depict less belief 
perseverance than individuals when tested at their optimal time of circadian preferences. By 
contrast, it was expected that individuals in a group with limited cognitive resources, through 
circadian incongruence, would exhibit pronounced belief perseverance.  
2.1.2 Present Experiment  
 
The primary aims of this study pertained to (1) an examination of the cognitive processes 
that influence an individual’s belief perseverance, and (2) to examine the moderating role that 
circadian variations and socially distributed thinking have on the cognitive process that 
impact belief perseverance.  The study’s context was a forensic scenario involving a 
description of a stereotypical suspect considered to be guilty of committing an offense. The 
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participants were required to revise their initial judgements of the extent to which the suspect 
was guilty after being provided with counterevidence from an expert profiler in the form of 
an atypical offender profile.  Two sets of participants were involved in producing guilt 
judgements. These included individual participants and groups of three participants. In 
parallel to the study’s aim, one half of the individual and group participants were tested based 
on optimal times that were congruent with their circadian preferences and the other half were 
tested based on non-optimal times that were incongruent with their circadian preferences.  
Based on the findings reported in prior studies on circadian variations, it was expected that 
individuals and groups tested at optimal times would exhibit significantly lower belief 
perseverance through deliberative thinking, compared to individuals and groups, tested at 
non-optimal times after presentation with counter evidence. It was also expected that groups, 
due to the positive impact of socially distributed cognition, would have lower belief 
perseverance compared to individuals when tested at optimal circadian times.  
2.2 Method 
2.2.1 Data Management  
 
The existence of missing values of more than 5% in the dataset could lead to a distortion 
of the results. In this study, no missing values were observed, hence the ability to provide 
non-distorted results. With regards to normality, a data analysis using the multivariate 
kurtosis method yielded a value less than 1.96, which is an indicator of normal distribution. 
The study also relied on the parametric statistic, in which case, the sample data was 
considered to be from a population that follows a probability distribution. For this reason, 
parametric tests which include t-test and analysis of variance (ANOVA) were used.  
2.2.2 Participants  
 
A total of 129 participants from Kingston University (students and administrative staff 
members) participated in the study. Two sets of participants were randomly chosen. They 
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were either tested individually (N=32, Mean age = 29 years, SD = 12.85, 22 women), or in 
one of 32 small groups comprising of three to four individuals. An individual was only 
allowed to participate in one group. Table 1.1 provides a summary of the group 
demographics.  
Table 1.1: Group Demographics  
Group type  N Mean age (SD) 
Women only 5 25 (9.33) 
Men only  3 22 (2.46) 
Mixed (2 women/1 man) 12 23(6.65) 
Mixed (1 woman/2 men)  12 23 (5.60) 
Total  32 23 (6.48) 
 
2.2.3 Design  
 
A 2x2x2 mixed design experiment was used. Participants were categorised into two 
groups comprising of between-subjects and within-subjects. For the between-subjects, the 
independent variables included testing (congruent circadian preferences and incongruent 
circadian preferences) and testing conditions (individually or in groups). The independent 
variable for the within-subject was the time of judgement (before or after being provided with 
discrediting evidence). Allocation of participants to each of the four conditions was done 
randomly.  
2.2.4 Materials and Procedure  
Participants took part in a study that examined the process used by jurors to make 
decisions under diverse circumstances. Prior to making their judgements, the participants 
were required to complete the online abridged English Version of the Morningness-
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Eveningness Questionnaire (MEQ) (rH&O, Chelminski, Petros, Plaud, & Ferraro, 2000). See 
Appendix A2.  MEQ validation was conducted by Chelminski et al. (2000) who suggested 
internal consistency (Cronbach α) MEQ was 0.70. The MEQ consists of 5 items to assess the 
time of day an individual feels the most alert. Participants’ responses to each of the items 
were added up and ranged from 4 to 25. According to the scoring criterion, participants can 
be classified as ‘definitely evening types’ (4-7), ‘moderately evening type’ (8-11), ‘neither 
type’ (12-17), ‘moderately morning type’ (18-21), and ‘definitely morning types’ (20–25). 
High scores indicate a greater degree of morningness, while low scores indicate a greater 
degree of eveningness. Participants who were classified as ‘neither type’ were excluded from 
the rest of the study (n=4). 
On the basis of the questionnaire results, the participants were categorised as either 
Morning (M) types or Evening (E) types. Such categorisation was achieved through a median 
split of the participants’ scores. M-type participants scored significantly higher on the 
Morningness-Eveningness dimensions compared to their E-type counterparts; MM-types = 
17.00 (SD = 3.36), N = 34, ME-types = 11.57 (SD = 1.36), N = 30, t(64) = 7.31, p < .001. After 
categorisation as either M-type or E-type, the participants were reconvened and required to 
complete a small questionnaire. One half of the participants were tested at circadian 
congruent times in which case M-types were tested between 10am and 12noon (n=64) while 
E-types were tested between 1pm and 5pm (n=65). The other half was tested at circadian 
incongruent times.  
As part of the process of making judgements, both individual and group participants were 
first required to read a brief description of a criminal case that entailed a series of sexual 
molestation of young girls (See Appendix A1). Second, the participants were required to read 
a stereotypical description of the suspect. An example of such a description is a 44-year-old 
white male who is violent, unemployed, lonely and an underachiever. Lastly, the participants 
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read an atypical offender profile provided by a forensic expert. This brief description 
included a spectrum of characteristics that individuals who have previously engaged in sexual 
attacks fall under, based on actual statistical evidence, but at odds with the stereotypical 
suspect description. For example, the suspect was described as a male employed in a form of 
a skilled job, affectionate and acts maturely (see Marshall & Alison, 2007 for complete 
descriptions). Participants tested in groups were first required to read the case information 
individually, and afterwards they were asked to discuss the case between themselves in order 
to form a collective judgement. 
2.2.5 Measures  
 
After being briefed and ensuring that all instructions were understood, the participants 
were asked to rate the extent to which the suspect could be considered guilty. In addition, 
they were required to rate their perceptions about the accuracy of the judgement (1= Not at 
all accurate, 2= very small accuracy, 3= slight accuracy, 4= some accuracy, 5 = fair level of 
accuracy, 6= fairly good accuracy, 7= good accuracy, 8= very good accurate, 9= almost 
completely accurate, 10= completely accurate) before and after being presented with the 
atypical profile. This process was necessary for measuring the extent of belief perseverance. 
In order to assess the level of cognitive resources that were expended during the decision 
making process, the participants were asked to rate their involvement level on a 10-point 
likert scale (1= none, 2= very small, 3= slight, 4= some, 5 = fair level, 6= fairly high, 7= 
high, 8= very high, 9= almost complete, 10=greatly), as well as how difficult it was to make 
the decision (1= not at all, 2= very low, 3= somehow low, 4= low, 5= neither difficult nor 
easy, 6= slightly, 7= moderately, 8= quite difficult, 9= very difficult, 10= extremely 
difficult). Prior to indicating their level of involvement, the participants were briefed that the 
involvement described the level of mental effort devoted towards understanding and 
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evaluating the case. Lastly, the participants were debriefed, and their participation in the 
experiment was appreciated.  
2.3 Results 
2.3.1 Manipulation Checks 
 
A slightly higher level of involvement in the task was noted for participants tested at a 
circadian congruent time; Mcongruent = 6.55, SD = 2.36 vs. Mincongruent = 5.88, SD = 2.56. 
Similarly, participants tested at congruent times reported higher levels of difficulty in making 
judgements; Mcongruent = 6.23, SD = 2.35 vs. Mincongruent = 5.74, SD = 2.21. Neither difference 
for level of involvement or difficulty reached statistical significance; t(62) – 1.08, p= .14, one 
tailed, Cohen’s d=0.27 for involvement, and t(62) = 0.87, p = .19, one tailed, Cohen’s d = 
0.22 for difficulty.  
2.3.2 Guilt Judgements  
 
Four key theoretical patterns were observed in the analysed data. First, the impact of time 
of judgement that reflected the extent to which the participants changed their guilt ratings 
after being briefed on the atypical profile. Second, the study obtained a pattern of interaction 
between the circadian congruence, and time taken to make guilt rating (see Fig. 1.1). The 
third pattern involved interaction between group and time (i.e. match vs. mismatch) of ratings 
(see Fig. 1.2); while the fourth involved the interaction between circadian match/congruence 
and group (see Fig. 1.3). 
Data on guilt judgement was analysed with a 2 (circadian congruent vs. circadian-
incongruent) x 2 (individual vs. group) x 2 (before vs. after the atypical profile presentation) 
mixed analysis of variance (ANOVA). From the analysis, there was no statistically 
significant difference for a time of testing (congruent or incongruent with circadian 
preferences), F< 1. Similarly, the main effect of testing condition (individually or in a small 
group) was not significant, F(1, 60) = 1.25. A significant difference was however noted for 
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effect of the time of judgement, Mbefore = 7.26 (SD = 1.52) vs. Mafter = 5.44 (SD = 2.07), F(1, 
60) = 47.23, MSE = 2.35, p < .001. Further, a significant interaction was noted between the 
circadian time of testing and the judgement time as illustrated in Figure 1.3: F(1, 60) = 4.65, 
p= .04. The participants also made a significant downward revision of their guilt judgement 
after presentation with the atypical profile for both circadian congruent times, t(29) = 6.02, 
p< .001 and at circadian incongruent times, t(33) = 3.46, p= .002. As anticipated, 
significantly less time taken to provide/make pre- and post-profile judgements were noted 
under circadian-incongruent times thus suggesting more robust belief perseverance, t(62) = -
2.13, p= .02, one tailed.  
 
Figure 1.1: Mean judgement of suspect’s guilt before and after provision with atypical 
profile based on circadian preferences (circadian /congruent times vs. circadian/incongruent 
times). 
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Figure 1.2: Mean judgement of suspect’s guilt before and after provision with atypical 
profile based on individuals vs. group. 
Further, the effect of individual or group as a test condition on guilt judgements collapsed 
across time of testing was controlled by circadian congruency, F(1, 60) = 4.50, MSE = 3.89, p 
= .04 (see Fig. 1.3). Testing condition (individual vs. group) using unplanned post-hoc tests 
did not reveal a significant effect (with a Bonferroni-corrected α set at .0125) on guilt 
judgements at circadian congruent time, t(28) =-.61. Individual guilt judgements were 
however significantly higher than group judgements when the participants were tested at 
circadian mismatching time, t(32) = 2.72, p < 0.05. Based on these results, there are no 
significant differences of individual and group guilt judgements for circadian congruent 
times. However, the differences for the two testing conditions are significant for circadian 
incongruent times.  
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Figure 1.3: Mean judgement of suspect’s guilt for individual vs. group based on circadian 
congruent and non-congruent times. 
2.4 Discussion 
 
The findings from the study affirm that circadian variations have a moderating effect on 
belief perseverance. Specifically, individuals tested at times that matched their circadian 
preferences exhibited less belief perseverance after being briefed with the atypical suspect 
profile. By contrast, participants who were tested at times that mismatched their circadian 
preferences were less flexible in terms of revising their beliefs after presentation with the 
suspect’s profile. These findings thus corroborate earlier research which indicates that an 
individual’s performance in tasks that require cognitive efficiency is dependent on the 
availability of cognitive resources (Natale et al., 2003; Schmidt et al., 2007).  
The present experiment sought to investigate the extent of belief perseverance and 
alleviation from the context of circadian variations and belief perseverance. From the review 
of the literature, it was hypothesised that belief perseverance can be attributed to heuristic 
thinking, which is characterised by an exertion of less cognitive efforts in examining a 
situation and making judgements. To alleviate belief perseverance, it was argued that 
individuals should have access to greater cognitive resources that are required to engage in 
deliberative/cognitive thinking. In this experiment, augmentation of such resources was done 
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by testing individuals at their optimal circadian times, when their cognitive resources are at 
their peak level, as well as exposure to socially distributed thinking through participation in-
group judgements. In order to test whether such augmentation had any significant impact in 
terms of alleviating belief perseverance, it was deemed important to test some participants 
individually and in groups during their non-optimal circadian incongruent times.  
With regard to socially distributed thinking, one of the key findings from the study is that 
group participants exhibited less belief perseverance after presentation with the atypical 
suspect profile compared to individuals. In other words, it was easier for participants in a 
group to revise their initial judgements, compared to individuals making judgements on their 
own. This could suggest the concept of distributed cognition, which implies that interactions 
between several individuals allows for distribution of information processing and, thus, more 
deliberative thinking (Brown & Duguid, 1991; Olsson, Juslin, & Olsson, 2006). The study, 
however, proves that groups did not exhibit any significant differences in revising their initial 
beliefs when tested at congruent and incongruent times. This finding, in essence, suggests 
that even in non-optimal circadian times, members of a group were able to engage in more 
deliberative thinking due to augmentation of cognitive resources through distributed 
cognition.  
The findings contributed to existing research on the effect of cognitive mechanisms on 
belief perseverance in several ways. First, the findings help prove that belief perseverance is 
not only a result of content of thought, for example, the availability of reasons for or against 
the initial belief (Anderson, 1982), but also the consequence of availability of cognitive 
resources, which determine the type of thinking to be applied (intuitive or analytical). The 
extent to which counterarguments are valid depends on the availability of cognitive 
resources. In the absence of cognitive resources, individuals are more likely to engage in less 
conscious/heuristic thinking that does not give adequate consideration to the issue at hand. 
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On the contrary, individuals provided with greater cognitive resources can engage in more 
analytical thinking and can, therefore, rely on counterarguments to revise their initial faulty 
beliefs. Empirically, the present study provides credible evidence that circadian variations 
and socially distributed thinking have a positive impact on belief perseverance alleviation, by 
providing more cognitive resources for tasks that demand higher levels of cognitive 
efficiency.  
Another insightful finding from the present study, as aforementioned, is the observation 
that belief perseverance alleviation did not change significantly for group participants when 
tested at circadian congruent and incongruent times. It can thus be argued that group thinking 
allows for greater exploitation of individual cognitive resources, even at non-optimal times. 
Some studies such as List (2008) had however proven that, in some context, group thinking 
might lead to optimal results. This is likely to be the case when the groups are less structured. 
In the present study, this aspect was overcome by grouping individuals with similar circadian 
preferences in the same groups. In future, researchers may, therefore, investigate the impact 
that mixed group participants (i.e. morning and evening persons) have on the extent of 
alleviation of belief perseverance. For example, researchers can test whether inclusion of 
evening type persons in a group comprising mainly of morning type persons tested in the 
morning hours (circadian congruent times) can reduce the extent of belief perseverance 
alleviation.  
From yet another perspective, the study suggests that, besides influencing the level 
cognitive resources available, circadian timing may influence other cognitive performance 
risks, such as distraction and attentiveness. The study, for instance, finds that during circadian 
congruent times, individuals spend more time in making a judgement, thus implying that they 
are more attentive and less distracted. It is also at circadian congruent timings that individuals 
are likely to consider the decision-making process as difficult, and, therefore, use more 
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cognitive resources. It has also been found that individuals who considered the judgement 
difficult are more likely to revise their beliefs after being provided with counter evidence. 
The availability of cognitive resources impacts on the level of understanding of 
counterevidence that is necessary to alleviate belief perseverance. In the real world decision-
making such as courtrooms, the implication is that individuals required to perform tasks at 
their non-optimal times are at a competitive disadvantage compared to individuals operating 
in their optimal times. This is especially the case for tasks that require deeper reasoning. In 
such a case, the negative effects of cognitive stress, such as suboptimal decision-making, can, 
in part, be minimised by providing opportunities for individuals to work in groups.  
The findings also have implications for past explanations of belief perseverance. In the 
present study, it has been suggested that instructions to consider counterarguments may 
successfully lead to a reduction of the initial belief by inviting deeper processing of the 
counterevidence. Such instructions may, however, fail when an individual’s cognitive 
resources are depleted, for instance, by requiring the person to undertake a task that requires 
higher cognitive efficiency at a circadian incongruent time. Alternative accounts by studies 
such as Nestler (2010) have suggested that judgements are, to a large extent, mediated by 
metacognitive perceptions pertaining to difficulty in handling the task. Nestler (2010), in 
particular, suggested that individuals tend to reduce the likelihood of the truth or an outcome 
from the extent to which they find generating reasons for or against the outcome difficult. 
From the present study’s findings, individuals examined at circadian congruent times tended 
to perceive the task as more difficult, but at the same time, exhibited less belief perseverance. 
Therefore, Nestler’s (2010) metacognitive explanation is not supported by the study’s results.  
The study thus concludes that circadian preferences can have a significant impact on 
cognitive resources available for decision making in processes that require higher cognitive 
efficiency. During circadian incongruent times, individuals are predisposed by relying on 
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automatic/unconscious response systems, resulting in more pronounced belief perseverance. 
This ensures that individuals tested at the circadian congruent preferences, as well as 
allowing for distributed cognition through participation in-group thinking, can overcome this 
impact. In the case of the distributed cognition, it has been shown that the efficiency of group 
thinking is not affected by congruent or incongruent circadian timings. Therefore, socially 
distributed thinking has a positive impact on augmenting cognitive resources that influence 
the level of belief perseverance.  
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Chapter 3: The Effect of Circadian Variations and Type of Reason given on Belief 
Perseverance in a Legal Context 
3.1 Chapter Introduction 
3.1.1 Study Background  
 
Imagine you are a police officer in charge of an investigation. You are reading a suspect’s 
description related to your case. You may form an opinion about this suspect’s guilt or 
innocence. Now you receive an offender profile, which is at odds with the suspect’s 
description you have just read. Two things could happen: you can change your mind, or you 
can stick to your own belief. People tend to hold onto their belief even when new evidence 
contradicts their initial beliefs. This phenomenon is known as belief perseverance (Ross et 
al., 1975). While different explanations have been proposed for this phenomenon (e.g., 
Anderson, 1983; Sanna, Schwarz, & Stocker, 2002), few studies have looked at the factors 
that may moderate the extent to which people will persevere with their original belief. In the 
present experiment, Author considers two factors: whether they provide a reason for the 
original belief or against it, and whether they are tested at their least compatible or most 
compatible circadian time.  
3.1.2 The Psychology of Belief Perseverance   
 
 Belief perseverance, as reviewed in the introduction chapter, occurs when people who 
have learned about an event continue to stand with their opinion, even after they are told that 
it was fictitious. There have been efforts to research on the various ways in which belief 
perseverance can be alleviated. Anderson, Lepper, and Ross (1980) proposed that asking 
participants to provide an explanation that would go against their beliefs would diminish 
belief perseverance. In their experiment, half of the participants were given a scenario 
suggesting that people who are risk-takers make better fire-fighters compared to cautious 
people; the other half were told the opposite was true. Both groups were told to write down 
Running Head: K0801532 
	
	
54 
possible explanations for the arguments in the scenarios they had read. The authors found that 
participants who had been told that risk takers make better firefighters were more likely to 
change their belief if they had explained why a cautious person might make a better 
firefighter. This suggests that generating causal explanations for an alternative theory will 
help alleviate the effect of belief perseverance (see also, Anderson & Sechler, 1986; Lord, 
Ross, & Lepper, 1979).  
It is possible, however, that belief perseverance does not decrease because people simply 
generate an alternative explanation. It could be due to the fact that generating an alternative 
explanation is difficult, and demands deeper level of cognitive processing. For example, 
Sanna et al. (2002) hypothesised that it was difficult for people to list many reasons for an 
alternative outcome. They asked participants to read a story adapted from Fischhoff (1975), 
relating a battle in the British-Gurkha war. Half of the participants were in a “British win” 
condition, where they were told, “The British overcame the Gurkhas and ultimately won the 
war.” The other half of the participants were in a “Gurkha win” condition, where they were 
told, “The Gurkhas overcame the British and ultimately won the war.” Participants were then 
asked to list two or ten reasons for the victory of either the Gurkhas or the British. 
Specifically, participants in the British-win condition were required to list their thoughts 
supporting the Gurkha victory, whereas the participants in the Gurkha-win condition required 
listing their thoughts supporting a British victory. Sanna et al. (2002) found that the 
alternative outcome was deemed less likely to have occurred when participants had to list ten 
thoughts, compared to when participants had to list two thoughts only. These findings suggest 
that producing many reasons is much more difficult than listing only a few. 
Nestler (2010) examined this possibility in two experiments while investigating belief 
perseverance. In the first experiment, participants were asked to read a scenario describing a 
psychological study looking at toy preferences in children. For example, when some 
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participants were told that when children were forbidden to play with a toy, their attitude 
towards this toy became more positive. After reading the brief, participants were split into 
three groups. The first group was asked to generate an explanation for the outcome reported. 
The second group was asked to list two possible reasons for the occurrence of this outcome, 
while a third group was asked to list ten possible reasons. Participants were then informed 
that the reported experiment had not been carried out. Rather, the report was invented to 
present the typical procedures of psychological experiments. Participants were then asked 
whether they believed the fictitious outcome that they had read about would be likely to be 
true.  
Nestler (2010) hypothesised that, when people experience difficulties in explaining a 
given outcome, they might also believe that this outcome is less likely to be true. He found 
that participants who had listed only two reasons for the occurrence of the spurious study 
results were more likely to believe these results would actually be observed if the study were 
to be carried out, compared to participants who had been asked to list ten reasons for the 
occurrence of the same results. In a second experiment, Nestler (2010) reversed these patterns 
by asking participants to list either two or ten explanations for the occurrence of the opposite 
outcome. He found that providing two reasons for the opposite outcome reduced belief 
perseverance, however providing ten reasons for the opposite outcome led to a sharp increase 
in belief perseverance.  
Nestler (2010) concluded that individuals used their subjective experience of difficulty in 
judging the likelihood of an outcome to evaluate this likelihood. Accordingly, the ease with 
which people could generate a few reasons for a given outcome increased belief perseverance 
in this outcome, while the ease with which people could generate a few reasons against the 
occurrence of a given outcome decreased belief perseverance. Besides experiencing ease or 
difficulty while generating reasons, there is another factor which has been shown to affect 
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belief perseverance; namely the cognitive resources available at the time of judgement. This 
work is reviewed in the next section. 
3.1.3 Circadian Variations, Dual-Processes, and Belief Perseverance 
 
Villejoubert, Khan, and Vallée-Tourangeau (2013) investigated the influence of 
circadian preferences on belief perseverance in a legal context. They hypothesised that belief 
perseverance results from the operations of rapid and automatic cognitive processes, whereas 
belief revision results from slower and more deliberate and effortful cognitive processes 
(Kahneman, 2003; Sloman, 1996; Stanovich & West, 2000). Hence, when people are tested 
at their preferred circadian time, their increased cognitive resources should result in less 
belief perseverance. At incongruent circadian times, however, their limited cognitive 
resources should result in more belief perseverance. The researcher asked participants to read 
a description of a crime followed by a suspect description presenting a typical suspect and, 
finally, an offender profile describing an atypical offender. They were then asked to estimate 
the probability that the suspect was guilty once before reading the offender profile and once 
after reading the profile. Belief perseverance was measured as the difference between these 
two probability judgements. Half of the participants were tested at a time that was congruent 
with their circadian preferences (e.g., morning-types tested in the morning), while the 
remaining half were tested at an incongruent time (e.g., morning-types tested in the evening). 
Results showed that belief perseverance was the largest when individuals were tested at 
incongruent circadian times (compared to when they were tested at congruent times), 
suggesting that belief perseverance was more pronounced when people had limited cognitive 
resources at their disposal, as anticipated by the author. These results suggested another way 
to test Nestler’s (2010) hypothesis. When people experience difficulty in explaining an 
outcome, it leads to weaker beliefs. Thus, the author managed to manipulate people’s 
cognitive resources available through circadian preferences.  
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3.1.4 Present Experiment 
 
The current research sought to establish whether belief perseverance occurs in decision-
making and under what circumstances. Furthermore, the research sought to understand 
whether individuals tested at congruent times would exhibit less belief perseverance than 
those tested at incongruent times. Moreover, it sought to examine whether individuals 
providing reasons for the alternative outcome would exhibit less belief perseverance than 
those providing reasons for the original outcome. Under circadian incongruent testing, the 
author expected that individuals would have less cognitive resources available, concluding 
that generating reasons supporting the original belief would be more difficult. When it is 
difficult to generate reasons in favour of a known outcome, individuals should rethink their 
initial judgement and change their mind. Therefore, it was expected less belief perseverance, 
not more, under incongruent thinking when participants are asked to provide reasons for the 
outcome (hypothesis 1, replicating the condition where participants had to provide 10 reasons 
for the outcome in Nestler 2010, Experiment 1). Under circadian congruent testing, by 
contrast, it could be assumed it was easier to generate reason supporting the original belief, so 
it can be expected that an increase in belief perseverance under congruent thinking when 
asked to provide reasons for (hypothesis 2, replicating the condition where participants had to 
provide 2 reasons for in Nestler, 2010, Experiment 1). 
For reasons against, the pattern should be different. Generating reasons against is hard, 
and under incongruent testing, it would be hardest, so it was expected for participants to 
revert to their original belief and show more belief perseverance (hypothesis 3, replicating the 
condition where participants had to provide 10 reasons against in Nestler, 2010, Experiment 
2). Whereas under congruent testing, generating reasons against should be easier (they have 
more cognitive resources to do so), therefore, this should lead to a decrease in belief 
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perseverance (hypothesis 4, replicating the condition where participants had to provide 2 
reasons against in Nestler, 2010, Experiment 2). 
3.2 Method 
3.2.1 Data Management  
 
The scores obtained from the experiment followed a normal distribution in which the 
value of multivariate kurtosis was less than the recommended 1.96. The sample from 
Kingston University students was obtained from a population that follows a probability 
distribution. As such, it was considered necessary to make use of parametric statistical tests 
including t-test and ANOVA.  
3.2.2 Participants and Design  
 
A total number of 162 Kingston University students took part in the study (Mean age = 22 
years, SD = 6.84).  Some participants were compensated with psychology course credits, 
while others were volunteer university students. Participants who were familiar with the task 
were removed from the study (n=4). The experiment used a 2 × 2 between-subject design. 
The independent variables were the time of testing (circadian-congruent or circadian-
incongruent) and the type of reasons given (for suspect’s guilt or against suspect’s guilt). 
Judgements of the probability of guilt, level of confidence in the guilt judgements, 
involvement with the case and difficulty in forming a judgement about the suspect’s guilt, as 
well as the difficulty of generating reasons, were measured as dependent variables.  
3.2.3 Materials and Procedure  
 
The nature of the experiment was explained to participants, and informed consent was 
sought.  In order to determine their circadian rhythm preference, participants were first asked 
to complete the abridged English Version of the Morningness-Eveningness Questionnaire 
(rH&O, Chelminski et al., 2000).  MEQ consists of 5 items to assess the time of day an 
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individual feels the most alert (see Appendix B2). MEQ validation was conducted by 
Chelminski et al. (2000) they suggested internal consistency (Cronbach α) MEQ was 0.70. 
Participants’ responses to each of the items were added up and ranged from 4 to 25. 
According to the scoring criterion, participants can be classified as ‘definitely evening types’ 
(4-7), ‘moderately evening type’ (8-11), ‘neither type’ (12-17), ‘moderately morning type’ 
(18-21), and ‘definitely morning types’ (20–25). High scores indicate a greater degree of 
morningness, while low scores indicate a greater degree of eveningness. Participants who 
were classified as ‘neither’ type were excluded from the rest of the study (n= 11).  
After their circadian preference was identified, participants were invited to take part in the 
second part of the study, and were randomly allocated to one of two conditions: half of the 
participants were tested at a time that was congruent with their circadian preferences (n=81) 
while the remaining half of the participants was tested at an incongruent time (n=81). 
Specifically, circadian congruent testing involved either testing individuals with a morning 
circadian preference (hereafter M-types) before 12noon, or testing individuals with an 
evening circadian preference (hereafter E-types) after 12noon. Conversely, circadian 
incongruent testing involved either testing M-types after 12noon or E-types before 12noon. 
In this second part of the experiment, participants were invited to complete a short 
questionnaire on investigative decision-making, which was introduced as involving a series 
of sexual assaults against girls. Participants were reminded that should this material cause 
them discomfort or distress, they were not obliged to respond to the questionnaire and could 
leave the questionnaire at any time. Prior to the start of study, participants were further 
informed that they were not under any time pressure into giving an answer and had as much 
time as they liked to read and answer each task. Upon consenting to participate, individuals 
were asked to record their MEQ score and to rate the extent to which they felt mentally alert 
on a visual analogue scale ranging from 1 to 10 (1 = not at all, 2= very low, 3= somehow 
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low, 4= low, 5= neither low or high, 6= slightly alert, 7= moderately, alert 8= quite alert, 9= 
very alert, 10= extremely alert).  
They were then asked to imagine they were acting as the Senior Investigating Officer in 
charge of investigating a series of sexual assaults against young girls, and were invited to 
read a laminate sheet providing information about the incident. The information presented 
was adapted from Marshall and Alison (2007), and included some background information, a 
short description of the suspect, and a description of the offence (see Appendix B1). The sheet 
then informed participants that an individual had been brought to their attention following a 
media broadcast of the suspect description. The following detailed description of this 
individual was then presented to them: 
Suspect A is a 44 year old white male who is 6ft 2 inches tall, has dark blonde 
hair and has a tattoo on his left arm. Further inquiries have revealed that he is 
currently single and he is described by local people as insecure with women, 
although, he has had one previous relationship with a woman which lasted 6 months. 
He lives alone in an apartment complex half a mile from where the crimes took place 
and he grew up in the local area, which is reflected, in his accent. He is currently 
unemployed and inquiries in local pubs revealed that he is a fairly heavy user of 
alcohol. He was brought up in a poor, working class family and he dropped out of 
school at 15 before taking his O-levels. Local people described him as having a short 
temper and a tendency to be quite aggressive. A search of his home revealed that he 
had a large collection of pornography. 
After participants read this information, they were asked to consider the case and decide 
whether they thought the suspect was the offender. Specifically, they were asked to rate the 
probability that the suspect may have committed the series of the offences based on the 
available information. Participants were asked to report their answer on a visual-analogue 
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scale ranging from 1 to 10 (1 = impossible, 10 = Certain). Next, participants were asked to 
rate the degree to which they felt confident that their judgement was correct on a visual-
analogue scale ranging from 1 to 10 (1 = Not at all confident, 10 = Absolutely confident). 
After this, half of the participants were asked to provide five reasons explaining why the 
suspect may actually be the offender (for suspect’s guilt condition), or to provide five reasons 
explaining why the suspect may not actually be the offender (against suspect’s guilt 
condition). 
Next, participants were told that, due to the serious nature of the offence, a behavioural 
investigator was requested to assist them in their apprehension of the unknown offender and 
produced the following offender profile:  
In most crimes of this nature the offender is employed in some form of skilled 
or office job. The offender will usually be married, often with children of his own. 
The offender will be sexually exploratory and will probably have had several sexual 
partners. The offender will own a pornography collection. Most offenders live within 
2 miles of the scene of the crime. Many offences of this type do not involve the use of 
alcohol or drugs. Offenders of this sort are often perceived by others as being quiet, 
self-assured individuals. Sex offenders of this nature try to avoid police attention and 
usually have no previous criminal convictions. Offenders typically appear to have 
normal moral and belief structures. Offences like this are characteristically committed 
by individuals of approximately 25 years of age (average). Most are aged under 30. 
This type of sex offender often has a superficial charm, and will probably be fairly 
popular. The offender will probably have been educated beyond the age of 16 and is 
likely to have gone to university. 
After they finished reading the profile information, participants were asked again to rate 
the probability that suspect may have committed this series of offences (this time, based on 
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all the information at their disposal), as well as to provide a second confidence judgement. 
Participants were then asked to rate their level of involvement in the case (1 = not at all, 10 = 
extremely) and the extent to which they found it difficult to list reasons as well as to estimate 
the probability that the suspect might have been the offender (1 = not at all, 10 = very). Next, 
they reported their gender, age, area and level of study. Finally, all participants were thanked 
and debriefed by the researcher. 
3.4 Results 
 
To compute the time of testing (circadian-congruent vs. circadian-incongruent) variable, it 
was classified testing times as “morning-congruent” if testing took place before 12:00 and 
“evening-congruent” if testing took place after 12:002. The participants were then split up as 
“morning-type” or M-type and “evening-type” or E-type, depending on whether their MEQ 
score was above or below the median score for the entire sample, Mdn = 14. As expected, the 
MEQ scores for E-types were significantly lower than the MEQ scores for M-types, ME-type = 
10.14, SD = 1.96 vs. MM-type = 17.93, SD = 2.76, t(160) = 20.56, p < .001. M-types tested 
after 12.00noon and E-types tested before 12.00noon were in the circadian-incongruent 
condition (n = 40) whereas M-types tested before 12.00noon and E-types tested after 
12.00noon were in the circadian-congruent condition (n =53). 
3.4.1 Manipulation Check for Circadian Congruency 
 
To ensure that the circadian congruency of the time of testing had an impact on cognitive 
processing, a Multivariate Analysis of Variance (MANOVA) was conducted with time of 
testing (circadian-congruent vs. circadian-incongruent) as an independent variable and mental 
alertness, involvement with the case, difficulty to provide reasons for or against the suspect’s 
guilt, difficulty in judging the likelihood of the suspect’s guilt, and finally the number of 
																																								 																				
2Adan and Almiral’s (1991) classified testing times as “morning-congruent” if testing took place between 07:00 and 15:00 
and “evening-congruent” if testing took place after 15:00 and before 07:00. Their study, however, used night shift workers. 
Since this study involved students, it was decided to use 12:00 as a cut-off point. 
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reasons generated as dependent variables. Figure 2.1 presents the mean data for each 
measure. Unfortunately, results revealed no statistically significant difference in cognitive 
processing based on testing time congruency with circadian preferences, F(5, 156) = 
0.43, p = .82; Wilks' Λ = 0.98, ηp2 = .014. 
                             
Figure 2.1: Measures of cognitive processing as a function of circadian congruency at 
the time of testing. Error bars represent standard errors. 
3.4.2 Probability of Guilt Judgements  
 
The theoretically important patterns in these data are the effect of time of testing 
(circadian-congruent or circadian-incongruent) and the type of reasons given (for suspect’s 
guilt or against suspect’s guilt) on people’s persistence in their original judgement of the 
probability that the suspect committed the offence after being presented by an atypical 
offender profile. The degree of belief persistence after the profile presentation was computed 
as follows: first, the absolute difference between the first and second guilt probability 
judgements was computed. Since those judgements were made on a scale ranging from 1 to 
10, the absolute difference ranged from 0 (no change) to 9 (maximum change). The absolute 
difference score to obtain a belief persistence score ranging from 0 (no belief persistence) to 
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9 (absolute belief persistence) was reverse coded. A 2 (time of congruency)  × 2 (type of 
reasons given) between-subject Analysis of Variance (ANOVA) was conducted on the belief 
persistence scores. 
Time of testing did not affect belief persistence, Mcongruent = 7.31, SD = 1.78, Mincongruent = 
7.06, SD = 1.55, F < 1. Similarly, the type of reason given (for vs. against the suspect’s guilt) 
did not affect belief persistence, Mfor = 7.33, SD = 1.54, Magainst = 7.04, SD = 1.79, F < 1. 
Similarly, the interaction between time of testing and type of reasons was not significant, F 
(1, 158) = .42, p = .51. For the sake of illustration, Figure 2.2 presents the mean belief 
persistence scores as a function of both testing time and reason type. 
 
Figure 2.2: Belief persistence as a function of the congruence between circadian 
preferences and time of testing and as a function of the type of reasons given. 
3.4.3 Change in Confidence Judgements 
 
Finally, a 2 (time of testing)  × 2 (type of reasons given) between-subject Analysis of 
Variance (ANOVA) was conducted on the change in confidence scores. Time of testing did 
affect confidence level, Mcongruent = -0.28, SD = 2.03, Mincongruent = 0.32, SD = 1.76, F (1, 158) 
= 4.11, p = .04.  Similarly, the type of reason given (for vs. against the suspect’s guilt) did 
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show a marginal effect on confidence level, Mfor = 0.29, SD = 1.98, Magainst = -0.26, SD = 
1.82, F (1, 158) =3.49, p = .06.  However, the interaction between time of testing and type of 
reasons was not significant, F(1, 158) =.35, p = .55.  
3.5 Discussion 
 
This study sought to examine the cognitive processes that underpin belief perseverance 
with a specific focus on the effect of circadian variations and type of reason given for such 
perseverance. Study 1 and 2 used the same brief of a criminal case that entails a series of 
sexual assaults of young girls. The information was adapted from Marshall and Alison 
(2007). However, different outcomes were observed in relation to belief perseverance in 
circadian congruent and circadian incongruent times. Specifically, after being presented with 
the atypical suspect, study 1 indicated that participants tested at their circadian congruent 
times exhibited less belief perseverance compared to participants tested at their circadian 
incongruent times. In contrast to study 2, the participants did not significantly revise their 
guilt judgement after presentation with the atypical profile.  
The contradictory results of study 1 and study 2 could be attributed to the differences in 
sample population. Study 1 comprised of staff members as well as students, while study 2 
comprised of only students. It could be argued that, when given a uniform and well-balanced 
sample size, there would be little to no contradictory findings between the two studies. There 
was no correlation found between the age and gender on the findings of the two studies. This 
lack of correlation could be explained largely due to the sample population. There was no 
correlation found between age on belief perseverance (r = 0.85, p>0.05) and gender on belief 
perseverance (r = 0.88, p>0.05). Furthermore, a multiple regression analysis was used to test 
if the gender or age had any effect on the belief perseverance. The results indicated that 
neither age (R2=0.007, β=0.85, p>0.05) nor gender (R2=0.008, β=0.88, p>0.05) had any 
influence on the belief perseverance.  
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In study 1, the correlation of age on belief perseverance and gender on belief perseverance 
showed results similar to study 2. Age (r = 0.75, p>0.05) and gender (r = 0.80, p>0.05) had 
no influence on the belief perseverance. The multiple regression test conducted also revealed 
that neither gender (R2=0.006, β=0.86, p>0.05) nor age (R2=0.007, β=0.83, p>0.05) had any 
influence on the belief perseverance. The fact that students follow a morning-schedule 
regardless of their Morningness-Eveningness preference from a young age could have 
resulted in them being trained to function at their optimal level during the day. This is in line 
with an observation made by Roberts and Kyllonen (1999), who claimed that students are 
“atypical”. Therefore, it can be inferred that the student nature of the participants led to a 
difference between the results of the two studies.  
Furthermore, contrary to study 1 and study 2 findings, Schmidt, Peigneux, and Cajochen 
(2012) have indicated that age could dampen or enhance the effects of circadian variations. In 
greater detail, the authors noted that age could cause changes in circadian and homeostatic 
processes, which, in turn, impact on cerebral activity. The fact that circadian variations were 
not affected by gender differences contradicts Boivin, Shechter, Boudreau, Begum, and Ying-
Kin’s (2016) study. This study noted that, during the night (i.e., circadian incongruent times), 
women are characterised by significantly lower levels of alertness compared to their male 
counterparts. This suggests that, in turn, male participants are likely to be less susceptible to 
effects of circadian variations on cognitive efficiency compared to their female counterparts.  
Another reason for this difference can be explained by taking into account the general 
intelligence and emotional intelligence levels of the participants. While some evidence is 
found that evening types showed higher intelligence (Roberts & Kyllonen, 1999), the 
difference in the sample population based on their Morningness-Eveningness preference in 
this study was statistically non significant. Lam and Kirby (2002) studied the effect of 
emotional and general intelligence on cognitive-based performance, and found that higher 
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rates of emotional and general intelligence correlated to higher cognitive-based performance. 
While intelligence, either general or emotional, was not tested in this study, it could have led 
to the differences in the study results. It is a possibility that there was a higher general or 
emotional intelligence present in study 1, compared to study 2.  
While the results of this study are important, future research can establish a larger sample 
size and apply the experiment to a wider range of sample population. As suggested by Fritz 
and MacKinnon (2007), a sample size of 405 or greater is important to detect errors and 
generate a substantial statistical power. The experiment can be conducted by applying 
variables such as emotional intelligence and general intelligence level, and the M-E Type 
preferences. While study 1 and study 2 found no correlation of age or gender on the results, a 
larger sample size could be used to test the findings of this study. 
Goel, Basner, Rao, and Dinges (2013) also acknowledged that circadian variations have 
the capability of degrading neuro-behavioural functions such as attention, cognitive speed 
and memory. They, however, emphasise that genetic components could also affect an 
individual’s degree of stability in neuro-behavioural responses. Therefore, among some 
individuals with certain genetic makeup, circadian variations may not have an overly high 
impact on cognitive efficiency that is required to process information which influences belief 
perseverance. This aspect could, therefore, possibly explain the differences in findings 
between the two studies.  
The finding showed that type of reasons (for and against) did not affect belief 
perseverance among participants in study 2, which largely contradicts other findings. Such as 
research by Schwarz (2004), for example, which suggested that individuals tend to 
experience difficulty while making their judgement. As a result, it is expected that individuals 
who experience these difficulties in generating reasons are likely to be characterised by 
possessing less belief perseverance, compared to individuals who find it easier to generate 
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reasons in support of their chosen outcome. Nestler (2010) expressed similar views, in which 
case, accessibility experiences (i.e. ability to generate supportive or counter-arguments) were 
found to influence the extent of belief perseverance persistence.  Further, Anderson (1982, 
2007) argued that belief perseverance emerges from the content of thought, such as the 
availability of reasons for or against a target belief or counter-explanation.  
The present study’s contradiction of the above views may be explained from the 
perspective of confirmation bias. Such bias as Grcic’s (2009) example is evident which states 
that an individual engages in the habit of looking for information that supports, as opposed to 
challenges, one’s belief system and preconceptions. In relation to the present research, the 
participants could, therefore, have held entrenched views regarding a sexual offender profile. 
It thus becomes possible to easily offer many reasons for or against a certain belief. When 
individuals are characterised by such confirmation bias, it is unlikely that they will be willing 
to easily admit the presence of erroneous beliefs, or be willing to change a belief after being 
provided with counterevidence.  Several studies (Nyhan & Reifler, 2010; Howell & West, 
2009; Cobb, Nyhan, & Reifler, 2013) also found that provision of information intended to 
correct misconceptions may fail to change the individual’s prior opinions/beliefs.  
From another perspective, the finding that circadian variations did not have a significant 
impact on mental alertness and task involvement contradicts other studies that reported 
significant findings. Valdez et al. (2012), for example, reported that mental performance or 
alertness tend to vary based on circadian variations, such that individuals are expected to be 
more alert at their circadian congruent times. The non-significant results, however, supported 
by research indicating that effects of circadian variations on mental performance could be 
affected by a range of other factors, such as the ambient conditions of the individual that is 
undertaking the task, the effects of practice and the nature of the task under consideration 
among others (Carrier & Monk, 2000). Moreover, Ferreira, Garcia-Marques, Sherman, and 
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Sherman (2006) and Posner and Snyder (1975) found that certain decision domains might be 
less susceptible to temporal variations in cognition. This is particularly the case for decision-
making situations that require less controlled thought processes. In other words, some 
decisions may be dominated by the presence of automatic response mechanisms, as opposed 
to the need for more conscious deliberation.  
A cognitive schematic theoretical approach also provides plausible explanations for the 
lack of change in confidence of judgement of the suspect’s guilt level among participants 
based on circadian preferences. The theory suggests that individuals routinely persist in 
disconfirmed beliefs because they tend to generate explanatory schema that, once developed, 
becomes independent of the information that originally gave rise to them (Smith, 2009). In 
such cases, belief persistence can only be reliably alleviated through generating messages that 
offer alternative explanatory scripts. Alternatively, belief perseverance, in such a context, can 
be achieved by distracting the individuals under consideration from developing supportive 
schemata for the faulty belief (Smith, 2009). This is in contrast to varying of cognitive 
resources through circadian rhythms, as investigated in the present experiment.  
To focus on the legal context in study 2, the non-significant results on the relationship 
between circadian variations, belief perseverance and type of reason given (for or against) 
have several implications. First, it suggests that scheduling demands which require a legal 
personnel to work or make decisions at various times of the day may not necessarily affect 
performance. In greater detail, individuals in courtrooms, who are required to make decisions 
at their circadian incongruent times, may not be more susceptible to inaccurate judgements 
and unnecessary belief perseverance, compared to their colleagues required to work at their 
circadian congruent times. However, other work sectors, such as the field of healthcare, have 
been found to be characterised significant differences in productivity of workers based on 
circadian variations. For example, McMenamin (2007) found that shift workers, such as 
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healthcare support staff and protective services employees who are required to work at their 
non-optimal circadian times, exhibit lower performance reports due to the presence of 
depleted cognitive resources (McMenamin, 2007).  
The study also argues that the absence of differences in belief perseverance among 
individuals tested at congruent and incongruent times can be attributed to under or 
overestimation of the efforts required in alleviating a prior false or inaccurate belief. Legally, 
the implication is that biased judgements in criminal or civil cases may be given when the 
jury is not keen on the effects of belief perseverance. Bias may be induced by false positive 
information about the suspect that will tend to be exaggerated since individuals tend to find it 
more difficult to recall positive information (Gilovich, 1991). In addition, positive 
information has been shown to be less influential than negative information (Baumeister, 
Bratslavsky, Finkenauer, & Vohs, 2001). If courtroom officials such as judges and 
prosecutors are not aware of such asymmetry, they are likely to be affected by belief 
perseverance while making decisions.  
In conclusion, this study examined whether belief perseverance in a legal context is 
affected by circadian variations and type of reasons offered in a judgement. In contrast to the 
earlier findings in study 1, the results indicate that circadian variations have no influence on 
belief perseverance. Similarly, types of reasons offered in judgement were not found to have 
an effect on belief perseverance. The study attributes the differences in outcomes of the two 
studies to a variety of factors that were not taken into account in the experiments, but could 
potentially influence the cognitive efficiency of the participants. These include a larger 
sample size in age, gender, and genetic makeup, as well as the ability of individuals to adapt 
to external demands by tuning their circadian preferences. Furthermore, future research may 
benefit from applying variables such as emotional intelligence and general intelligence level 
with their circadian preferences.  
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Chapter 4: The Effect of Circadian Variations and Framing Effects on the Three 
Framing Problems 
4.1 Chapter Introduction 
4.1.1 Research Background  
 
Valence framing, wherein the frame describes the same information based on Positive or 
Negative terms, has been an area of key interest in the past few decades (Bizer, Larsen, & 
Petty, 2011; Cassotti et al., 2012). Tversky and Kahneman (1981) conducted the pioneering 
study on framing effects, concluding that decision-making under risk is sensitive to whether 
the situation is described in terms of gains or losses. The participants in the study expressed 
very different valuations for options that were identical from an objective standpoint but were 
described as either gains or losses. Specifically, when presented with the ‘Asian Disease 
Problem’, the majority of the participants chose treatment A that was framed in terms gain 
lives over treatment B that was framed in terms of losing lives. There was no difference in 
the actual outcomes in the gain and loss conditions, hence the conclusion that individuals are 
risk-averse in gain situations and risk-taking in loss situations (Mahoney et al., 2011).  
Task designs in which there are risk-free and risky alternatives are commonly referred to 
as “risky-choice” and form the basis of the present study. Other forms of valence framing 
include goal framing and attribute framing (Levin et al., 1998). The underlying notion in 
risky-choice framing is that context has a heavy influence on how individuals evaluate 
information, in that how something is said often matters much more than what is said. Since 
the original work by Tversky and Kahneman (1981), subsequent studies have suggested the 
presence of mixed findings with regard to whether framing an alternative, in Positive versus 
Negative terms, has an influence on the response towards the alternative. Some studies have 
reported a benefit for the Positive frame (e.g., McElroy & Dowd, 2007; McElroy & 
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Dickinson, 2010) while others have found no significant frame effects (e.g. Peters & Levin, 
2008).  
Framing effects have been observed in a variety of real-life contexts. For example, the 
study by Zaller and Feldman (1992) found that Americans thought very differently about the 
advantages of oil drilling when the issue was framed in terms of the country’s dependency on 
foreign sources of energy, rather than in terms of the economic costs of the country failing to 
develop new energy sources. Framing is also used in the political field to shape opinions 
under certain conditions. In the field of marketing, negative attribute frames have, in some 
contexts, shown to be more persuasive in generating sales than positive ones (Putrevu, 2010). 
Based on prior research in the field of framing effects, it is evident that risky choice framing 
has a reliable and powerful impact on individuals’ decision-making in various fields. It is 
thus important to investigate and identify the factors that may influence individuals to be 
susceptible to framing effects.  
4.1.2 Framing Effects From a Cognitive Perspective  
 
A number of studies have attempted to explain framing effects from cognitive 
perspectives.  Gigerenzer et al. (1991) attributed framing effects to the construction of a 
mental model of the decisional situation among individuals. More specifically, this approach 
suggests that an individual will make a decision based on a comparison of the 
data/information used to describe the current situation and the pre-existing cognitive 
representations that are activated from the long-term memory (LTM). Similarly, Olekalns and 
Smith (2005) developed a model in which framing effects were suggested to occur as a result 
of the alternatives embedded in a cognitive causal schema. In this model, the manner in 
which alternatives are presented to an individual activates congruent schema (i.e. similar 
pattern of thought) from the LTM, which, in turn, leads to selective processing of available 
information, and finally the making of a decision that is biased (Olekalns & Smith, 2005). In 
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a circadian context, it would thus be expected that, during circadian incongruent times, 
individuals are more predisposed to selective processing of available information and 
inadequately reasoned use of congruent schema from LTM. This can be attributed to the 
presence of fewer cognitive resources that in turn increase the likelihood of framing effects 
occurring.  
Some studies also affirmed the presence of a relationship between cognitive bias and 
framing. The study by Nakamura (2016), for example, focuses on framing effects among 
adolescents, and reports that cognitive bias has an influence on framing. In the study, college 
students, who were characterised by moderate and high levels of rational thinking as opposed 
to experiential thinking, were shown to be more susceptible to the framing effect. Goal-
directed tasks and work that requires carefully considered decisions are examples of tasks 
that require rational thinking, while a task such as impulse buying makes use of experiential 
thinking. An earlier study by Shiloh, Salton, and Sharabi (2002), however, suggested that 
rational thinking does not, on its own, significantly moderate the framing effect on the risky-
choice situation. Rather, individuals characterised by complementary (high rational/high 
experiential) and poor (low rational/low experiential) thinking showed a framing effect 
(Shiloh et al., 2002).  
From another perspective, introducing negative bias by framing a particular situation in 
negative terms has been suggested to reinforce framing effects, due to the higher sensitivity 
of the human cognitive systems to negatively framed information (Ito & Cacioppo, 2005; 
Fiske & Taylor, 2013). Lupfer et al. (2000) further add that, during the process of impression 
formation, an expectancy that confirms negative information tends to overrule the effect of 
disconfirming positive information. By way of example, information that signals danger or 
threat to an individual tends to outweigh information signalling hope. In an attempt to explain 
the rationale behind such occurrences, Miclea and Curseu (2003) found that participants were 
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willing to allocate personal as well as external resources (e.g. calculators, computers and 
checklists) in the process of addressing situations that were framed as dangerous, and thus, 
the perception of an impending threat. By contrast, the participants were more reluctant in 
allocating resources to understand a situation framed positively as an opportunity. The 
general implication, therefore, is that the human cognitive system operates in such a way that 
greater resources are mobilised in processing negatively framed information. Based on these 
arguments, it is expected that, during circadian congruent times, individuals have greater 
cognitive resources to analyse negatively framed situations, and hence a lower incidence of 
framing effects.  
While taking into consideration the “life” and “death” situation in the Asian Disease 
problem, it has been argued that such an issue carries different emotional connotations 
(Cassotti et al., 2012). When presented with such information, individuals will form initial 
positive or negative reactions, which affect attitudes and behaviours. Therefore, a 
participant’s automatic affective response is likely to guide the decision-making process. 
While providing evidence for such effects, McElroy and Conrad (2009) found that the effects 
of framing, in most cases, arise from unconscious processing. Neurological research also 
provides support for the argument that automatic affective responses have an influence on 
decision-making in emotional situations. De Martino, Kumaran, Seymour, and Dolan (2006), 
in this context, found the presence of increased amygdala activity that is usually associated 
with the tendency of individuals to conform to framing effects which includes risk aversion 
in gain frames and risk- taking in loss frames. Adolphs (2006) also argued that since 
amygdala is usually vital in the detection of emotionally relevant information that can be 
obtained from contextual cues, it is possible that framing effects are an effective response. 
Since affective responses are made unconsciously, they require low cognitive 
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resources/mental process. In such a case it can thus be suggested that circadian variations do 
not have a significant influence on risky choice framing.  
4.1.3 Present Experiment 
 
In light of the mixed findings in extant research on the factors influencing framing, this 
study sought to examine whether framing effects are more likely to occur in decision-making 
as a function of the Morningness-Eveningness orientation of the participants. Previous 
research in this field has mainly focused on the role of frames on individuals’ preferences and 
choices (Tversky & Kahneman, 1987; Nelson, Oxley, & Clawson, 1997; Puto, 1987).  The 
present study went a step further by evaluating the influence of circadian variations as one of 
the factors that affect the availability of cognitive resources and consequently the ability to 
make comprehensive judgements in framed situations. Prior research in similar areas has 
demonstrated that participants tested at their circadian incongruent times exhibit more 
stereotyping (Bodenhausen, 1990) and also exhibit less careful thinking of persuasive 
arguments (Martin & Marrington, 2005). However, the potential moderating effect of 
circadian variations on risky-choice framing is yet to be extensively studied. Thus, the 
present study ascertained whether Morningness or Eveningness affected participants’ 
susceptibility to framing effects. It used the original framing effect task that involves the 
Asian Disease Problem as part of the investigation. In line with the circadian variations 
literature, the present study hypotheses that H1a: Participants tested at circadian congruent 
times would be less susceptible to framing effects in the Asian Disease Problem. H1b: 
Participants tested at their circadian incongruent times would be more susceptible to framing 
effects in the Asian Disease Problem.  
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4.2 Method 
4.2.1 Data Management  
 
As part of the data management process, it was established that the dataset did not 
comprise of missing values and hence elimination of the risk of distorted results. In addition, 
the multivariate kurtosis analysis indicated that the dataset followed a normal distribution 
with a value less than the recommended 1.96. The population from which the sample was 
derived was also assumed to support a probability distribution and hence the use of 
parametric tests which include t-test and ANOVA.  
4.2.2 Participants  
 
A total of 163 participants who were undergraduate and postgraduate students from 
Kingston University took part in the study. The sample comprised of 63 males (38%) and 100 
females (62%) with a mean age of 23, SD=5.09. In terms of study level, 124 students (76%) 
studied at the undergraduate level while 38 students (23%) studied at the post-graduate level. 
All participants took part in the study voluntarily.  
4.2.3 Design  
 
The study made use of a 2 x 2 (i.e. circadian congruent, circadian incongruent x gain 
frame, loss frame) within-subjects design to assess the impact of framing on risky choice. 
The dependent variable in the study was the participants’ reported risk preference based on 
the type of frame (gain and loss) in which case participants were either inclined to the risk 
aversion choice (Treatment A/Program A) or risky choice (Treatment B/Program B). Using 
the Asian Disease Problem the gain frame was linked to statements indicating that a 
particular choice would lead to saving of lives. By contrast, the loss frame was linked to 
choices indicating that a certain number of lives would be lost. The independent variable was 
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the time of testing which was optimal or non-optimal (i.e. circadian congruent and circadian 
incongruent) in terms of morningness and eveningness.   
4.2.4 Procedure 
 
Students from the Kingston University campus were invited to take part in a 15-minute in-
person framing survey. Upon acceptance of the invitation and provision of informed consent, 
the participants were issued with a participant number and MEQ score after completing the 
Morningness-Eveningness Questionnaire. In order to determine their circadian rhythm 
preference, participants were first asked to complete the abridged English Version of the 
Morningness-Eveningness Questionnaire (rH&O, Chelminski et al., 2000).  The MEQ 
consists of 5 items to assess the time of day an individual feels the most alert (see Appendix 
C2). MEQ validation was conducted by Chelminski et al. (2000) they suggested; internal 
consistency (Cronbach α) was 0.70. 
Participants’ responses to each of the items were added up and ranged from 4 to 25. 
According to the scoring criterion, participants can be classified as ‘definitely evening types’ 
(4-7), ‘moderately evening type’ (8-11), ‘neither type’ (12-17), ‘moderately morning type’ 
(18-21), and ‘definitely morning types’ (20–25). High scores indicate a greater degree of 
morningness, while low scores indicate a greater degree of eveningness. A total of 8 
participants were in neither type category, and were therefore excluded from the experiment. 
The remaining participants were also required to indicate their current mental alertness based 
on a visual analogue scale ranging from 1 to 10  (“1” representing not at all mentally alert 
and “10” representing extremely mentally alert).  
The participants were then randomly allocated to one of two testing conditions: a circadian 
time of testing, or a circadian incongruent time of testing. One half of the participants were 
tested at their optimal circadian time (n=81) while the other half at their non-optimal 
circadian times (n=82). In within-subject design, each participant was presented with both the 
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gain and loss-frame problems. The following framing problems were adopted from Mahoney 
et al. (2011) and dealt with life threatening human diseases: Asian disease problem, Lung 
cancer and HIV virus. The complete set of framing problems is provided in appendix C1. 
(1) Classic Asian Disease  
Imagine the US is preparing for the outbreak of an unusual Asian disease, which is 
expected to kill 600 people. Two alternative programs have been prepared to combat the 
disease have been proposed. Assume that the exact scientific estimates of the consequences 
of the programs are as follows: 
Program A: 200 people will be saved. 
Program B: 1/3 probability that 600 people will be saved and 2/3 probability that no people 
will be saved. 
(2) Lung Cancer  
The National Cancer Institute has two possible treatments for lung cancer, which could 
become standard treatments across the country. Assume that the exact scientific estimates of 
the consequences of the treatments are as follows: 
Treatment A: Of every 1000 people who get lung cancer, 400 will be saved. 
Treatment B: 2/5 chance that 1000 of every 1000 who get lung cancer will be saved and 3/5 
chance that no people of every 1000 who get lung cancer will be saved. 
(3) HIV Virus  
The United States is expecting the outbreak of a new strain of HIV virus which is expected 
to kill 2000 persons. Two alternative programs were developed to combat the disease. 
Assume that the exact scientific estimates of the consequences of the programs are as 
follows: 
Program A: 800 people will be saved. 
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Program B: 2/5 probability that 2000 people will be saved and 3/5 probability that no 
people will be saved. 
The probabilities and payoffs used in the problems were varied in the ranges specified by 
Kühberger (1998) and Kühberger, Schulte-Mecklenbeck, and Perner (1999). The 
participants’ choice in the risky-choice decision tasks was measured on a 10-point scale with 
Program A on one side of the scale and Program B on the other extreme end. 
Half of the study participants were given three gain-framed risky choice problems, a 
cognitive reflection test (CRT), and then the same three risky choice problems, but using a 
loss frame. The remaining participants were given the same test, except that they were given 
the three loss-framed risky choice problems first. After making a decision on each risky 
choice problem (i.e. Program A or B on the 10 point scale), the participant’s recorded the risk 
preference ratings on a scale ranging from 1 (most risk-averse) to 10 (most risk-seeking). In 
addition, the confidence ratings of the decision made were measured on a visual-analogue 
scale ranging from 1 (not at all confident) to 10 (absolutely confident).  In the final part of the 
questionnaire, the participants were required to indicate their task involvement and provide 
demographic details including the age, gender, area of study and level of study. All 
participants were thanked and debriefed for taking part in the study.  
4.3 Measures 
4.3.1 Circadian Preferences  
 
Circadian preferences among the participants were measured using the abridged English 
Version of the Morningness-Eveningness Questionnaire (rH&O, Chelminski et al., 2000). 
From the statistical analysis, M-type participants scored significantly higher on the 
Morningness-Eveningness Dimensions compared to their E-type counterparts: MM-types = 
16.46, SD= 2.41, (n=82) vs. ME-types = 10.10, SD= 3.02. In consistence with standards 
established in prior studies, one-half of the participants were tested at the circadian congruent 
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times, in which case, the M-type participants were tested between 10am and 12noon, while 
their E-type counterparts were tested between 1pm and 5pm. The remaining half of the 
participants were tested at their circadian incongruent times.  
4.3.2 Risk Preferences  
 
The participants’ risk preferences towards the alternatives (i.e. Treatment A or Treatment 
B) were the basis of establishing the absence or presence of framing effects. The preferences 
were measured through a 10 point scale, in which “1” indicated a definite preference for 
Treatment A and “10” a definite preference for Treatment B. Participants whose numerical 
ratings were below the midpoint (i.e. 1-4) were considered to be characterised by a risk- 
averse preference, while participants who chose numerical ratings from 5 to 10 were 
considered to depict preference for risky alternative.  
4.3.3 Cognitive Reflection  
 
Cognitive reflection, as measured in the study, is defined as an individual’s tendency to 
override a strongly impelling incorrect response by engaging in the further reflection that 
leads to the correct response (Lambie, 2014). CRT thus measures cognitive ability and 
overlaps with the concept of critical open-mindedness.  The CRT was adopted from 
Frederick (2005) and consisted of three seemingly simple questions. The test measured the 
participants’ inclination to involve System 1 or System 2 cognitive processes in the decision-
making process. Participants who failed all questions or only got one correct answer were 
considered to engage in Systems 1 cognitive processes that are quick, unconscious and 
intuitive. In contrast, participants who got 2 or 3 correct answers were considered to be 
characterised by System 2 cognitive processes that are slow, conscious and reflective 
(Stanovich & West, 2008).  
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4.3.4 Task Involvement 
 
The participants’ level of task involvement was assessed based on a visual-analogue scale 
ranging from (1= not at all involved and 10=extremely involved). Higher scores were 
interpreted to mean use of higher cognitive resources in completing the survey, while lower 
scores were indicative of lower mental efforts. A mean score of 6.49, SD= 1.91 was obtained, 
thus suggesting moderate levels of task involvement.  
4.4 Results 
4.4.1 Cognitive Reflection Test 
 
From the cognitive reflection, a mean score of M=0.67, SD=0.92 was obtained. Over half 
of the participants (57%) incorrectly answering all questions, 26% had 1 correct answer, 10% 
had 2 correct answers, and 7% had 3 correct answers. 
4.4.2 Manipulation Check 
A manipulation check of the study results indicates a slightly higher level of task 
involvement for the CRT task among participants tested at circadian congruent times at 
M=6.58, SD=1.77 compared to participants tested at circadian incongruent times at M=6.39, 
SD=2.06. However, the differences between the confidence levels of the two groups of 
participants were not statistically significant, t(161) = -.64, p=.53 at 95% confidence interval.   
With regard to confidence levels in the gain frame, higher scores were recorded in all the 
three scenarios for participants tested at circadian congruent time (Frame 1: M=7.08, 
SD=2.08; Frame 2: M=7.13, SD=1.97; Frame 3: M=7.04, SD=2.09) compared to participants 
tested that their circadian incongruent times (Frame 1: M=6.38, SD=2.02; Frame 2: M=6.52, 
SD=2.37; Frame 3: M= 6.58, SD=2.34). The differences in confidence levels were 
statistically significant only in Frame 1, t(161) = -2.18, p=0.03. No statistically significant 
differences were found in Frame 2, t(161) = -1.80, p=0.073 and Frame 3, t(161) = -1.36, 
p=0.17 (See Appendix C1).  
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In the loss frame, higher confidence levels were only noted in Frame 3 for participants 
tested at circadian congruent times (Frame 3: M=7.19, SD=1.99) compared to participants 
tested at circadian incongruent times (Frame 3: M=6.73, SD=2.07). However, the differences 
in Frame 3 were not statistically significant t(161) = -1.43, p=0.15. In Frame 1 and 2, lower 
confidence level scores were noted for participants tested at circadian congruent times 
(Frame 1: M=6.53, SD=2.22; Frame 2: M=6.84, SD=2.01) compared to participants tested at 
circadian incongruent times (Frame 1: M=6.94, SD=1.98; Frame 2: M=6.94, SD=2.01). No 
statistically significant differences were found in Frame 1, t(161) = 1.24, p=.216 and Frame 
2, t(161) = .33, p=0.74 at the 95% confidence interval.  
Gain Frame and Loss Frame analysis Order 1 (Positive/gain frame first) vs. Order 2 
(Negative/ loss frame first) 3 
As part of the preliminary analysis, the study looked at the risky choices as a function of 
the order and frame. A 3 (Gain Frame: Frame, 1, 2 and 3) x 2 (Order: 1 and 2) mixed 
Analysis of Variance (ANOVA) was conducted with the risk preference as the dependent 
variable.  From the analysis, there were no statistically significant differences for order of the 
frame (i.e. Order 1 or 2), and the risk preferences among the participants for each of the 
scenarios in the gain frame. For Frame 1, the Order 1 (Positive/gain frame first) participants 
had a risk preference mean (M=4.74, SD=2.99) which was identical to Order 2 (negative/loss 
frame first) participants F(1, 161) =.03, p=0.96. In relation to Frame 2, Order 1 participants 
had a slightly lower mean (M=4.80, SD=2.84) compared to Order 1 participants (M= 5.02, 
SD= 2.92) but at an insignificant level, p>0.05. Lastly, for Frame 3, the mean of risk 
preferences was slightly lower for Order 1 participants (M=5.01, SD=5.15) compared to 
Order 2 participants at an insignificant level, p>0.05.  
																																								 																				
3	The framing problems were adopted from Mahoney et al. (2011). The problems dealt with life threatening human diseases: Asian disease 
problem (Frame 1), lung cancer (Frame 2) and HIV virus (Frame 3). Half of the participants were given three gained-framed risky choice 
problems, a cognitive reflection test, and the same three risky choice problems, but using a loss frame (Order 1). The remainder of the 
participants were given the same tests, except that they were given the three loss-framed risky choice problems first (Order 2).  
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An analysis was also conducted to assess whether the risk preferences in the loss frame 
varied based on whether the participant was examined using Order 1 or Order 2. For Frame 1, 
participants in Order 1 had a slightly higher loss frame mean risk preference (M=5.26, 
SD=2.71) compared to participants in Order 2 (M=5.08, SD = 2.79), F<1. For Frame 2, 
participants in Order 1 had slightly lower mean risk preference (M=5.34, SD=2.52) compared 
to Order 2 participants (M=5.44, SD=2.51), F <1. Similarly for Frame 3, Order 1 participants 
had an identical mean risk preference (M=5.07, SD=5.38) relative to Order 2 participants 
(M=5.07, SD=5.37), F <1.  
While taking into consideration the average risk preferences for gain and loss frames, 
participants tested through Order 1 had a lower mean risk preference (M=4.92, SD=2.36) 
compared to participants tested through Order 2 (M=5.26, SD=2.01). Despite Order 1 
participants depicting preferences for risk aversion and Order 2 participants depicting risk- 
taking behaviour, the differences were not statistically significant, p>0.05. Figure 3.1 
summarises the differences in risk preferences based on the average scores (i.e. the three 
scenarios combined) for both gain and loss frames.  
 
Figure 3.1: Participants’ risk preferences based on Order of testing Order 1 (Positive/gain 
frame first) vs. Order 2 (Negative/ loss frame first). 
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4.4.3 Circadian Preference  
 
In order to test the primary circadian hypothesis, the data was examined to understand 
framing effects based on gain and loss frames in the context of circadian congruent and 
circadian incongruent time of testing. For the gain frame, participants tested at their circadian 
congruent time had a higher mean risk preference (M=5.77, SD=2.38) compared to 
participants tested at their incongruent times (M=4.03, SD=2.0). Based on ANOVA analysis, 
the differences were significant F(1,161)= 25.22, p< .001. For the loss frame, participants 
tested at their circadian congruent time had lower mean risk preferences (M=5.09, SD=1.91) 
compared to participants tested at their incongruent times (M= 5.44, SD=2.10), although the 
differences were not statistically significant. 
To further examine the influence of circadian preferences, the data was assessed for any 
significant revisions in the gain and loss frames for participants tested at their circadian 
congruent times and participants tested at their circadian incongruent times. Using the paired 
samples t-test the mean risk preference score (M=5.76, SD=2.38) for circadian congruent 
participants for the gain frame did not reveal any significant difference compared to the mean 
risk preference score (M=5.09, SD=1.91) for loss frame, t(82)=1.92, p =.58. A frame effect 
was therefore absent with the majority of the participants, depicting neutrality in the choice of 
Treatment A or Treatment B/ Program A or Program B.  
With regard to participants tested that their circadian incongruent times, the paired 
samples t-test revealed a significant difference in means for gain frames and loss frames. 
Specifically, the participants had a mean risk preference score of 4.03 (SD=2.01) in the gain 
frame and a mean risk preference score of 5.44 (SD=2.10) in the loss frame, which was 
significant, t(79)= -4.661, p <.001 (see Figure 3.2). Framing effects were therefore evident 
when participants were tested at their circadian incongruent times.  
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Figure 3.2: Differences in risk preference scores based on circadian preferences. 
While taking into consideration demographic variables and risk preferences, no significant 
correlations were observed for age, gender and study level. However, a significant correlation 
(r =1.55, p =<. 01) was established between CRT and mean risk preference for the gain 
frame.  
Table 3.1: Correlations between demographic variables and risk choices.  
 
Gender Age 
Study 
level CRT 
Task 
involvement 
Mean Risk 
Gain 
Mean Risk 
Loss 
Gender 1       
Age -.041 1      
Study level .009 .636** 1     
CRT -.122 .173* .066 1    
Task  
involvement 
-.080 -.079 -.058 .131 1   
Mean Risk 
Gain 
.027 .041 -.043 .155* .088 1  
Mean Risk 
Gain 
.022 -.015 .009 -.073 .082 -.021 1 
*. Correlation is significant at the .05 level (2-tailed). 
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4.5 Discussion 
 
From the study findings, no significant changes were found in participants’ risky choice 
preferences for the Asian Disease Problem, Lung Cancer and HIV virus based on the order in 
which the frames were introduced.  Participants who were first exposed to the gain frame 
depicted an inclination towards neutrality in terms of the choice of Treatment A or Treatment 
B, and Program A or Program B. A similar inclination was observed among participants who 
were first introduced to a loss frame and later to gain frame. This finding suggests that 
framing effects may not be affected by the order in which the frames (gain and loss) are 
presented. In other words, there are no significant interactions between order and frame. 
Martinussen (2016) also made similar findings.  
In relation to task involvement, participants tested at their circadian congruent times 
depicted slightly higher involvement for the cognitive reflection task compared to their 
counterparts tested at circadian incongruent times. The study’s findings affirm previous 
research, which suggests that individuals operating at their circadian congruent times have 
greater cognitive resources, and are therefore more attentive and able to engage in 
deliberative thinking (Valdez et al., 2012; Bodenhausen, 1990). However, scores from the 
cognitive reflection test were not found to have a significant impact on the mean risk 
preference scores for both the gain and loss frames. In part, this can be attributed to the 
overall low scores that were obtained for CRT across the study’s sample. Prior research by 
Peters and Levin (2008) also indicate that while individuals with higher critical thinking and 
numeracy tend to be less vulnerable to framing effects, the differences are not always 
significant. As such, it is expected that individuals with more reflective skills may be 
susceptible to framing effects in a similar way to their less reflective counterparts.  
While taking into consideration the study’s main hypothesis, the findings confirm that 
framing effects are less likely to occur when individuals are tested at their circadian 
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congruent times compared to circadian incongruent times. For example, the study’s 
participants who were tested at their circadian congruent times were neutral in their choice of 
Treatment A or Treatment B, and Program A or Program B in both the gain and loss frames. 
By contrast, participants tested at circadian incongruent times were inclined to the risk-averse 
Treatment A/Program A in the gain frame, and more inclined to the risky Treatment 
B/Program B in the loss frame. While taking into consideration framing effects as a 
preference shift, the differences were significant, thus indicating the presence framing effects. 
Such framing effects were consistent which prior studies, indicating that individuals tend to 
be risk averse in gain situations and risk seeking in negative situations (Tversky & 
Kahneman, 1981; Mahoney et al., 2011; Bizer et al., 2011).  
The presence of framing effects among individuals tested at circadian incongruent times 
further indicates individuals tested at their less optimal times have lower involvement when 
making decisions. This confirms earlier views by McElroy and Conrad (2009), indicating that 
framing effects mainly arise from unconscious processing of information. At circadian 
incongruent times, individuals have lower cognitive effects, and hence likely to engage in 
less conscious thinking that demands lower mental effort (De Martino et al., 2006; Martin & 
Marrington, 2005).  
Some contradictory evidence on framing effects was also evident in the present study. In 
the gain frame, individuals tested at their circadian congruent time depicted neutrality in the 
choice of Treatment A or B at a mean of M=5.77, while circadian incongruent individuals in 
the same gain frame depicted an inclination towards risk aversion (Treatment A) at a mean of 
M=4.03. These findings may, in essence, suggest the presence of other factors that may 
override circadian variation effects, which were not included in the study. Such factors, as 
suggested by other studies, include the level of emotional arousal, effective levels and level 
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of motivation among others (Nabi, 2003; Gross, 2008; Martinussen, 2016).  Future studies 
can include the influence of these variables in a circadian congruent/incongruent context.  
In terms of contributions and implications, the findings of the present study helps highlight 
that performance in tasks requiring higher cognitive effort may be the result of the amount of 
cognitive capacity that is at the disposal of the individuals. Greater stability in decision-
making for professionals, such as managers, is likely to be experienced when individuals are 
allowed to work at their optimal levels.  In other words, the study ensuring that individuals 
have access to adequate cognitive resources can reduce framing. It also helps emphasise the 
need to encourage individuals in various professions in domains such as medicine and policy-
making to engage in the more systematic processing of information to overcome framing 
effects which are associated less conscious/heuristic processing of information. The nature of 
these domains is such that they are characterised by the need to make risky decisions, and 
hence the importance of paying greater attention to the available alternatives/options.   
The present study provides new insights pertaining to factors that influence framing 
effects. It indicates that testing individuals at circadian congruent or incongruent times may 
lead to preference shifts for questions with the same outcomes due to differences in 
availability of cognitive resources. Individuals tested at their circadian incongruent times are 
at a higher risk of framing effects due to lower availability of cognitive resources required for 
more deliberate/conscious decision-making. The study however indicates that a number of 
other factors may still be responsible for framing effects, hence the need for further studies in 
this field.  
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Chapter 5: General Discussion 
5.1 Circadian Variations and Belief Perseverance  
 
One of the aims of the thesis pertained to investigating the role circadian preferences plays 
on the ability of individuals to overcome belief perseverance. Based on existing research, a 
common view is that belief perseverance can be associated with the level of cognitive 
resources available. For instance, individuals who engage in intuitive thinking, which is 
characterised by the use of fewer cognitive resources, are more susceptible to belief 
perseverance (Evans & Stanovich, 2013). This should be the case, since overcoming belief 
perseverance requires greater use of cognitive efforts in order to challenge previously held 
views that may be incorrect or biased (Jelalian & Miller, 1984; Guenther & Alicke, 2008). 
 Within the above perspective, this thesis, as evident from study 1, suggested that the 
amount of cognitive capacity available to an individual during a certain time of the day could 
potentially influence his or her ability to attenuate belief perseverance. From the literature 
review, circadian variations constitutes as one of the factors that can influence cognitive 
resources that are available for processing information in tasks that require the utilisation of 
working memory (Stevens et al., 2011). Accordingly, belief perseverance among the study 
participants was tested at circadian congruent and incongruent times, when cognitive 
resources are likely to vary based on whether one is a morning type or evening type.  
 Prior to presenting disconfirming information about the suspect’s guilt, study 1 showed 
no significant differences among participants tested during congruent and incongruent times.  
Moreover, both groups of participants significantly revised their initial guilt judgements after 
being debriefed with disconfirming information. It should, however, be noted that 
participants tested at their circadian incongruent times were characterised by a significantly 
smaller downward revision of their suspect guilt judgements compared to participants tested 
at their circadian congruent times. The presence of significant differences in study 1 thus 
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supports the hypothesis that belief perseverance is reduced when participants are tested at 
their optimal time of circadian preferences compared to testing at circadian incongruent 
times. 
The findings on the significant association between circadian variations and belief 
perseverance in study 1 corroborate previous research on the influence of cognitive efficiency 
on making judgements. Bodenhausen (1990), as highlighted in the literature review, for 
instance, demonstrated that stereotyping is exacerbated when individuals were tested at their 
circadian incongruent times due to reliance on heuristic type of thinking. Nestler (2010) also 
found that individuals have fewer cognitive resources available at their non-optimal circadian 
times. Furthermore, it can be argued that the higher levels of belief perseverance among 
individuals tested at circadian incongruent times indicates greater reliance on System 1 type 
of thinking that mainly works independently from working memory (Kahneman, 2003). For 
participants tested at their circadian congruent times, the higher levels of belief perseverance 
attenuation suggest, as predicted in prior research (e.g. Evans, 2008; Evans & Stanovich, 
2013), that more deliberate thinking was used while incorporating the disconfirming 
information.  Therefore, individuals with greater cognitive resources available to them are 
better placed to consider alternative hypotheses or explanations.  
Prior research, as reviewed in the present study, further suggests that differences in the 
influence of circadian preferences on decision-making may be dependent on the complexity 
of the task at hand (Kahneman, 2003; Drummond et al., 2001; Harrison & Horne, 2000). For 
less complex tasks, the level of availability of cognitive resources based on circadian 
congruence may have no significant influence on making judgements. In the present study, 
the presence of significant differences in belief perseverance among participants in study 1, 
who were tested at their circadian congruent and incongruent times, indicates that the task of 
rating the suspect’s guilt level and incorporating disconfirming evidence is highly complex. 
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For such tasks, higher levels of cognitive efficiency are required to help overcome cognitive 
bias and attribution errors (Nisbett & Ross, 1980). Ideally, it also means that people working 
at their non-optimal times are inclined to form judgements that affirm, as opposed to 
challenge, the validity of their existing predispositions, and, in the process, satisfy the belief 
perseverance principle.  
It should, however, be noted that the influence of circadian variations on belief 
perseverance may not hold in all situations. This was demonstrated in study 2, in which case, 
no significant influences were observed despite the participants in the two experiments being 
presented with the same offender profile. The suggestion, therefore, is that in an instance 
where an existing belief is deep-rooted (e.g. characteristics of a sex offender), circadian 
preferences may not perform a significant influence on belief alleviation. In this case, some 
beliefs may not be considered as mistaken or illogical, since some evidence may be 
observable from everyday experience or knowledge of certain behaviours. For example, some 
people could erroneously believe that obesity among most people is caused by overeating. 
Such a belief could be attributed to encounters with obese people, who also tend to overeat. 
Counter-arguments indicating that obesity is also strongly influenced by other factors such as 
genetic makeup, lack of opportunities for physical exercise and lack of access to healthy 
foods could, therefore, be rejected. In such instances, it requires more than the availability of 
cognitive resources to attenuate the beliefs.   
Study 1 and 2 further suggest that the presence of high levels of confirmation bias among 
some individuals could limit the extent to which circadian preferences influence belief 
perseverance attenuation. The existence of confirmation bias is evident when an individual 
tends to search for information that will support an initial or existing view (Sanderson, 2009). 
In greater detail, when an individual has existing expectations about a particular process or 
aspect, he or she will tend to acquire little information that could lead to the disapproval of 
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existing assumptions. The individual will, therefore, give over value assumptions-confirming 
evidence while undervaluing any assumption-disconfirming evidence (Proctor & Capaldi, 
2012). As an example, an individual may assume that left-handed individuals are more 
creative than right-handed individuals. All encounters involving left-handed people that are 
creative are therefore likely to be interpreted as confirmatory evidence of existing beliefs. On 
the other hand, any information that could discount such a belief could be easily discounted. 
In such cases, the extent of cognitive efficiency based on circadian variations could fail to 
have an impact on attenuation of existing beliefs. The line of argument here suggested that 
beliefs were slightly held by participants in study 2 as compared to study 1.   
Furthermore, the differences in the study 1 and study 2 results could be attributed to the 
fact that certain individuals have higher levels of general and emotional intelligence. 
According to a study conducted by Lam and Kirby (2002), it was discovered that their 
emotional and general intelligence levels had an influence on the amount of cognitive 
capacity was available to an individual. The levels of intelligences were not tested in this 
study and it could be that the participants of study 2 simply had higher levels of intelligence. 
Hence, the participants of study 2 could have made a sound decision in the first part of the 
study and therefore, no significant change in belief perseverance was found after the 
discrediting of the initial information. 
5.2 Socially Distributed Thinking and Belief Perseverance  
Besides circadian preferences, the amount of cognitive capacity available for processing 
complex tasks can be augmented through socially distributed thinking. In other words, groups 
of people working together are likely to have greater cognitive resources for processing 
information compared to individuals working on their own (Semin & Smith, 2013). As 
mentioned earlier, this possibility was examined in study 1, by testing two conditions (i.e., 
the impact of individual and groups) on belief perseverance at circadian congruent and 
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incongruent times. Unlike individual testing at circadian congruent and incongruent times, 
group judgements were characterised by less belief perseverance, both at congruent and 
incongruent circadian times of testing. Hypothesis 1b, which suggested that participants in a 
group would depict less belief perseverance than individuals when tested at both circadian 
congruent or non-congruent times, is therefore affirmed.   
In essence, the findings on lower susceptibility to belief perseverance in groups compared 
to individuals when tested at circadian incongruent times provide support for existing 
theories, and empirical work on socially distributed cognition. Prior studies such as 
Cornelissen and Clarke (2010) and West (2007) have, in this context, argued that collective 
cognition is distinct from individual cognition. Precisely, collective cognition has a more 
superior impact on decision-making by increasing cognitive efficiency levels. Furthermore, 
the greater ability among group participants to overcome belief perseverance compared to 
individual participants provides partial support for the claim in the hypothesis of extended 
cognition that cognition is not limited to the individual brain, but also extends to one’s 
environment (Spaulding, 2011; Sutton, 2010; Clark, 2008). Therefore, creating platforms 
where complex problems can be solved through group work enhances the chances of 
successful results due to the higher levels of cognitive efficiency.  
A number of alternative explanations can also be put forward, in relation to the possible 
causes of lower belief perseverance, among group participants after presentation with the 
atypical offender profile. First, the group discussions provide a platform for sharing their 
views, and hence a more critical evaluation of an issue at hand. In line with this view, prior 
research, as reviewed in this study, indicates that, in socially distributed cognition, feedback 
from other individuals influences the decision-making processes through consideration of 
additional information (Blanchette & Richards, 2010; Xue et al., 2010; Glockner & 
Witteman, 2010). The extra information plays an important role in reaching a conclusion that 
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is based on a comprehensive evaluation of all key issues. Second, groups, unlike individuals, 
form a consensus that is devoid of distorted perceptions about the issue under consideration. 
Wright et al. (1996) and Olsson et al. (2006), within this context, mention that the collective 
cognitive resources that are at the disposal of individuals’ in-group help overcome the effect 
of insufficient weight that often leads to inaccurate judgements.  
It can also be noted that group judgements were not significantly revised when tested at 
circadian incongruent times. It therefore means that “groupthink” did not have a significant 
influence on the final judgement. Additionally, this finding suggests that the presence of a 
greater pool of cognitive resources, that results from socially distributed cognition, helps 
overcome the tendency to make use of intuitive thinking when cognitive resources are 
depleted. Put differently, socially distributed thinking helps maintain higher cognitive 
efficiency, even in instances where individual cognitive resources are insufficient (Xue et al., 
2010; Blanchette & Richards, 2010).   
Despite the positive impact, it can be noted that socially distributed thinking is not cost 
free. In greater detail, the efficiency at which socially distributed thinking leads to higher 
cognitive performance is influenced by three cost structures: cost of mental operations, cost 
of outer operations and cost of coordinating inner and outer processes (Kirsh, 2010; Cowley 
& Vallée-Tourangeau, 2013). The present research reduced cost of outer operations by 
allowing group participants to evaluate information on the suspect’s guilt in a collective way. 
Therefore, it can be argued that the superior performance of the groups, in terms of 
attenuating belief perseverance, when tested at circadian incongruent times, can be attributed 
to the socially distributed cognition, reducing the effects of cost of inner cognitive resources 
and the coupling costs. Therefore, socially distributed thinking has vital importance in 
relation to the level of sense making and taking effective actions (Cowley & Vallée-
Tourangeau, 2013).  
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 For researchers seeking to extend research in this area, coupling costs could be increased 
in order to determine whether groups would still be able to exhibit less belief perseverance 
when tested at circadian incongruent times. One way in which this could be accomplished 
would involve presenting information on the suspect guilt profile to single thinkers, who 
should then aggregate it in order to produce a collective output in the form of an overall guilt 
judgement for the group. This is in contrast to presenting the information to all group 
members to be debated collectively. Presenting the information to the single thinkers 
increases the coupling costs, since every single individual has to think on his or her own, 
leading to differences in propositions which must then be coordinated in order to produce the 
most optimal aggregated judgement. In such a case, it would be expected that the increased 
cost of coordination, especially circadian incongruent times, would result in more belief 
perseverance.   
The findings on reduced belief perseverance among groups also have implications on 
methods that can be used to enhance cognitive efficiency. Social cognition, which is achieved 
by requiring individuals to work under groups, can help in suppressing erroneous beliefs by 
improving the level of control over habitual or automatic responses that are associated with 
heuristic thinking (Mannix, Neale, & Goncalo, 2009). In some instances, social cognition can 
be achieved by enhancing cognitive efficiency. For example, individuals should be exposed 
to cognitive training that targets specific cognitive abilities such as working memory, speed 
of processing, divided attention and response inhibition. In studies where such training has 
been examined, it has been shown that participants in the treatment group tend to display 
higher cognitive efficiency compared to participants in the control group (Ignjatovic, Kalabic, 
Batic, & Zikic, 2015; Hardy et al., 2015).  
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5.3 Type of Reason Given and Belief Perseverance 
  
Besides circadian variations, the present study investigated the impact that type of reason 
given – against or in support, is in relation to belief perseverance and the implications in a 
legal context. Nestler (2010) highlighted in the methodology that the participants were 
required to rate the extent to which they believed the suspect was guilty and the degree of 
confidence in the accuracy of their judgement. The effect of type of reason given on belief 
perseverance was examined by asking half of the respondents to provide reasons why the 
suspect might be the offender, and the other half, five reasons why the suspect might not be 
the offender. The participants were then briefed regarding the atypical profile of the offender, 
and asked to provide a second confidence judgement. The mental alertness and involvement 
levels were also established.  
Contrary to expectations, the findings indicated that type of reason given has no influence 
on belief perseverance. As such, the findings from the study does not provide adequate 
support for hypothesis H2a, that participants tested at their circadian incongruent times find it 
hard to generate reasons in favour of a known outcome and hence less belief perseverance.  
Similarly, hypothesis H2b which states that participants tested at their circadian congruent 
times finds it easier to generate reasons in favour of a known outcome, hence more belief 
perseverance is not sufficiently supported despite not being contradicted. Hypothesis H2c and 
H2d on ease of difficulty of generating reasons for or against when tested at circadian 
incongruent times are also not supported.  In contrast, other studies (e.g. Anderson, 1983; 
Davies, 1997) reported that ease of generating explanations could enhance belief 
perseverance while difficulties in generating explanations often prompt individuals to 
reconsider their earlier beliefs and hence a possible reduction or elimination of perseverance.   
Several explanations have been suggested for the observed results. First, it is likely that 
the participants could find it easy to generate reasons for their belief based on accessible 
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content and previous experiences. Therefore, no difficulties may be encountered in 
generating many reasons, thus leading to the persistence of the belief. Greifeneder and Bless 
(2007) reported similar findings, in which case individuals with high process capacity 
depicted the tendency to base their judgement on accessible content information. Second, 
attitude formation could impact on the ease of generating reasons for or against certain 
aspects under consideration. Haddock (2002), for instance, found that individuals who are 
well versed in particular areas, such as politics, were unaffected by number and type of 
accessed attributes. In other words, they could easily generate positive or negative attributes, 
and hence unlikely to change their initial beliefs. Similarly, Schwarz et al. (1991) found that 
individuals who can easily generate or recall information are likely to rate themselves as 
assertive in a certain area, and hence, it is a very slight chance for them to change their 
beliefs, thus suggesting that they relied more on availability bias. 
Cognitive efficiency was, on the other hand, investigated by measuring the participants’ 
mental alertness and levels of involvement. The findings on indicating that cognitive 
efficiency parameters did not vary significantly based on whether the participant was tested at 
circadian congruent or incongruent times. This view is contradicted by Schwartz et al. 
(1991), they reported that individuals operating at their circadian congruent times are likely 
to experience significantly less difficulty in making judgements and are less susceptible to 
heuristics thinking. The study by Wright et al. (2002) also indicated that circadian variations 
could be the reason behind differences in performance for the task requiring higher levels of 
focused attention and working memory, but this finding is not fully supported in the 
outcomes of study 1 and 2. Schmidt et al. (2007) had further indicated that circadian 
variations could lead to inferior performance among individuals required to perform certain 
tasks at their non-optimal circadian times. 
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The studies suggested that the effect of circadian variations has on cognitive efficiency 
could be due to the presence of other factors that also play a role in mental performance. 
Such factors, as identified earlier, include depression, adapting to external demands and 
genetic makeup (Forni et al., 2014; Goel et al., 2013). The level of task difficulty could 
partially explain the absence of differences between the participants based on their circadian 
preferences. For example, some participants might have found it equally easy to generate 
many reasons for or against based on their initial judgements. However, a single sample t-test 
was conducted to identify if there was a statistically significant difference in the level of task 
difficulty between the participants based on their circadian preferences. There was a general 
lack of difference found for participants tested at their circadian incongruent times (M = 6.04, 
SD = 2.80) and circadian congruent times (M = 5.60, SD = 2.66) conditions, t (159) = 1.97, p 
= 0.27.  
From another perspective, the findings indicate that participants tested at their circadian 
congruent times experienced slightly higher levels of difficulty in making judgements, which 
is consistent with past research on thinking processes. In this case, the findings support the 
view that circadian congruency facilitates System 2 thinking, which is more deliberate and 
analytical. Unlike System 1 heuristic thinking, the analytical thinking process is more time 
consuming, rule-based and necessitates metal simulation and use of complex emotions 
(Kahneman & Frederick, 2002; Evans & Stanovich, 2013). Collectively, these aspects of 
analytical or deliberate thinking make it difficult for an individual to arrive at a judgement.  
5.4 Implications of Belief Perseverance for the Legal Context  
 
The findings on the inability of some individuals to overcome belief perseverance, even 
after presentation with counterarguments or discrediting information, have significant 
implications in the legal system. One of the legal contexts that could be impacted by biased 
attitudes pertains to courts of law. In most cases, juror judgements make allowances for pre-
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trial and trial biases during the decision-making processes. When such biases are not 
adequately taken into consideration, there is a chance that they could negatively influence 
judgements such as a suspect’s guilty verdict. Prior research in this area has demonstrated 
that once biases are formed, they impact the ways in which information is presented during 
trials. This affects how jurors, and other stakeholders involved in the legal system attend to, 
process, recall and weigh on the information (Carlson & Russo, 2001; Jones & Kaplan, 
2003).  
The results of the study indicating higher levels of belief perseverance for individuals 
tested at circadian incongruent times are also manifested in the legal system. Moran and 
Cutler (1991), and Kunda and Sinclair (1999), for example, found that certain individuals 
often encounter difficulties in detecting and evaluating their own biases in courtrooms. In 
such cases, the individuals’ pre-trial attitudes that become discredited during the trial 
processes undermine their satisfaction with the outcomes of the justice process. Regarding 
fairness of verdicts, relying on biased information and attitudes that fail to be attenuated 
during the trial could have had a negative influence on verdicts. Along these lines, Kaplan 
and Miller (1978) found that sources of legal information, such as case summaries and trial 
transcripts, are often laden with biases that prosecutors and judges should be keen to identify 
and help overcome in order to give fair verdicts.  
Given that biases in these sources of information may not always be overcome effectively, 
researchers have suggested the use of other sources that are less susceptible to biases. Ross, 
Dunning, Toglia, and Ceci (1990), and Diamond, Murphy, and Rose (2012), for example, 
argue that courts are more likely to reach more accurate judgements if they make use of 
videotaped trials. Such trials contain more legally relevant information, compared to 
transcripts and case summaries, leading to fewer extralegal biases that could influence the 
verdict in undesired ways. Arguably, the use of videotaped trials supports the concept of 
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socially distributed thinking. As reviewed in Chapter 1, a socially distributed cognitive 
system contains external representations (Spaulding, 2011; Giere, 2007). Such 
representations are not localised in a person’s brain, but contribute immensely towards 
increasing cognitive efficiency. As such, videotaped trials are external representations of the 
cognitive system that can assist in the process of making reliable judgements that are not 
based on erroneous attitudes and beliefs.  
From another perspective, the results reported here, as discussed earlier, suggested that 
participants find it easier to generate reasons in favour of a known outcome, and hence 
displaying more belief perseverance especially when tested at their circadian optimal times. 
The underlying cognitive biases in such a context have also been observed in legal cases. In 
particular, cognitive biases in the form of hindsight bias, also known as the “knew-it-all-
along effect”, could impact on the extent to which an investigation and verdict is thorough 
and fair. According to Cutler (2007), hindsight bias is evident when an individual makes use 
of information obtained after an event to make conclusions that the eventual outcome was 
inevitable, while this may not be necessarily the case. Therefore, the knowledge of an 
outcome predisposes an individual to emphasise evidence that matches with the outcome. 
The individual also minimises the use of discounting evidence that is deemed to be 
inconsistent. This explains the inability of the study participants to generate reasons against 
when the outcome was known. When taken into the context of criminal cases, cognitive 
processes that lead to hindsight bias would lead to investigators such as prosecutors, police 
and judges making conclusions that a certain suspect was guilty from the beginning. This is 
because the evidence against the suspect is enhanced. This bias has a negative impact on the 
justice processes, as it makes the court officials focus on only that individual as the main 
suspect, while failing to consider other leads.  
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The witnesses to a certain criminal case may also be influenced by belief perseverance 
when testifying. Specifically, certain cognitive biases influence the ability of a witness to 
make an accurate assessment, or confidently make an identification of a witness. By way of 
example, an eyewitness may only have had a fleeting glimpse of an assailant. The poor visual 
sight at night could, for example, lead to the witness having a poor memory or mental picture 
of the assailant. If the witness is subsequently provided with clear images of a suspect, for 
example, through an identification parade, he or she might make a replacement of the poor 
image with the clear one from the parade. It can, however, be that the identification is wrong. 
In such a situation, the witness may, in hindsight, make use of the clear image and confirming 
feedback to confidently claim that he or she actually saw the assailant. In order to overcome 
such bias, it is important that jurors be proactive in reviewing the validity of testimonies and 
convictions. This can help identify possible errors arising from a bias that reflects belief 
perseverance. Such a review is particularly important before making final judgements, since 
realisation of strong evidence of erroneous biases after making of verdicts make it difficult to 
issue a reversal.   
Previously, such cases of belief perseverance have been found to be common in court. 
Cutler (2007), for example, highlights a situation where an individual was convicted as guilty 
based on an assessment which indicated that the hair samples obtained from the scene of the 
crime had microscopic physical characteristics that were consistent with those of the suspect. 
However, later DNA testing proved, in a conclusive way, that the hairs were not those of the 
suspect. Despite the disconfirming evidence, the investigators and prosecutors belief about 
the guilt of the defendant persisted.  In such a case, the inability to change previous beliefs 
results in a biased judgement. Consistent with this view, Ross et al. (1975) found that jurors 
may experience difficulties in complying with instructions that require them to disregard 
inadmissible evidence when more reliable evidence is obtained.  
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From the context of belief perseverance, such reluctance can be attributed to jurors’ biased 
assimilation of information that is subsequently presented. The biased assimilation is 
particularly high when the information is in the form of counterarguments. Alternatively, the 
high levels of belief perseverance can be attributed to the generation of alternative 
explanations for the existing beliefs (Nadel & Sinnott-Armstrong, 2012). Such explanations 
enhance support for the belief, independent of the original foundation. While the presentation 
of new information could play an instrumental role in attenuating the erroneous beliefs, the 
cognitive processes dampens the effect. From a circadian variation point of view, it implies 
that jurors would need to utilise a higher amount of cognitive capacity in order to identify 
evidence that should be categorised as inadmissible. Therefore, jurors working at their 
circadian congruent times are more likely to be keen on challenging inadmissible evidence 
that is based on biased beliefs.  
In relation with the study findings, research also points out that jurors who come to courts 
with pre-existing beliefs about certain issues about the requirement of the law may be 
predisposed to belief perseverance. The beliefs may be derived from long-term exposure to 
sources of information, such as media and legal commentaries, among others. Over the 
course of time, the exposure leads to ideas and views from these sources being firmly 
entrenched in the juror’s mind (Krivoshey, 2014). Jurors who are unable to adequately 
confront such beliefs may use them as rule of thumb, and hence make decisions that are not 
entirely objective.  Further, it is likely in some cases that jurors may erroneously rely on the 
defendant’s past criminal record to make a current conviction. According to Krivosney 
(2014) when preconceived notions from past criminal record of the defendant are congruent 
with jury instructions, it is likely that the juror will rely on such notions to make judgements. 
In contrast, when preconceived notions are incongruent with the instructions, jurors are less 
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likely to make use of such notions to make decisions. This implies that belief perseverance is 
likely to persist when information supporting an existing belief exists. 
 The previous work on belief perseverance in judicial behaviour has, however, not 
comprehensively been investigated in regards to the role that cognitive resources which could 
influence circadian variations performance in order to overcome existing beliefs. In this light, 
it can be suggested that, when making judgements, it is important that jurors give greater 
attention to evidence, and less on pre-existing attitudes that may not be entirely objective. 
Furthermore, jurors could seek to eliminate biased decisions by enhancing their levels of 
collaboration during the deliberation process. Collaboration is consistent with the concept of 
socially distributed thinking, in which case, the combined cognitive resources make it easier 
to identify and neutralise cognitive bias (Burke, 2006).  
The need for jurors to make use of socially distributed thinking is further supported by 
research, indicating that they tend to have possession of limited cognitive resources. Martin, 
Set, and Crelia (1990) observed that jurors are exposed to highly demanding trials 
characterised by the presence of large amounts of inadmissible evidence, corresponding 
instructions from judges to disregard such evidence, as well as multiple cases, of confusing 
evidence and arguments. While corroborating these views, Nadel and Sinnott-Armstrong 
(2012) admit that jurors work in a complex environment. Specifically, the need to listen, 
process and make conclusions from large amounts of information can be taxing on the jurors, 
in that it leaves them with fewer resources. Adequate cognitive resources are required to 
facilitate more effortful and deliberate processing of information in order to identify 
inadmissible evidence. Therefore, socially distributed thinking can help boost the availability 
of cognitive resources.  
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5.5 The Effect of Circadian Variations and Framing Effect on the Three Framing 
Problems  
The final study sought to establish whether circadian variations have an influence on risky 
choice framing, in relation to the Classic Asian Disease, Lung Cancer and HIV Virus framing 
problems. The study participants were evaluated for framing effects based on their 
morningness and eveningness orientation. From the review of the relevant literature, it was 
expected that participants tested at their circadian congruent times would be able to expend 
more cognitive efforts in evaluating the choices compared to their circadian incongruent 
participants, and hence resulting in lesser framing effects. The rationale for this expectation is 
that individuals operating at their optimal circadian times have access to greater amounts of 
cognitive capacity, resulting in greater levels of alertness when making judgements. Other 
aspects that were taken into account include the level of confidence depicted by the 
participants in making their decision and the extent of cognitive reflection.   
One focus area in need of elaboration is the demonstration of changes in their risky choice 
preferences for the Classic Asian Disease, Lung Cancer and HIV Virus framing problems. 
This is where the frames -gain or loss- are introduced. From the results, participants who 
were first presented with a gain frame were mainly neutral in their choice of either Treatment 
A or B. A similar pattern was also found for participants who were first introduced to the loss 
frame, and later to the gain frame. The implication, therefore, is that the order of presenting 
frames does not have a significant impact on the risky choice preference. Put differently, the 
study results do not reveal the presence of significant interactions between order and frame. 
Other scholars, such as Martinussen (2016) also reported similar finding: the sequence of 
gain or loss frames did not have a significant influence on risk seeking and loss aversion.  
The above finding, however, contradicts a number of other studies on framing effects. 
Schwarz (1999) for example, found that when the sequence of alternative was changed, the 
risky option (losing lives) was chosen by fewer participants who had been first presented 
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with the gain framework. In contrast, more than half of the respondents choose the risky 
frame when they were first presented with the lives lost frame. In this case, manipulating the 
respondents’ sequence of alternatives either gain first or loss first- triggered a significant 
change in preferences. In their study, LeBoeuf and Shafir (2003) also found that the majority 
of the study subjects chose the risky option when first presented with the loss frame, and only 
a minority considered choosing the risky option when first presented with the gain frame.  
Task involvement was measured to assess the extent to which participants were 
cognitively engaged in choosing the alternatives from the Classic Asian Disease, Lung 
Cancer and HIV Virus framing problems. From the results, a slightly higher level of 
involvement for the cognitive reflection task was evident from the participants who were 
tested at their circadian congruent times. The difference with the task involvement levels of 
the participants tested at their non-optimal circadian times was not statistically significant. 
However, it implies that operating at one’s optimal times enhances the amount of cognitive 
efficiency, and hence developing higher levels of attention and ability to engage in 
deliberative thinking. Other scholars such as Valdez et al. (2012) and Bodenhausen (1990) 
have previously reported that circadian congruency improves the cognitive capacity through 
access to a greater amount of resources. Some consistency is, therefore, evident between the 
present findings and earlier work on the cognitive impact of circadian variations.  
It can, however, be noted that no significant interactions were shown between the CRT 
scores and mean risk preferences for participants in both the gain and loss frames. This can in 
part be attributed to the low CRT scores that were obtained from all participants. In parallel 
with these results, Peters and Levin (2008) in a prior study found that although individuals 
with higher critical thinking and numeracy skills are likely to be less susceptible to framing 
effects, the differences relative to counterparts with deficient skills in these areas are not 
always significant. Notwithstanding such possibility, a few studies have demonstrated that 
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individuals with more reflective skills are not highly predisposed to framing effects. The 
studies by Oechssler et al. (2009) and Frederick (2005), for example, found that participants 
with high CRT scores have significantly low framing effects, due to relying greatly on 
conscious and deliberate thinking processes. Framing effects were found to be robust among 
participants who relied on more automatic processing.  
The study’s hypothesis 3a proposed that the participants tested at their circadian congruent 
times are less susceptible to framing effects in the Classic Asian Disease, Lung Cancer and 
HIV Virus framing problems. The results of the study confirm this hypothesis. Specifically, 
the study finds that participants who were tested at their circadian optimal times did not make 
significant revisions in their judgements in both the gain and loss frames. The mean scores 
remained at the neutral level for Treatment A or B. By contrast, participants who were tested 
at their non-optimal circadian times depicted risk aversion behaviour for the gain frame in 
Treatment A, and shifted their preference to the risky Treatment B in the loss frame. The 
presence of framing effects among the participants tested at their incongruent circadian times 
confirms hypothesis 3b and are consistent with prior research, indicating that people tend to 
be risk-averse in gain frames and risk seeking in loss frames (Tversky & Kahneman, 1981; 
Mahoney et al., 2011).  
The finding on framing effects further supports the view that human cognitive systems are 
highly sensitive to information that is negatively framed. Specifically, negative information 
tends to override the effects of positive information, hence the inclination to risk-seeking 
behaviour in loss frames (Acton, 2013; Lupfer et al., 2000). It could also be that the framing 
effects are the result of the activation of congruent schema from the participants’ long-term 
memory (Olekalns & Smith, 2005; Gigerenzer et al., 1991). In this case, presenting 
negatively framed information triggers a memory of similar instances, which demanded that 
risk-seeking behaviour is adopted to minimise the potentially negative outcomes.  
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The lack of framing effects among participants tested at their circadian congruent times 
correlates to several studies on cognition. Olekalns and Smith (2005), for example, 
highlighted that framing effects are likely to occur as a result of reliance on alternatives from 
one’s cognitive causal schema. When larger amounts of cognitive resources are available, 
individuals are less inclined to engage in selective processing of information during decision-
making. Therefore, framing effects are less likely to be evident for individuals operating at 
their circadian optimal times. Studies focusing on need for cognition have also demonstrated 
that individuals who can put more effort in processing tasks are characterised by lower 
framing effects (Smith & Levin, 1996; Chatterjee et al., 2000; Curseu, 2006). This also 
means that System 2 thinking, which is associated with analytical and deliberative thinking, 
can help reduce framing effects among people.  
Both Positive and Negative framing can have a range of practical implications in various 
settings. From a health perspective, gain-framed information is meant to motivate the societal 
members to protect themselves from certain health hazards, but may not be adequately 
effective in motivating the public to avoid certain practices. Specifically, the gain-framed 
stories are unlikely to provide strong and compelling reasons for individuals to take an active 
role in health issues. In such a case, Negative framing, in the form of threats, helps increase 
people’s guilt levels leading to higher motivation to act (Major, 2011). In greater detail, loss-
framed messages lead to high guilt appeals among the targeted individuals, and are therefore 
more persuasive in terms of societal responsibility of health issues.  
This framing effect does not, however, have the same impact on all health issues. In health 
detection behaviours the expected outcome is risky, and better levels of persuasion are 
achieved when loss-framed messages are used. Conversely, in situations where health 
prevention behaviours have certain and risk-averse outcomes, it is better for policymakers to 
make use of gain-framed messages. Gain-framed messages can be used to encourage 
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preventive behaviour in aspects such as physical activity, the use of sunscreen and smoking 
cessation (Gallagher & Updegraff, 2011). In a more specific example, gain-framed messages 
that advocate for physical activity as a way of preventing obesity are more effective than 
equivalent but loss-framed messages that emphasise that becoming obese is an outcome of 
lack of physical activity (Rothman & Salovey, 1997). It can, therefore, be concluded that 
framing of messages should be tailored to suit the intended outcomes.  
The framing effects can also be used to help understand how different individuals arrive at 
consensus during negotiations. In most cases, negotiators make their decision after presenting 
with the outcome as either a gain or a loss, thus determining their demands (Kahneman & 
Tversky, 1979). Negotiators who consider their outcome as a gain are likely to demand 
relatively low prices when making sales, while those who perceive their outcome as a loss 
tend to demand relatively high prices. The overall outcome is a negotiation impasse. 
Therefore, negotiators expecting gains are likely to be risk seeking while their counterparts 
who expect losses are likely to depict loss aversion behaviour (Bottom, 1998; Neale & 
Bazerman, 1991). Understanding these psychological issues can help individuals approach 
negotiations in such a way that their demands are met.  
5.6 Framing Effects Study Limitations  
 
The present study on framing effects from the context of circadian preferences makes 
several contributions to this field of research. However, there were several limitations in the 
methodology employed that future research could seek to overcome. First, the focus on only 
a few areas Classic Asian Disease problem, HIV and lung cancer limits the generalisability of 
the findings to other areas. This is especially the case for fields that do not involve risks that 
are similar to those in the field of public health. Therefore, further studies that make use of 
circadian variations are required in order to determine whether circadian preferences and 
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their influence on framing effects can be replicated in other domains besides the Asian 
Disease, Lung Cancer and HIV Virus framing problems. 
Second, the consideration of only one issue in the experiment may have limited the 
amount of cognitive efforts that the participants expended in making their judgements. To 
better understand the impact that circadian congruency and incongruent testing have on 
framing effects, the participants may, in future, be required to make decisions for a larger 
number of issues. For example, 8 to 12 message frames could be used. It is expected that a 
larger number of message frames increases demand for higher levels of cognitive efforts and 
efficiency, and hence the impact of more cognitive resources in circadian optimal times, 
compared to the non-optimal times, could be more visible.  
Besides establishing the level of task involvement, future studies may also measure the 
response time used while making a decision on framing effects. Such measurement can help 
in further establishing whether participants, based on their circadian preferences, make use of 
heuristic thinking, which is characterised by faster responses compared to analytical thinking, 
which is more time-consuming. The outcome is greater in support for research on dual 
process cognition in relation to circadian variations.  
Lastly, framing effects, as mentioned earlier, were only observed among participants 
tested at their circadian incongruent times. For the other condition on circadian congruent 
times, the findings did not reflect consistency with the general argument that gain frames are 
associated with risk aversion, while loss-frames are associated with risk seeking (Cassotti et 
al., 2012; Levin et al., 1998). Such findings highlight the need for researchers to take into 
consideration other factors that predispose individuals towards making a biased judgement. 
Such factors may include the individual’s interest in the issue at hand, the level of emotional 
arousal and affective levels among others (Nabi, 2003; Martinussen, 2016).  
Running Head: K0801532 
	
	
110 
5.7 Conclusion 
 
Overall, this thesis sought to examine the influence that circadian variations and socially 
distributed cognition have on belief perseverance and framing effects.  Circadian variations 
have been shown to have an influence on an individual’s morningness-eveningness 
orientation. The variations also affect the amount of cognitive capacity that are available for 
processing of information and tasks that require higher levels of cognitive efficiency and 
working memory. On one hand, the thesis finds that circadian variations do indeed have a 
significant influence on belief perseverance in which case participants tested at their 
circadian congruent times were characterised by less belief perseverance, compared to their 
counterparts tested at their non-optimal circadian times. The thesis links the presence of such 
impact on belief perseverance to the ability of people with more cognitive resources to take 
into consideration counterarguments and discrediting evidence through a thinking process 
that is more analytical and deliberate.  
By contrast, people who are mentally exhausted due to the requirement to perform tasks at 
their non-optimal circadian preferences tend to rely on heuristic thinking that is automated 
and less conscious. In other words, cognitive deficiency brought about by circadian variations 
at non-optimal times reduces the level of mental alertness and attention that is required to 
help attenuate belief perseverance that is based on cognitive bias and attribution errors. On 
the other hand, one of the experiments in the study suggest that while operating based on 
circadian congruent times help attenuate belief perseverance. The impact is not statistically 
significant relative to circadian congruent times. This partial support for the influence of the 
circadian variations on belief perseverance could be explained by the extent to which the task 
at hand is deemed to be complex by the study subjects.  
The thesis also concludes that socially distributed cognition can be used as an effective 
approach for attenuating belief perseverance. Participants who were tested in groups 
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demonstrated greater confidence in their judgements, and were also characterised by lower 
revision of their judgements when presented with the atypical profile of the offender 
compared to participants working individually. This thesis also attributes the lower levels of 
belief perseverance in groups to the supplementation of individual cognitive resources. In this 
case, individuals working as a group can engage in more effortful thinking by combining 
their cognitive resources. This positive impact is evident even in instances where participants 
working in groups are tested at their non-optimal circadian times.  
From the legal perspective, it can be concluded that jurors should be keen to identify 
situations where belief perseverance may influence their decision-making. Whenever jurors 
have preconceived notions about the defendant, it becomes easier to generate reasons that are 
consistent with such notions compared to reasons that go against the notions. The study 
findings suggest that similar effects may be evident among witnesses, police, prosecutors and 
other members of the justice systems. Further, it has been argued that belief perseverance can 
lead to unfair convictions and judgements. Even in instances where the verdict is corrected 
after gaining access to reliable evidence, the affected parties may still hold on to their initial 
beliefs. Jurors are especially at the risk of belief perseverance due to the tight schedules and 
cognitive demanding decision-making roles. To overcome belief perseverance, greater 
collaboration among jurors and other agencies in the justice systems is required. The 
collaboration process helps exploit the positive effects of socially distributed cognition.  
A number of observations have also been made with respect to circadian variations and the 
influence on framing effects. The thesis reveals that participants tested at their circadian 
congruent times are less susceptible to framing effects. In other words, the decisions made by 
these individuals are independent of the presentation of information in either gain or loss 
frames. By contrast, individuals required to perform tasks at their non-optimal circadian 
times are at the risk of framing effects, in which case gain-framed messages are associated 
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with risk-averse behaviour, while loss-framed messages are associated with risk-seeking 
behaviour. In terms of application, the thesis indicates that framing effects can be applied to 
achieve a desired social health outcome. Policymakers can use gain-framed messages to 
persuade the public to undertake health behaviours that are associated with positive 
outcomes. On the other hand, loss-framed messages can be used to motivate the public to 
engage in preventative behaviours when the health outcomes under consideration are 
considered to be negative.  
In conclusion, various studies have suggested that circadian variations could have a 
significant influence on the ability of people to make correct and unbiased judgements in 
tasks that require high levels of cognitive efficiency. It is recommended that further research 
be conducted in order to evaluate the influence of circadian variations when the workload is 
significantly increased or time required to perform the task is reduced.  
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Appendices 
Appendix A1 
Questionnaires 
GRULaK:	Questionnaire	(Group)	
Please	take	your	time	to	read	this	information	carefully	this	will	encourage	you	to	use	your		
time	and	reach	a	decision	in	a	timely	manner.	
Incident	information	
Please	consider	the	following	information	that	provides	details	on	a	series	of	sexual	assaults,	which	occurred	
on	the	14th	April	2002,	25th	May	2002	and	10th	July	2002.	
	Interviews	were	conducted	with	the	three	female	victims	aged	11,	12	and	10	years	old	respectively.		
Imagine	 that	 you	 are	 acting	 as	 the	 Senior	 Investigating	 team	 in	 charge	of	 investigating	 this	 series.	 Please	
read	over	the	subsequent	materials	and	answer	the	associated	questions.	
Suspect	description	
The	man	responsible	for	these	attacks	is	estimated	to	be	tall,	between	6ft	and	6ft	3	inches	in	height.	He	speaks	
with	a	local	accent	and	with	a	calm	voice.	His	hair	is	either	brown	or	dark	blonde.	He	is	pale	skinned	and	has	a	
tattoo	on	his	left	arm.		
Offence	description	
All	the	victims	were	walking	home	from	school	when	the	offender	who	was	wearing	a	hood,	or	shirt	around	his	
face	or	 in	 one	offence	dark	 glasses,	 grabbed	 them	 securely	 from	behind	 and	blindfolded	 them.	 The	 victims	
were	 all	 lead	 to	 a	 secluded	 spot	 indicating	 that	 the	 offender	 has	 knowledge	 of	 the	 local	 area.	 He	 tells	 the	
victims	not	to	make	any	noise,	cry	or	resist	his	efforts.	He	then	removes	their	clothes	and	demands	that	they	
kiss	him.	He	fondles	the	victim	and	attempts	intercourse.	After	getting	the	victim	to	put	their	clothing	back	on	
he	guides	them	away	from	the	secluded	spot,	warns	them	not	to	look	and	leaves	quietly	and	calmly.	
Suspect	information		
Following	the	media	broadcast	of	the	suspect	description;	the	following	individual	has	been	brought	to	your	
attention.		
Suspect	A	is	a	44	year	old	white	male	who	is	6ft	2	inches	tall,	has	dark	blonde	hair	and	has	a	tattoo	on	his	left	
arm.	Further	inquiries	have	revealed	that	he	is	currently	single	and	he	is	described	by	local	people	as	insecure	
with	women,	although,	he	has	had	one	previous	relationship	with	a	woman	which	 lasted	6	months.	He	 lives	
alone	in	an	apartment	complex	half	a	mile	from	where	the	crimes	took	place	and	he	grew	up	in	the	local	area,	
which	is	reflected,	in	his	accent.	He	is	currently	unemployed	and	inquiries	in	local	pubs	reveal	that	he	is	a	fairly	
heavy	user	of	alcohol.	He	was	brought	up	in	a	poor,	working	class	family	and	he	dropped	out	of	school	at	15	
before	 taking	his	O-levels.	 Local	people	described	him	as	having	a	short	 temper	and	a	 tendency	 to	be	quite	
aggressive.	A	search	of	his	home	revealed	that	he	had	a	large	collection	of	pornography.		
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Your	team	must	discuss	this	case	for	10	minutes,	and	decide	whether	you	think	this	suspect	is	the	offender.	
MAKE	SURE	YOU	REACH	A	COMMON	OPINION.	If	you	cannot	agree,	take	the	opinion	of	the	majority	as	the	
group	opinion.	Please	report	your	answer	below.	
Please	rate,	based	on	the	available	information,	the	degree	to	which	Suspect	A	may	be	guilty	of	this	series	of	
offences?	
Please	answer	by	putting	a	mark	on	the	line	below.	Put	a	mark	near	the	left	end	if	you	believe	the	suspect	is	not	
guilty	at	all.	Put	a	mark	near	the	right	end	of	the	line	if	you	believe	the	suspect	is	completely	guilty.	Put	a	mark	
at	 an	 intermediate	 position	 if	 you	 believe	 the	 extent	 to	which	 the	 information	 indicates	 that	 the	 suspect	 is	
guilty	lies	somewhere	in	between.	
Not	at	all	o---------o---------o---------o---------o---------o---------o---------o---------o---------o	Completely	
Please	rate,	based	on	the	available	information,	the	degree	to	which	you	feel	confident	that	your	judgement	
is	correct?	
Please	answer	by	putting	a	mark	on	the	line	below.	Put	a	mark	near	the	left	end	if	you	do	not	feel	confident	at	
all	that	your	judgement	is	correct.	Put	a	mark	near	the	right	end	of	the	line	if	you	feel	completely	confident	that	
your	judgement	is	correct.	Put	a	mark	at	an	intermediate	position	if	your	confidence	in	the	correctness	of	your	
judgement	lies	somewhere	in	between.	
Not	at	all	confident		 o---------o---------o---------o---------o---------o---------o---------o---------o---------o	 Completely	confident	
Profile	information	
Due	to	the	serious	nature	of	this	offence,	the	following	offender	profile	was	compiled	by	a	behavioural	
investigator	to	assist	you	in	the	apprehension	of	the	unknown	suspect:		
In	most	crimes	of	this	nature	the	offender	is	employed	in	some	form	of	skilled	or	office	job.	The	offender	will	
usually	be	married,	often	with	children	of	his	own.	The	offender	will	be	sexually	exploratory	and	will	probably	
have	had	several	sexual	partners.	The	offender	will	own	a	pornography	collection.	Most	offenders	live	within	2	
miles	of	the	scene	of	the	crime.	Many	offences	of	this	type	do	not	involve	the	use	of	alcohol	or	drugs.	
Offenders	of	this	sort	are	often	perceived	by	others	as	being	quiet,	self-assured	individuals.	Sex	offenders	of	
this	nature	try	to	avoid	police	attention	and	usually	have	no	previous	criminal	convictions.	Offenders	typically	
appear	to	have	normal	moral	and	belief	structures.	Offences	like	this	are	characteristically	committed	by	
individuals	of	approximately	25	years	of	age	(average).	Most	are	aged	under	30.	This	type	of	sex	offender	often	
has	superficial	charm,	and	will	probably	be	fairly	popular.	The	offender	will	probably	have	been	educated	
beyond	the	age	of	16	and	is	likely	to	have	gone	to	university.	
Your	team	must	discuss	this	new	information	for	10	minutes,	and	decide	to	what	extent	this	should	affect	
your	original	opinion	of	whether	the	suspect	is	the	offender.	MAKE	SURE	YOU	REACH	A	COMMON	OPINION.	
If	you	cannot	agree,	take	the	opinion	of	the	majority	as	the	group	opinion.	Please	report	your	answer	below.	
Please	rate	again;	based	on	the	available	information,	the	degree	to	which	Suspect	A	may	be	guilty	of	this	
series	of	offences?	
Please	answer	by	putting	a	mark	on	the	line	below.	Put	a	mark	near	the	left	end	if	you	believe	the	suspect	is	not	
guilty	at	all.	Put	a	mark	near	the	right	end	of	the	line	if	you	believe	the	suspect	is	completely	guilty.	Put	a	mark	
at	an	intermediate	position	if	you	believe	the	extent	to	which	the	information	indicates	that	the	suspect	is	
guilty	lies	somewhere	in	between.	
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Not	at	all	o---------o---------o---------o---------o---------o---------o---------o---------o---------o	Completely	
Please	rate,	based	on	the	available	information,	the	degree	to	which	you	feel	confident	that	your	judgement	
is	correct?	
Please	answer	by	putting	a	mark	on	the	line	below.	Put	a	mark	near	the	left	end	if	you	do	not	feel	confident	at	
all	that	your	judgement	is	correct.	Put	a	mark	near	the	right	end	of	the	line	if	you	feel	completely	confident	that	
your	judgement	is	correct.	Put	a	mark	at	an	intermediate	position	if	your	confidence	in	the	correctness	of	your	
judgement	lies	somewhere	in	between.	
Not	at	all	confident		 o---------o---------o---------o---------o---------o---------o---------o---------o---------o	 Completely	confident	
Please	 rate	 how	 much	 you	 felt	 involved	 with	 the	 case	 by	 putting	 a	 mark	 on	 the	 line	 below.		
Put	a	mark	near	the	left	if	you	did	not	feel	involved	at	all	and	put	a	mark	near	the	right	end	of	the	line	if	you	felt	
greatly	involved	with	the	case.	Put	a	mark	at	an	intermediate	position	if	you	believe	your	involvement	with	the	
case	lies	somewhere	in	between.	
No	involvement	 o---------o---------o---------o---------o---------o---------o---------o---------o---------o	 Great	Involvement	
Please	rate	how	difficult	it	was	to	make	a	decision	by	putting	a	mark	on	the	line	below.		
Put	a	mark	near	the	left	if	it	was	not	difficult	at	all	to	make	a	decision	and	put	a	mark	near	the	right	end	of	the	
line	if	it	was	really	difficult	to	make	a	decision.	Put	a	mark	at	an	intermediate	position	if	you	believe	the	
difficulty	of	making	a	decision	lies	somewhere	in	between.	
Not	at	all	difficult	 o---------o---------o---------o---------o---------o---------o---------o---------o---------o	 Very	difficult	
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1)	Participant	N.	|___|___|___|									
What	is	your	age?	|___|___|___|	
Please	indicate	if	you	are	male	or	female:	
Male	|___|	
Female	|___|	
________________________________________________________________________________	
	2)	Participant	N.	|___|___|___|									
What	is	your	age?	|___|___|___|	
Please	indicate	if	you	are	male	or	female:	
Male	|___|	
Female	|___|	
________________________________________________________________________________	
3)	Participant	N.	|___|___|___|									
What	is	your	age?	|___|___|___|	
Please	indicate	if	you	are	male	or	female:	
Male	|___|	
Female	|___|	
________________________________________________________________________________	
4)	Participant	N.	|___|___|___|									
What	is	your	age?	|___|___|___|	
Please	indicate	if	you	are	male	or	female:	
Male	|___|	
Female	|___|	
For	office	use	only:		
	
Time:	__	:	__	
	
Total	time:	__:__	
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GRULaK:	Questionnaire	(Individual)	
Please	take	your	time	to	read	this	information	carefully	this	will	encourage	you	to	use	your		
time	and	reach	a	decision	in	a	timely	manner.	
Incident	information	
Please	consider	the	following	information	that	provides	details	on	a	series	of	sexual	assaults,	which	occurred	
on	the	14th	April	2002,	25th	May	2002	and	10th	July	2002.	
	Interviews	were	conducted	with	the	three	female	victims	aged	11,	12	and	10	years	old	respectively.		
Imagine	that	you	are	acting	as	the	Senior	Investigating	Officer	 in	charge	of	 investigating	this	series.	Please	
read	over	the	subsequent	materials	and	answer	the	associated	questions.	
Suspect	description	
The	man	responsible	for	these	attacks	is	estimated	to	be	tall,	between	6ft	and	6ft	3	inches	in	height.	He	speaks	
with	a	local	accent	and	with	a	calm	voice.	His	hair	is	either	brown	or	dark	blonde.	He	is	pale	skinned	and	has	a	
tattoo	on	his	left	arm.		
Offence	description	
All	the	victims	were	walking	home	from	school	when	the	offender	who	was	wearing	a	hood,	or	shirt	around	his	
face	or	in	one	offence	dark	glasses,	grabbed	them	securely	from	behind	and	blindfolded	them.	The	victims	
were	all	lead	to	a	secluded	spot	indicating	that	the	offender	has	knowledge	of	the	local	area.	He	tells	the	
victims	not	to	make	any	noise,	cry	or	resist	his	efforts.	He	then	removes	their	clothes	and	demands	that	they	
kiss	him.	He	fondles	the	victim	and	attempts	intercourse.	After	getting	the	victim	to	put	their	clothing	back	on	
he	guides	them	away	from	the	secluded	spot,	warns	them	not	to	look	and	leaves	quietly	and	calmly.	
Suspect	information		
Following	the	media	broadcast	of	the	suspect	description;	the	following	 individual	has	been	brought	to	your	
attention.		
Suspect	A	is	a	44	year	old	white	male	who	is	6ft	2	inches	tall,	has	dark	blonde	hair	and	has	a	tattoo	on	his	left	
arm.	Further	inquiries	have	revealed	that	he	is	currently	single	and	he	is	described	by	local	people	as	insecure	
with	women,	although,	he	has	had	one	previous	relationship	with	a	woman	which	 lasted	6	months.	He	 lives	
alone	in	an	apartment	complex	half	a	mile	from	where	the	crimes	took	place	and	he	grew	up	in	the	local	area,	
which	is	reflected,	in	his	accent.	He	is	currently	unemployed	and	inquiries	in	local	pubs	reveal	that	he	is	a	fairly	
heavy	user	of	alcohol.	He	was	brought	up	in	a	poor,	working	class	family	and	he	dropped	out	of	school	at	15	
before	 taking	his	O-levels.	 Local	people	described	him	as	having	a	short	 temper	and	a	 tendency	 to	be	quite	
aggressive.	A	search	of	his	home	revealed	that	he	had	a	large	collection	of	pornography.		
You	should	consider	this	case	and	decide	whether	you	think	the	suspect	is	the	offender.	Please	report	your	
answer	below.	
Please	rate,	based	on	the	available	information,	the	degree	to	which	Suspect	A	may	be	guilty	of	this	series	of	
offences?	
Please	answer	by	putting	a	mark	on	the	line	below.	Put	a	mark	near	the	left	end	if	you	believe	the	suspect	is	not	
guilty	at	all.	Put	a	mark	near	the	right	end	of	the	line	if	you	believe	the	suspect	is	completely	guilty.	Put	a	mark	
at	an	intermediate	position	if	you	believe	the	extent	to	which	the	information	indicates	that	the	suspect	is	
guilty	lies	somewhere	in	between.	
Running Head: K0801532 
	
	
142 
	
Not	at	all	o---------o---------o---------o---------o---------o---------o---------o---------o---------o	Completely	
Please	rate,	based	on	the	available	information,	the	degree	to	which	you	feel	confident	that	your	judgement	
is	correct?	
Please	answer	by	putting	a	mark	on	the	line	below.	Put	a	mark	near	the	left	end	if	you	do	not	feel	confident	at	
all	that	your	judgement	is	correct.	Put	a	mark	near	the	right	end	of	the	line	if	you	feel	completely	confident	that	
your	judgement	is	correct.	Put	a	mark	at	an	intermediate	position	if	your	confidence	in	the	correctness	of	your	
judgement	lies	somewhere	in	between.	
Not	at	all	confident		 o---------o---------o---------o---------o---------o---------o---------o---------o---------o	 Completely	confident	
Profile	information	
Due	 to	 the	 serious	 nature	 of	 this	 offence,	 the	 following	 offender	 profile	 was	 compiled	 by	 a	 behavioural	
investigator	to	assist	you	in	the	apprehension	of	the	unknown	suspect:	
In	most	crimes	of	this	nature	the	offender	is	employed	in	some	form	of	skilled	or	office	job.	The	offender	will	
usually	be	married,	often	with	children	of	his	own.	The	offender	will	be	sexually	exploratory	and	will	probably	
have	had	several	sexual	partners.	The	offender	will	own	a	pornography	collection.	Most	offenders	live	within	2	
miles	 of	 the	 scene	 of	 the	 crime.	 Many	 offences	 of	 this	 type	 do	 not	 involve	 the	 use	 of	 alcohol	 or	 drugs.	
Offenders	of	this	sort	are	often	perceived	by	others	as	being	quiet,	self-assured	individuals.	Sex	offenders	of	
this	nature	try	to	avoid	police	attention	and	usually	have	no	previous	criminal	convictions.	Offenders	typically	
appear	 to	 have	 normal	 moral	 and	 belief	 structures.	 Offences	 like	 this	 are	 characteristically	 committed	 by	
individuals	of	approximately	25	years	of	age	(average).	Most	are	aged	under	30.	This	type	of	sex	offender	often	
has	 superficial	 charm,	 and	 will	 probably	 be	 fairly	 popular.	 The	 offender	 will	 probably	 have	 been	 educated	
beyond	the	age	of	16	and	is	likely	to	have	gone	to	university.	
Please	consider	this	new	information	and	decide	to	what	extent	this	should	affect	your	original	opinion	of	
whether	the	suspect	is	the	offender.	Please	report	your	answer	below.	
Please	rate	again,	based	on	the	available	information,	the	degree	to	which	Suspect	A	may	be	guilty	of	this	
series	of	offences?	
Please	answer	by	putting	a	mark	on	the	line	below.	Put	a	mark	near	the	left	end	if	you	believe	the	suspect	is	not	
guilty	at	all.	Put	a	mark	near	the	right	end	of	the	line	if	you	believe	the	suspect	is	completely	guilty.	Put	a	mark	
at	an	intermediate	position	if	you	believe	the	extent	to	which	the	information	indicates	that	the	suspect	is	
guilty	lies	somewhere	in	between.	
Not	at	all	o---------o---------o---------o---------o---------o---------o---------o---------o---------o	Completely	
Please	rate,	based	on	the	available	information,	the	degree	to	which	you	feel	confident	that	your	judgement	
is	correct?	Please	answer	by	putting	a	mark	on	the	line	below.	Put	a	mark	near	the	left	end	if	you	do	not	feel	
confident	at	all	that	your	judgement	is	correct.	Put	a	mark	near	the	right	end	of	the	line	if	you	feel	completely	
confident	that	your	judgement	is	correct.	Put	a	mark	at	an	intermediate	position	if	your	confidence	in	the	
correctness	of	your	judgement	lies	somewhere	in	between.	
Not	at	all	confident		 o---------o---------o---------o---------o---------o---------o---------o---------o---------o	 Completely	confident	
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Please	rate	how	much	you	felt	involved	with	the	case	by	putting	a	mark	on	the	line	below.		
Put	a	mark	near	the	left	if	you	did	not	feel	involved	at	all	and	put	a	mark	near	the	right	end	of	the	line	if	you	felt	
greatly	involved	with	the	case.	Put	a	mark	at	an	intermediate	position	if	you	believe	your	involvement	with	the	
case	lies	somewhere	in	between.	
No	involvement	 o---------o---------o---------o---------o---------o---------o---------o---------o---------o	 Great	Involvement	
Please	rate	how	difficult	it	was	to	make	a	decision	by	putting	a	mark	on	the	line	below.		
Put	a	mark	near	the	left	if	it	was	not	difficult	at	all	to	make	a	decision	and	put	a	mark	near	the	right	end	of	the	
line	if	it	was	really	difficult	to	make	a	decision.	Put	a	mark	at	an	intermediate	position	if	you	believe	the	
difficulty	of	making	a	decision	lies	somewhere	in	between.	
Not	at	all	difficult	 o---------o---------o---------o---------o---------o---------o---------o---------o---------o	 Very	difficult	
Participant	N.	|___|___|___|									
What	is	your	age?	|___|___|___|	
Please	indicate	if	you	are	male	or	female:	
Male	|___|	
Female	|___|	
For	office	use	only:		
	
Time:	__	:	__	
	
Total	time:	__:__	
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Appendix A2 
Online Questionnaires 
 
The reduced online English version of the Horne and Ostbery (1976) Morningness-eveningness 
questionnaire (rH&O, Chelminski et al., 2000) 
 
	
https://qtrial.qualtrics.com/SE/?SID=SV_bHDSEjH7kHLqFZW	
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Appendix A3 
Participant Information Sheet 
Study	name:	An	investigation	of	jury	decision-making.		
Dear	potential	participant,	
This	 is	an	 invitation	to	participate	 in	a	Doctoral	Research	Project	being	conducted	by	Madiha	Khan	
and	Rupreet	Gurm	under	the	supervision	of	Dr	Gaëlle	Villejoubert.	
The	project	aims	to	examine	how	jurors	make	decisions	in	various	circumstances.		
Participation	 in	 the	 study	 involves	 three	 stages.	 The	 first	 stage	 you	 will	 be	 asked	 to	 read	 and	
complete	an	online	survey	containing	questions	about	the	time	of	day	when	you	feel	at	your	best.	In	
the	second	stage	of	the	experiment,	you	will	be	asked	to	read	a	brief	description	of	a	criminal	case	
involving	a	series	of	sexual	assaults	against	young	girls	either	on	your	own	or	in	a	small	group.	You	
will	then	be	asked	to	answer	a	few	questions	related	to	the	case.	
The	questionnaire	package	should	take	approximately	20	minutes	to	complete.	
Your	 participation	 is	 entirely	 voluntary.	 Note	 that	 the	 study	 involves	 sensitive	material.	 Should	
such	material	cause	you	discomfort	or	distress,	you	may	withdraw	from	participating	now,	or	at	
any	point	whilst	 completing	 the	questionnaire.	 	All	 of	 your	 answers	will	 remain	confidential	 and	
anonymous.	Once	data	are	 collected,	 your	 results	will	 form	part	of	a	 larger	database,	 from	which	
only	group	data	will	be	reported.		
Only	 the	 researchers,	 Dr	 Villejoubert,	 myself,	 and	 Gurm	 Rupreet	 will	 have	 access	 to	 these	 data.	
Signing	up	for	this	study	indicates	that	you	understand	the	nature	of	the	research	and	freely	consent	
to	participating	in	the	study.	
This	study	has	been	approved	by	the	Research	Ethics	Committee	of	the	Department	of	Psychology,	
Kingston	University.	If	you	have	concerns	regarding	the	ethics	of	this	study,	please	contact	the	Chair	
of	the	Ethics	Committee,	Prof.	François	Nectoux,	F.Nectoux@kingston.ac.uk		
If	 you	 have	 any	 questions	 or	 comment	 on	 this	 study,	 during	 or	 after	 the	 completion	 of	 the	
questionnaire,	you	are	encouraged	to	discuss	these	at	any	time	by	contacting	me	or	my	supervisor.	
Detailed	summary	of	the	results	will	be	available	towards	the	end	of	the	year.	If	you	are	interested	in	
receiving	this	information,	please	contact	me	for	a	summary	to	be	posted	out.	
Thank	you	for	your	time	and	consideration	in	participating	in	the	present	study.	
Madiha	Khan:	K0801532@kingston.ac.uk	/	Rupreet	Gurm:	k0642103@kingston.ac.uk	
Dr	Gaëlle	Villejoubert:	g.villejoubert@kingston.ac.uk	
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Appendix A4 
CONSENT	FORM	
Participant	N.	|___|___|___|									
Please	fill	in	the	form	below:-	
o I	confirm	that	I	have	read	and	understood	the	information	sheet	of	invitation	for	this	study.	I	
have	been	informed	of	the	purpose	of	taking	part.		
o I	understand	what	my	involvement	will	entail	and	any	questions	have	been	answered	to	my	
satisfaction		
o I	understand	that	my	participation	is	entirely	voluntary,	and	that	I	can	withdraw	at	any	time	
without	prejudice.		
o I	understand	that	all	information	obtained	will	be	confidential		
o I	agree	that	research	data	gathered	for	the	study	may	be	published	provided	that	I	cannot	
be	identified	as	a	subject.		
o Contact	information	has	been	provided	should	I	wish	to	seek	further	information	from	the	
investigator	at	any	time	for	purposes	of	clarification.		
	
Signature:	________________________________________________	
Date											_________/_________/________	
	
	
Statement	by	investigator		
	
o I	have	explained	this	project	and	the	implications	of	participation	in	it	to	this	participant	
without	bias.	
o I	believed	that	the	consent	is	informed	and	that	he/she	understands	the	implications	of	
participations.	
	
Name	of	investigator	________________________________________	
	
Signature	____________________	
	
Date	________/____________/____________	
	
Research	Supervisor:	
Dr	Gaëlle	Villejoubert:	g.villejoubert@kingston.ac.uk	
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Appendix A5 
Participant	N.	|___|___|___|									
	
Study	Debrief	Sheet	
The	purpose	of	this	study	was	to	find	out	whether	extraneous	factors	such	as	whether	judgements	
are	made	individually	or	in	a	group	or	whether	people	are	making	judgements	at	their	most	efficient	
time	of	the	day	would	influence	individuals’	perception	of	a	suspect’s	guilt.		
The	 content	 of	 the	 experiment	 contained	 a	 description	 of	 a	 sexual	 crime	 against	 children.	 If	 the	
content	and	nature	of	the	experiment	has	caused	you	to	feel	discomfort	or	stress,	or	you	have	been	
affected	 in	 any	 way,	 you	 can	 call	 Victim	 Support	 on	 0845	 30	 30	 900,	 or	 alternatively	 go	 to	
www.victimsupport.org.uk	or	www.samaritans.org	to	receive	the	help	or	support	you	may	require.		
All	 data	 provided	 by	 all	 participants	 will	 remain	 confidential.	 However	 you	 have	 the	 right	 to	
withdraw	 your	 data	 at	 any	 time	 of	 the	 investigation.	 To	 do	 this	 please	 contact	 the	 email	 address	
provided	 and	 state	 your	 participation	 number	 which	 is	 at	 the	 top	 of	 this	 page.	 If	 there	 are	 any	
further	questions	regarding	the	study,	please	also	contact	us	via	the	email	addresses	provided.	
	
Thank	you	again	for	your	participation.	
Researchers:	
Madiha	Khan:	K0801532@kingston.ac.uk	
Rupreet	Gurm:	K0642103@kingston.ac.uk	
Supervisor:	
Gaëlle	Villejoubert	
g.villejoubert@kingston	.ac.uk		
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Appendix B1 
Questionnaires  
Please take your time to read this information carefully. 
 
Incident information 
The following considers a series of reports of sexual assaults between April and July 2011. 
All evidence and information relating to this series has been reviewed.  
Psychological interviews were carried out with the three victims. The first, assaulted on 10th 
April was 11 years old. The second, a 12-year-old victim, was assaulted May 22nd. The third 
was a 10- year-old girl who was assaulted on the 5th of July.  
The following description of the suspect and of the offence have been established on the basis 
of the information collected in the interviews.  
Suspect description 
  
Offence description 
All the victims were walking home from school when the offender who was wearing a 
hood, or shirt around his face or in one offence dark glasses, grabbed them securely from 
behind and blindfolded them. The victims were all lead to a secluded spot indicating that 
the offender has knowledge of the local area. He tells the victims not to make any noise, 
cry or resist his efforts. He then removes their clothes and demands that they kiss him. 
He fondles the victim and attempts intercourse. After getting the victim to put their 
clothing back on he guides them away from the secluded spot, warns them not to look 
and leaves quietly and calmly.  
  
Following the media broadcast of the suspect description; the following individual has been 
brought to your attention.  
The man responsible for these attacks is estimated to be tall, between 6ft and 6ft 3 inches in 
height. He speaks with a local accent and with a calm voice. His hair is either brown or dark 
blonde. He is pale skinned and has a tattoo on his left arm.  
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Suspect information 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Suspect A is a 44 year old white male who is 6ft 2 inches tall, has dark blonde hair and has a 
tattoo on his left arm. Further inquiries have revealed that he is currently single and he is 
described by local people as insecure with women, although, he has had one previous 
relationship with a woman which lasted 6 months. He lives alone in an apartment complex 
half a mile from where the crimes took place and he grew up in the local area, which is 
reflected, in his accent. He is currently unemployed and inquiries in local pubs reveal that he 
is a fairly heavy user of alcohol. He was brought up in a poor, working class family and he 
dropped out of school at 15 before taking his O-levels. Local people described him as having 
a short temper and a tendency to be quite aggressive. A search of his home revealed that he 
had a large collection of pornography.  
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Please take your time to read this information carefully.  
Profile information 
Due to the serious nature of this offence, you requested a behavioural investigator to assist 
you in the apprehension of the unknown offender. He produced the following offender 
profile.  
Offender profile 
 
In most crimes of this nature the offender is employed in some form of skilled or office job. 
The offender will usually be married, often with children of his own. The offender will be 
sexually exploratory and will probably have had several sexual partners. The offender will 
own a pornography collection. Most offenders live within 2 miles of the scene of the crime. 
Many offences of this type do not involve the use of alcohol or drugs. Offenders of this sort 
are often perceived by others as being quiet, self-assured individuals. Sex offenders of this 
nature try to avoid police attention and usually have no previous criminal convictions. 
Offenders typically appear to have normal moral and belief structures. Offences like this are 
characteristically committed by individuals of approximately 25 years of age (average). Most 
are aged under 30. This type of sex offender often has superficial charm, and will probably 
be fairly popular. The offender will probably have been educated beyond the age of 16 and is 
likely to have gone to university.  
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Questionnaire 
Reminder. This study aims to explore investigative decision-making. It involves a series of 
sexual assaults against young girls. Should such material cause you discomfort or distress, 
you are not obliged to respond to the questionnaire and can leave the questionnaire at any 
time. 
Before we begin, please answer the following questions:  
1. What is your participant number? |__|__|__| 
2. What was your MEQ score? |__|__| 
3. Do you feel mentally alert right now? 
Please put a mark on the line below to provide your answer. Put your mark near the left end if you 
feel mentally tired and do not feel mentally alert at all. Put a mark near the right end of the line if you 
feel wide awake and extremely alert mentally. 
 
Not at all o---------o---------o---------o---------o---------o---------o---------o---------o---------o Extremely  
 
4. What time is it now? |__|__| : |__|__| 
Imagine that you are acting as the Senior Investigating Officer in charge 
of investigating a series of sexual assaults against young girls. Please 
read over the subsequent materials in the order presented. 
 
Please read the “incident information” laminate now. 
Decision task 
You should consider this case and decide whether you think the suspect is the offender. 
Please report your answer below. 
5. Based on the available information, please rate the probability that Suspect A may have 
committed this series of offences. 
Please answer by putting a mark on the line below. Put your mark near the left end if you believe it is 
absolutely impossible that Suspect A committed the offences. Put a mark near the right end of the 
line if you believe it is certain that Suspect A has committed the offences. Put a mark at an 
intermediate position if you believe the probability that Suspect A committed the offences lies 
somewhere in between. 
Impossible o---------o---------o---------o---------o---------o---------o---------o---------o---------o Certain 
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6. Please rate the degree to which you feel confident that your judgment is correct? 
Please answer by putting a mark on the line below. 
 
Not at all confident o---------o---------o---------o---------o---------o---------o---------o---------o---------o Absolutely confident  
 
7. Please provide up to 5 possible reasons explaining why Suspect A may NOT actually be 
the offender. 
a....................................................................................................................................... 
b....................................................................................................................................... 
c....................................................................................................................................... 
d...................................................................................................................................... 
e....................................................................................................................................... 
Please read the “profile information” laminate now. 
 
Decision task (continued) 
8. Based on all the information now at your disposal, please rate again the probability that 
Suspect A may have committed this series of offences. 
Please answer by putting a mark on the line below. 
       Impossible o---------o---------o---------o---------o---------o---------o---------o---------o---------o Certain 
 
9. Please rate the degree to which you now feel confident that your judgment is correct? 
Please answer by putting a mark on the line below. 
Not at all confident o---------o---------o---------o---------o---------o---------o---------o---------o---------o Absolutely confident  
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Thank you for your answers. To better understand how you completed the task, we 
would be grateful if you could answer the following questions: 
 
10. What time is it now? |__|__| : |__|__| 
11. To what extent did you feel involved with the case? 
Please answer by putting a mark on the line below. 
Not at all involved o---------o---------o---------o---------o---------o---------o---------o---------o---------o Extremely involved  
12. To what extent did you find it difficult to list 5 reasons explaining why Suspect A might 
NOT have been the offender? 
Please answer by putting a mark on the line below. 
Not at all difficult o---------o---------o---------o---------o---------o---------o---------o---------o---------o Extremely difficult  
13. To what extent did you find it difficult to estimate the probability that Suspect A might 
have been the offender? 
 Please answer by putting a mark on the line below. 
Not at all difficult  o---------o---------o---------o---------o---------o---------o---------o---------o---------o Extremely difficult   
14. What is your age? |___|___|___| 
15. Are you are male or female? Male |___| Female |___| 
16. What is your main area of study? (e.g., psychology, engineering, journalism, business, 
etc.) 
....................................................................................................................................... 
17. What is your level of study? (e.g., First year, Second year, Final year, Master, PhD, etc.) 
....................................................................................................................................... 
 
Thank you for taking part in this study!	
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Questionnaire 
Reminder. This study aims to explore investigative decision-making. It involves a series of 
sexual assaults against young girls. Should such material cause you discomfort or distress, 
you are not obliged to respond to the questionnaire and can leave the questionnaire at any 
time. 
Before we begin, please answer the following questions:  
1. What is your participant number? |__|__|__| 
2. What was your MEQ score? |__|__| 
3. Do you feel mentally alert right now? 
Please put a mark on the line below to provide your answer. Put your mark near the left end if you 
feel mentally tired and do not feel mentally alert at all. Put a mark near the right end of the line if you 
feel wide awake and extremely alert mentally. 
 
Not at all o---------o---------o---------o---------o---------o---------o---------o---------o---------o Extremely  
 
4. What time is it now? |__|__| : |__|__| 
Imagine that you are acting as the Senior Investigating Officer in charge 
of investigating a series of sexual assaults against young girls. Please 
read over the subsequent materials in the order presented. 
 
Please read the “incident information” laminate now. 
Decision task 
You should consider this case and decide whether you think the suspect is the offender. 
Please report your answer below. 
5. Based on the available information, please rate the probability that Suspect A may have 
committed this series of offences. 
Please answer by putting a mark on the line below. Put your mark near the left end if you believe it is 
absolutely impossible that Suspect A committed the offences. Put a mark near the right end of the 
line if you believe it is certain that Suspect A has committed the offences. Put a mark at an 
intermediate position if you believe the probability that Suspect A committed the offences lies 
somewhere in between. 
Impossible o---------o---------o---------o---------o---------o---------o---------o---------o---------o Certain 
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6. Please rate the degree to which you feel confident that your judgment is correct? 
Please answer by putting a mark on the line below. 
 
Not at all confident o---------o---------o---------o---------o---------o---------o---------o---------o---------o Absolutely confident  
 
7. Please provide up to 5 possible reasons explaining why Suspect A may actually be the 
offender. 
a....................................................................................................................................... 
b....................................................................................................................................... 
c....................................................................................................................................... 
d...................................................................................................................................... 
e....................................................................................................................................... 
Please read the “profile information” laminate now. 
 
Decision task (continued) 
8. Based on all the information now at your disposal, please rate again the probability that 
Suspect A may have committed this series of offences. 
Please answer by putting a mark on the line below. 
       Impossible o---------o---------o---------o---------o---------o---------o---------o---------o---------o Certain 
 
9. Please rate the degree to which you now feel confident that your judgment is correct? 
Please answer by putting a mark on the line below. 
Not at all confident o---------o---------o---------o---------o---------o---------o---------o---------o---------o Absolutely confident  
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Thank you for your answers. To better understand how you completed the task, we 
would be grateful if you could answer the following questions: 
 
10. What time is it now? |__|__| : |__|__| 
11. To what extent did you feel involved with the case? 
Please answer by putting a mark on the line below. 
Not at all involved o---------o---------o---------o---------o---------o---------o---------o---------o---------o Extremely involved  
12. To what extent did you find it difficult to list 5 reasons explaining why Suspect A might 
NOT have been the offender? 
Please answer by putting a mark on the line below. 
Not at all difficult o---------o---------o---------o---------o---------o---------o---------o---------o---------o Extremely difficult  
13. To what extent did you find it difficult to estimate the probability that Suspect A might 
have been the offender? 
 Please answer by putting a mark on the line below. 
Not at all difficult  o---------o---------o---------o---------o---------o---------o---------o---------o---------o Extremely difficult   
14. What is your age? |___|___|___| 
15. Are you are male or female? Male |___| Female |___| 
16. What is your main area of study? (e.g., psychology, engineering, journalism, business, 
etc.) 
....................................................................................................................................... 
17. What is your level of study? (e.g., First year, Second year, Final year, Master, PhD, etc.) 
....................................................................................................................................... 
 
Thank you for taking part in this study!	
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Appendix B2 
Online	Questionnaires	
The	reduced	online	English	version	of	the	Horne	and	Ostbery	(1976)	Morningness-eveningness	
questionnaire	(rH&O,	Chelminski	et	al.,	2000)	
MEQ	Questionnaire	
Q1	Please	write	down	your	email	address	so	that	we	can	contact	you	for	the	next	part	of	the	study.	
(You	may	withdraw	from	participating	now,	or	at	any	point	whilst	completing	the	questionnaire.	If	
the	results	of	the	study	are	published,	then	your	answers	will	not	be	identifiable)					
Q2		Considering	only	your	own	“feeling	best”	rhythm,	at	what	time	would	you	get	up	if	you	were	
entirely	free	to	plan	your	day?				
Q3	During	the	first	half-hour	of	having	woken	in	the	morning,	how	tired	do	you	feel?	
m Very	tired	(1)	
m Fairly	tired	(2)	
m Fairly	refreshed	(3)	
m Very	refreshed	(4)	
	
Q4	At	what	time	in	the	evening	do	you	feel	tired	and	as	a	result	in	need	of	sleep?				
	
Q5		At	what	time	of	the	day	do	you	think	that	you	reach	your	“feeling	best”	peak?				
	
Q6		One	hears	of	“morning”	and	“evening”	types	of	people.	Which	one	of	these	types	do	you	
consider	yourself	to	be?	
m Definitely	a	“morning”	type	(1)	
m Rather	more	a	“morning”	than	an	“evening”	type	(2)	
m Rather	more	an	“evening”	than	a	“morning”	type	(3)	
m Definitely	an	“evening	type”	(4)	
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Appendix B3 
Participant	Information	Sheet	
Study	name:	An	investigation	of	Belief	Perseverance.		
Dear	potential	participant,	
This	 is	an	 invitation	to	participate	 in	a	Doctoral	Research	Project	being	conducted	by	Madiha	Khan	
under	the	supervision	of	Dr	Gaëlle	Villejoubert.	
The	project	 aims	 to	 examine	how	belief	perseverance	occurs	and	how	 individual	make	decisions	 in	
various	circumstances.		
Participation	 in	 the	 study	 involves	 three	 stages.	 The	 first	 stage	 you	 will	 be	 asked	 to	 read	 and	
complete	the	questionnaire	containing	questions	about	the	time	of	day	when	you	feel	at	your	best.	
In	 the	 second	 stage	of	 the	experiment,	 you	will	 be	asked	 to	 read	a	brief	description	of	 a	criminal	
case	involving	a	series	of	sexual	assaults	against	young	girls.	You	will	then	be	asked	to	answer	a	few	
questions	related	to	the	case.	
The	questionnaire	package	should	take	approximately	20	minutes	to	complete.	
Your	 participation	 is	 entirely	 voluntary.	 Note	 that	 the	 study	 involves	 sensitive	material.	 Should	
such	material	cause	you	discomfort	or	distress,	you	may	withdraw	from	participating	now,	or	at	
any	point	whilst	 completing	 the	questionnaire.	 	All	 of	 your	 answers	will	 remain	confidential	 and	
anonymous.	Once	data	are	 collected,	 your	 results	will	 form	part	of	a	 larger	database,	 from	which	
only	 group	 data	will	 be	 reported.	 Only	 the	 researchers,	 Dr.	 Villejoubert	 and	 I	 will	 have	 access	 to	
these	data.	Signing	up	for	this	study	 indicates	that	you	understand	the	nature	of	 the	research	and	
freely	consent	to	participating	in	the	study.	
This	study	has	been	approved	by	the	Research	Ethics	Committee	of	the	Department	of	Psychology,	
Kingston	University.	If	you	have	concerns	regarding	the	ethics	of	this	study,	please	contact	the	Chair	
of	the	Ethics	Committee,	Prof.	François	Nectoux,	F.Nectoux@kingston.ac.uk		
If	 you	 have	 any	 questions	 or	 comment	 on	 this	 study,	 during	 or	 after	 the	 completion	 of	 the	
questionnaire,	you	are	encouraged	to	discuss	these	at	any	time	by	contacting	me	or	my	supervisor.	
Detailed	summary	of	the	results	will	be	available	towards	the	end	of	the	year.	If	you	are	interested	in	
receiving	this	information,	please	contact	me	for	a	summary	to	be	posted	out.	
Thank	you	for	your	time	and	consideration	in	participating	in	the	present	study.	
Madiha	Khan:	K0801532@kingston.ac.uk		
Dr	Gaëlle	Villejoubert:	g.villejoubert@kingston.ac.uk	
	
	
Running Head: K0801532 
	
	
159 
Appendix B4 
CONSENT	FORM	
Participant	N.	|___|___|___|									
Please	fill	in	the	form	below:-	
o I	confirm	that	I	have	read	and	understood	the	information	sheet	of	invitation	for	this	study.	I	
have	been	informed	of	the	purpose	of	taking	part.		
o I	understand	what	my	involvement	will	entail	and	any	questions	have	been	answered	to	my	
satisfaction		
o I	understand	that	my	participation	is	entirely	voluntary,	and	that	I	can	withdraw	at	any	time	
without	prejudice.		
o I	understand	that	all	information	obtained	will	be	confidential		
o I	agree	that	research	data	gathered	for	the	study	may	be	published	provided	that	I	cannot	
be	identified	as	a	subject.		
o Contact	information	has	been	provided	should	I	wish	to	seek	further	information	from	the	
investigator	at	any	time	for	purposes	of	clarification.		
	
Signature:	________________________________________________	
Date											_________/_________/________	
	
	
Statement	by	investigator		
	
o I	have	explained	this	project	and	the	implications	of	participation	in	it	to	this	participant	
without	bias.	
o I	believed	that	the	consent	is	informed	and	that	he/she	understands	the	implications	of	
participations.	
	
Name	of	investigator	________________________________________	
	
Signature	____________________	
	
Date	________/____________/____________	
	
Research	Supervisor:	
Dr	Gaëlle	Villejoubert:	g.villejoubert@kingston.ac.uk	
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Appendix B5 
	
Participant	N.	|___|___|___|									
Study	Debrief	Sheet	
The	purpose	of	this	study	was	to	find	out	whether	extraneous	factors	such	as	whether	decision	and	
judgements	are	made	when	they	are	generating	explanation	in	a	narrative	form	or	in	a	listing	form	
or	whether	people	are	making	decision	and	judgements	at	their	most	efficient	time	of	the	day	would	
influence	individuals’	belief	perseverance	of	a	suspect’s	guilt.		
The	 content	 of	 the	 experiment	 contained	 a	 description	 of	 a	 sexual	 crime	 against	 children.	 If	 the	
content	and	nature	of	the	experiment	has	caused	you	to	feel	discomfort	or	stress,	or	you	have	been	
affected	 in	 any	 way,	 you	 can	 call	 Victim	 Support	 on	 0845	 30	 30	 900,	 or	 alternatively	 go	 to	
www.victimsupport.org.uk	or	www.samaritans.org	to	receive	the	help	or	support	you	may	require.			
All	 data	 provided	 by	 all	 participants	 will	 remain	 confidential.	 However	 you	 have	 the	 right	 to	
withdraw	 your	 data	 at	 any	 time	 of	 the	 investigation.	 To	 do	 this	 please	 contact	 the	 email	 address	
provided	 and	 state	 your	 participation	 number	 which	 is	 at	 the	 top	 of	 this	 page.	 If	 there	 are	 any	
further	questions	regarding	the	study,	please	also	contact	us	via	the	email	addresses	provided.	
Thank	you	again	for	your	participation.	
Researchers:	
Madiha	Khan:	K0801532@kingston.ac.uk	
Supervisor:	
Gaëlle	Villejoubert	
g.villejoubert@kingston	.ac.uk		
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Appendix C1 
For	office	use	only:		
	
Time	Started:	__:	__	
	
Total	time:	__:__	
Questionnaire 
 
1. What is your participant number? |__|__|__| 
 
2. What was your MEQ score? |__|__| 
 
3. Do you feel mentally alert right now? 
Please put a mark on the line below to provide your answer. Put your mark near the left end if 
you feel mentally tired and do not feel mentally alert at all. Put a mark near the right end of 
the line if you feel wide-awake and extremely alert mentally. 
Not at all  o---------o---------o---------o---------o---------o---------o---------o---------o--------o Extremely 
 
 
The following section includes a number of situations in which you are asked to make a decision.  
Please take your time to read each individual situation carefully, and choose the option which you  
prefer. There are no right or wrong answers.  
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Imagine the US is preparing for the outbreak of an unusual Asian disease, which is expected 
to kill 600 people. Two alternative programs have been prepared to combat the disease 
have been proposed. Assume that the exact scientific estimates of the consequences of the 
programs are as follows: 
Program A: 200 people will be saved. 
Program B: 1/3 probability that 600 people will be saved and 2/3 probability that no people 
will be saved. 
Decision task 
Based on the available information, please rate the extent to which you prefer 
Program A or Program B.  
1. Please answer by putting a mark on the line below. Put your mark near the left end if you 
definitely prefer Program A over Program B. Put a mark near the right end of the line if you 
definitely prefer Program B. Put a mark at an intermediate position if your preference for 
Program A or Program B lies somewhere in between. 
 
Program A o---------o---------o---------o---------o---------o---------o---------o---------o---------o Program B 
 
Please rate the degree to which you feel confident that your judgement is correct? 
 
2. Please answer by putting a mark on the line below. 
	
Not at all 
confident o---------o---------o---------o---------o---------o---------o---------o---------o---------o 
Absolutely 
confident 
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The National Cancer Institute has two possible treatments for lung cancer, which could 
become standard treatments across the country. Assume that the exact scientific estimates 
of the consequences of the treatments are as follows: 
Treatment A: Of every 1000 people who get lung cancer, 400 will be saved. 
Treatment B: 2/5 chance that 1000 of every 1000 who get lung cancer will be saved and 3/5 
chance that no people of every 1000 who get lung cancer will be saved. 
Decision task 
Based on the available information, please rate the extent to which you prefer 
Treatment A or Treatment B.  
1. Please answer by putting a mark on the line below. Put your mark near the left end if you 
definitely prefer Treatment A over Treatment B. Put a mark near the right end of the line if you 
definitely prefer Treatment B. Put a mark at an intermediate position if your preference for 
Treatment A or Treatment B lies somewhere in between. 
 
Treatment A o---------o---------o---------o---------o---------o---------o---------o---------o---------o Treatment B 
 
Please rate the degree to which you feel confident that your judgement is correct? 
 
2. Please answer by putting a mark on the line below. 
	
Not at all 
confident o---------o---------o---------o---------o---------o---------o---------o---------o---------o 
Absolutely 
confident 
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The United States is expecting the outbreak of a new strain of HIV virus which is expected to 
kill 2000 persons. Two alternative programs were developed to combat the disease. Assume 
that the exact scientific estimates of the consequences of the programs are as follows: 
Program A: 800 people will be saved. 
Program B: 2/5 probability that 2000 people will be saved and 3/5 probability that no people 
will be saved. 
Decision task 
Based on the available information, please rate the extent to which you prefer 
Program A or Program B.  
1. Please answer by putting a mark on the line below. Put your mark near the left end if you 
definitely prefer Program A over Program B. Put a mark near the right end of the line if you 
definitely prefer Program B. Put a mark at an intermediate position if your preference for 
Program A or Program B lies somewhere in between. 
 
Program A o---------o---------o---------o---------o---------o---------o---------o---------o---------o Program B 
 
Please rate the degree to which you feel confident that your judgement is correct? 
 
2. Please answer by putting a mark on the line below. 
Not at all 
confident o---------o---------o---------o---------o---------o---------o---------o---------o---------o 
Absolutely 
confident 
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Some	Questions	
We would be delighted if you could answer a few additional 
questions. The answers will take a few minutes only. 
 
	
 
 
 
 
 
 
in	a	lake,	there	is	patch	of	lily	pads.	Everyday	the	patch	doubles	in	size.	if	it	
takes	48	days	for	the	patch	to	cover	the	enfre	lake,	how	long	would	it	take	
for	the	patch	to	cover	half	of	the	lake?			
--------------------	days?		
If	it	takes	5	machine4s	to	make	5	widgets,	how	long	would	it	take	100	
machines	to	make	100	widgets?	
--------------------	minutes		
A	bat	and	a	ball	cost	$1.10	in	total.	the	bat	cost	$1.00	more	than	the	ball.	
how	much	does	the	ball	costs	
--------------------	cents?	
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Imagine the US is preparing for the outbreak of an unusual Asian disease, which is expected 
to kill 600 people. Two alternative programs have been prepared to combat the disease 
have been proposed. Assume that the exact scientific estimates of the consequences of the 
programs are as follows: 
Program A: 400 people will die. 
Program B: 1/3 probability that nobody will die and 2/3 probability 600 people will die. 
Decision task 
Based on the available information, please rate the extent to which you prefer 
Program A or Program B.  
1. Please answer by putting a mark on the line below. Put your mark near the left end if you 
definitely prefer Program A over Program B. Put a mark near the right end of the line if you 
definitely prefer Program B. Put a mark at an intermediate position if your preference for 
Program A or Program B lies somewhere in between. 
 
Program A o---------o---------o---------o---------o---------o---------o---------o---------o---------o Program B 
 
Please rate the degree to which you feel confident that your judgement is correct? 
 
2. Please answer by putting a mark on the line below. 
	
Not at all 
confident o---------o---------o---------o---------o---------o---------o---------o---------o---------o 
Absolutely 
confident 
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The National Cancer Institute has two possible treatments for lung cancer, which could 
become standard treatments across the country. Assume that the exact scientific estimates 
of the consequences of the treatments are as follows: 
Treatment A: Of every 1000 people who get lung cancer, 600 will die. 
Treatment B: 2/5 chance that no people of every 1000 who get lung cancer will die and 3/5 
chance that 1000 people of every 1000 who get lung cancer will die. 
Decision task 
Based on the available information, please rate the extent to which you prefer 
Treatment A or Treatment B.  
1. Please answer by putting a mark on the line below. Put your mark near the left end if you 
definitely prefer Treatment A over Treatment B. Put a mark near the right end of the line if you 
definitely prefer Treatment B. Put a mark at an intermediate position if your preference for 
Treatment A or Treatment B lies somewhere in between. 
 
Treatment A o---------o---------o---------o---------o---------o---------o---------o---------o---------o Treatment B 
 
Please rate the degree to which you feel confident that your judgement is correct? 
 
2. Please answer by putting a mark on the line below. 
Not at all 
confident o---------o---------o---------o---------o---------o---------o---------o---------o---------o 
Absolutely 
confident 
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The United States is expecting the outbreak of a new strain of HIV virus which is expected to 
kill 2000 persons. Two alternative programs were developed to combat the disease. Assume 
that the exact scientific estimates of the consequences of the programs are as follows: 
Program A: 1200 people will die. 
Program B: 2/5 probability that nobody will die and 3/5 probability 
that 2000 people will die. 
Decision task 
Based on the available information, please rate the extent to which you prefer 
Program A or Program B.  
1. Please answer by putting a mark on the line below. Put your mark near the left end if you 
definitely prefer Program A over Program B. Put a mark near the right end of the line if you 
definitely prefer Program B. Put a mark at an intermediate position if your preference for 
Program A or Program B lies somewhere in between. 
Program  A o---------o---------o---------o---------o---------o---------o---------o---------o---------o Program B 
Please rate the degree to which you feel confident that your judgement is correct? 
2. Please answer by putting a mark on the line below. 
Not at all 
confident o---------o---------o---------o---------o---------o---------o---------o---------o---------o 
Absolutely 
confident 
Thank you for your answers. To better understand how you completed the task, we 
would be grateful if you could answer the following questions: 
1. To what extent did you feel involved with the task? 
 Please answer by putting a mark on the line below. 
Not	at	all	
involved o---------o---------o---------o---------o---------o---------o---------o---------o---------o 
Extremely 
involved 
2. What is your age? |___|___|  
 
3. Are you are male or female? Male |___| Female |___|  
 
4. What is your main area of study? (e.g., psychology, engineering, journalism, business, etc.) 
 
.......................................................................................................................................  
 
5. What is your level of study? (e.g., First year, Second year, Final year, Master, PhD, etc.) 
 
.......................................................................................................................................  
Thank you for taking part in this study! 
For	office	use	only:	 
																Time	Finished:	__:	__	
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For	office	use	only:		
	
Time	Started:	__:	__	
	
Total	time:	__:__	
Questionnaire 
 
1. What is your participant number? |__|__|__| 
 
2. What was your MEQ score? |__|__| 
 
3. Do you feel mentally alert right now? 
Please put a mark on the line below to provide your answer. Put your mark near the left end if 
you feel mentally tired and do not feel mentally alert at all. Put a mark near the right end of 
the line if you feel wide-awake and extremely alert mentally. 
Not at all  o---------o---------o---------o---------o---------o---------o---------o---------o--------o Extremely 
 
 
The following section includes a number of situations in which you are asked to make a decision.  
Please take your time to read each individual situation carefully, and choose the option which you  
prefer. There are no right or wrong answers.  
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Imagine the US is preparing for the outbreak of an unusual Asian disease, which is expected 
to kill 600 people. Two alternative programs have been prepared to combat the disease 
have been proposed. Assume that the exact scientific estimates of the consequences of the 
programs are as follows: 
Program A: 400 people will die. 
Program B: 1/3 probability that nobody will die and 2/3 probability 600 people will die. 
Decision task 
Based on the available information, please rate the extent to which you prefer 
Program A or Program B.  
3. Please answer by putting a mark on the line below. Put your mark near the left end if you 
definitely prefer Program A over Program B. Put a mark near the right end of the line if you 
definitely prefer Program B. Put a mark at an intermediate position if your preference for 
Program A or Program B lies somewhere in between. 
 
Program A o---------o---------o---------o---------o---------o---------o---------o---------o---------o Program B 
 
Please rate the degree to which you feel confident that your judgement is correct? 
 
4. Please answer by putting a mark on the line below. 
	
Not at all 
confident o---------o---------o---------o---------o---------o---------o---------o---------o---------o 
Absolutely 
confident 
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The National Cancer Institute has two possible treatments for lung cancer, which could 
become standard treatments across the country. Assume that the exact scientific estimates 
of the consequences of the treatments are as follows: 
Treatment A: Of every 1000 people who get lung cancer, 600 will die. 
Treatment B: 2/5 chance that no people of every 1000 who get lung cancer will die and 3/5 
chance that 1000 people of every 1000 who get lung cancer will die. 
Decision task 
Based on the available information, please rate the extent to which you prefer 
Treatment A or Treatment B.  
3. Please answer by putting a mark on the line below. Put your mark near the left end if you 
definitely prefer Treatment A over Treatment B. Put a mark near the right end of the line if you 
definitely prefer Treatment B. Put a mark at an intermediate position if your preference for 
Treatment A or Treatment B lies somewhere in between. 
 
Treatment A o---------o---------o---------o---------o---------o---------o---------o---------o---------o Treatment B 
 
Please rate the degree to which you feel confident that your judgement is correct? 
 
4. Please answer by putting a mark on the line below. 
	
Not at all 
confident o---------o---------o---------o---------o---------o---------o---------o---------o---------o 
Absolutely 
confident 
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The United States is expecting the outbreak of a new strain of HIV virus which is expected to 
kill 2000 persons. Two alternative programs were developed to combat the disease. Assume 
that the exact scientific estimates of the consequences of the programs are as follows: 
Program A: 1200 people will die. 
Program B: 2/5 probability that nobody will die and 3/5 probability 
that 2000 people will die. 
Decision task 
Based on the available information, please rate the extent to which you prefer 
Program A or Program B.  
3. Please answer by putting a mark on the line below. Put your mark near the left end if you 
definitely prefer Program A over Program B. Put a mark near the right end of the line if you 
definitely prefer Program B. Put a mark at an intermediate position if your preference for 
Program A or Program B lies somewhere in between. 
 
Program  A o---------o---------o---------o---------o---------o---------o---------o---------o---------o Program B 
 
Please rate the degree to which you feel confident that your judgement is correct? 
 
4. Please answer by putting a mark on the line below. 
	
Not at all 
confident o---------o---------o---------o---------o---------o---------o---------o---------o---------o 
Absolutely 
confident 
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Some	Questions	
We would be delighted if you could answer a few additional 
questions. The answers will take a few minutes only. 
 
	
	
	
	
	
	
 
in	a	lake,	there	is	patch	of	lily	pads.	Everyday	the	patch	doubles	in	size.	if	it	
takes	48	days	for	the	patch	to	cover	the	enfre	lake,	how	long	would	it	take	
for	the	patch	to	cover	half	of	the	lake?			
--------------------	days?		
If	it	takes	5	machine4s	to	make	5	widgets,	how	long	would	it	take	100	
machines	to	make	100	widgets?	
--------------------	minutes		
A	bat	and	a	ball	cost	$1.10	in	total.	the	bat	cost	$1.00	more	than	the	ball.	
how	much	does	the	ball	costs	
--------------------	cents?	
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Imagine the US is preparing for the outbreak of an unusual Asian disease, which is expected 
to kill 600 people. Two alternative programs have been prepared to combat the disease 
have been proposed. Assume that the exact scientific estimates of the consequences of the 
programs are as follows: 
Program A: 200 people will be saved. 
Program B: 1/3 probability that 600 people will be saved and 2/3 probability that no people 
will be saved. 
Decision task 
Based on the available information, please rate the extent to which you prefer 
Program A or Program B.  
3. Please answer by putting a mark on the line below. Put your mark near the left end if you 
definitely prefer Program A over Program B. Put a mark near the right end of the line if you 
definitely prefer Program B. Put a mark at an intermediate position if your preference for 
Program A or Program B lies somewhere in between. 
 
Program A o---------o---------o---------o---------o---------o---------o---------o---------o---------o Program B 
 
Please rate the degree to which you feel confident that your judgement is correct? 
 
4. Please answer by putting a mark on the line below. 
	
Not at all 
confident o---------o---------o---------o---------o---------o---------o---------o---------o---------o 
Absolutely 
confident 
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The National Cancer Institute has two possible treatments for lung cancer, which could 
become standard treatments across the country. Assume that the exact scientific estimates 
of the consequences of the treatments are as follows: 
Treatment A: Of every 1000 people who get lung cancer, 400 will be saved. 
Treatment B: 2/5 chance that 1000 of every 1000 who get lung cancer will be saved and 3/5 
chance that no people of every 1000 who get lung cancer will be saved. 
Decision task 
Based on the available information, please rate the extent to which you prefer 
Treatment A or Treatment B.  
3. Please answer by putting a mark on the line below. Put your mark near the left end if you 
definitely prefer Treatment A over Treatment B. Put a mark near the right end of the line if you 
definitely prefer Treatment B. Put a mark at an intermediate position if your preference for 
Treatment A or Treatment B lies somewhere in between. 
 
Treatment A o---------o---------o---------o---------o---------o---------o---------o---------o---------o Treatment B 
 
Please rate the degree to which you feel confident that your judgement is correct? 
 
4. Please answer by putting a mark on the line below. 
	
Not at all 
confident o---------o---------o---------o---------o---------o---------o---------o---------o---------o 
Absolutely 
confident 
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The United States is expecting the outbreak of a new strain of HIV virus which is expected to 
kill 2000 persons. Two alternative programs were developed to combat the disease. Assume 
that the exact scientific estimates of the consequences of the programs are as follows: 
Program A: 800 people will be saved. 
Program B: 2/5 probability that 2000 people will be saved and 3/5 probability that no people 
will be saved. 
Decision task 
Based on the available information, please rate the extent to which you prefer 
Program A or Program B.  
3. Please answer by putting a mark on the line below. Put your mark near the left end if you 
definitely prefer Program A over Program B. Put a mark near the right end of the line if you 
definitely prefer Program B. Put a mark at an intermediate position if your preference for 
Program A or Program B lies somewhere in between. 
 
Program A o---------o---------o---------o---------o---------o---------o---------o---------o---------o Program B 
Please rate the degree to which you feel confident that your judgement is correct? 
4. Please answer by putting a mark on the line below. 
Not at all 
confident o---------o---------o---------o---------o---------o---------o---------o---------o---------o 
Absolutely 
confident 
Thank you for your answers. To better understand how you completed the task, we 
would be grateful if you could answer the following questions: 
1. To what extent did you feel involved with the task? 
 Please answer by putting a mark on the line below. 
Not	at	all	
involved o---------o---------o---------o---------o---------o---------o---------o---------o---------o 
Extremely 
involved 
2. What is your age? |___|___|  
 
3. Are you are male or female? Male |___| Female |___|  
 
4. What is your main area of study? (e.g., psychology, engineering, journalism, business, etc.) 
 
.......................................................................................................................................  
 
5. What is your level of study? (e.g., First year, Second year, Final year, Master, PhD, etc.) 
 
.......................................................................................................................................  
Thank you for taking part in this study! 
For	office	use	only:		
	
Time	Finished:	__:	__	
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Appendix C2 
The	reduced	online	English	version	of	the	Horne	and	Ostbery	(1976)	Morningness-eveningness	
questionnaire	(rH&O,	Chelminski	et	al.,	2000)	
MEQ	Questionnaire	
Q1)	Considering	only	your	own	“feeling	best”	rhythm,	at	what	time	would	you	get	up	if	you	were	
entirely	free	to	plan	your	day?				
Q2)	During	the	first	half-hour	of	having	woken	in	the	morning,	how	tired	do	you	feel?	
m Very	tired		
m Fairly	tired		
m Fairly	refreshed		
m Very	refreshed		
	
Q3)	At	what	time	in	the	evening	do	you	feel	tired	and	as	a	result	in	need	of	sleep?				
	
Q4)		At	what	time	of	the	day	do	you	think	that	you	reach	your	“feeling	best”	peak?				
	
Q5)		One	hears	of	“morning”	and	“evening”	types	of	people.	Which	one	of	these	types	do	you	
consider	yourself	to	be?	
m Definitely	a	“morning”	type		
m Rather	more	a	“morning”	than	an	“evening”	type		
m Rather	more	an	“evening”	than	a	“morning”	type		
m Definitely	an	“evening	type”		
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Appendix C3 
Participant	Information	Sheet	
Study	name:	An	investigation	of	framing	effects.		
Dear	potential	participant,	
This	 is	an	 invitation	to	participate	 in	a	Doctoral	Research	Project	being	conducted	by	Madiha	Khan	
under	the	supervision	of	Dr	Gaëlle	Villejoubert.	
The	project	aims	to	examine	how	framing	effect	occurs	and	how	individual	make	decisions	in	various	
circumstances.		
Participation	 in	 the	 study	 involves	 three	 stages.	 The	 first	 stage	 you	 will	 be	 asked	 to	 read	 and	
complete	the	questionnaire	containing	questions	about	the	time	of	day	when	you	feel	at	your	best.	
In	the	second	stage	of	the	experiment,	you	will	be	asked	to	make	a	choice	in	a	simple	task.	You	will	
then	be	asked	to	answer	a	few	questions	related	to	the	task.	
The	questionnaire	package	should	take	approximately	20	minutes	to	complete.	
Your	 participation	 is	 entirely	 voluntary.	 All	 of	 your	 answers	 will	 remain	 confidential	 and	
anonymous.	Once	data	are	collected,	 your	 results	will	 form	part	of	a	 larger	database,	 from	which	
only	 group	 data	will	 be	 reported.	 Only	 the	 researchers,	 Dr.	 Villejoubert	 and	 I	 will	 have	 access	 to	
these	data.	Signing	up	for	this	study	 indicates	that	you	understand	the	nature	of	the	research	and	
freely	consent	to	participating	in	the	study.	
This	study	has	been	approved	by	the	Research	Ethics	Committee	of	the	Department	of	Psychology,	
Kingston	University.	If	you	have	concerns	regarding	the	ethics	of	this	study,	please	contact	the	Chair	
of	the	Ethics	Committee,	Prof.	François	Nectoux,	F.Nectoux@kingston.ac.uk		
If	 you	 have	 any	 questions	 or	 comment	 on	 this	 study,	 during	 or	 after	 the	 completion	 of	 the	
questionnaire,	you	are	encouraged	to	discuss	these	at	any	time	by	contacting	me	or	my	supervisor.	
Detailed	summary	of	the	results	will	be	available	towards	the	end	of	the	year.	If	you	are	interested	in	
receiving	this	information,	please	contact	me	for	a	summary	to	be	posted	out.	
Thank	you	for	your	time	and	consideration	in	participating	in	the	present	study.	
Madiha	Khan:	KU48114@Kingston.ac.uk		
Dr	Gaëlle	Villejoubert:	g.villejoubert@kingston.ac.uk	
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Appendix C4 
CONSENT	FORM	
Participant	N.	|___|___|___|									
Please	fill	in	the	form	below:-	
o I	confirm	that	I	have	read	and	understood	the	information	sheet	of	invitation	for	this	study.	I	
have	been	informed	of	the	purpose	of	taking	part.		
o I	understand	what	my	involvement	will	entail	and	any	questions	have	been	answered	to	my	
satisfaction		
o I	understand	that	my	participation	is	entirely	voluntary,	and	that	I	can	withdraw	at	any	time	
without	prejudice.		
o I	understand	that	all	information	obtained	will	be	confidential		
o I	agree	that	research	data	gathered	for	the	study	may	be	published	provided	that	I	cannot	
be	identified	as	a	subject.		
o Contact	information	has	been	provided	should	I	wish	to	seek	further	information	from	the	
investigator	at	any	time	for	purposes	of	clarification.		
	
Signature:	________________________________________________	
Date											_________/_________/________	
	
Research	Supervisor:	
Dr	Gaëlle	Villejoubert:	g.villejoubert@kingston.ac.uk	
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Appendix C5 
Participant	N.	|___|___|___|									
Study	Debrief	Sheet	
The	 purpose	 of	 this	 study	 was	 to	 find	 out	 whether	 framing	 effects	 would	 be	 stronger	 during	
circadian	congruent	times	and	relatively	weaker	during	incongruent	times.		
All	 data	 provided	 by	 all	 participants	 will	 remain	 confidential.	 However	 you	 have	 the	 right	 to	
withdraw	 your	 data	 at	 any	 time	 of	 the	 investigation.	 To	 do	 this	 please	 contact	 the	 email	 address	
provided	 and	 state	 your	 participation	 number	 which	 is	 at	 the	 top	 of	 this	 page.	 If	 there	 are	 any	
further	questions	regarding	the	study,	please	also	contact	us	via	the	email	addresses	provided.	
Thank	you	again	for	your	participation.	
Researchers:	
Madiha	Khan:	KU48114@Kingston.ac.uk	
Supervisor:	
Gaëlle	Villejoubert	
g.villejoubert@kingston	.ac.uk		
	
	
	
	
	
 
